Sullivan v. Cheatham, 8 Div. 791

• Decision Date: 28 November 1955
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 791
• Parties: L. B. SULLIVAN, as Director, Department of Public Safety, v. Frank CHEATHAM.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 374

84 So.2d 374

264 Ala. 71

L. B. SULLIVAN, as Director, Department of Public Safety, v. Frank CHEATHAM.

8 Div. 791.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Nov. 28, 1955.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1956.

John Patterson, Atty. Gen., and Robt. P. Bradley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Britnell & McEntire, Decatur, for appellee.

MAYFIELD, Justice.

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan County, brought under the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act, Act No. 704, appvd. Sept. 5, 1951, Gen. Acts of Alabama 1951, pp. 1224-1244, Code 1940, Tit. 36 § 74(42) et seq.

The threshold question for our consideration is whether or not the controversy between these parties, which resulted in this appeal, is now moot. Without specifically so deciding, it would appear from the whole record in this cause, that it is now beyond the power of the Director of Public Safety to take further action against the appellee, Frank Cheatham, under the provisions of Act No. 704, supra.

While there is doubt that there remains a justiciable controversy between the parties; the question presented is one of broad public interest, and one which deserves a decision by this Court. We are cited to no case, nor does our research reveal the existence of a case, construing the particular section of the Act in question. In the cases of Willis v. Buchman, 240 Ala. 386, 199 So. 892, 132 A.L.R. 1179, and Jones v. Crawford, 258 Ala. 278, 62 So.2d 221, we find authority for the proposition that where a broad public interest is involved it is within the power of this Court to write to the issue even though such decision may not be determinative of any existing rights between the appealing parties.

In the case at bar, the appellee was the driver-owner of an automobile involved in a collision with one Stinson on 2 January 1954. Both parties filed accident reports with the appellant Director of Public Safety, within ten days after the accident. Stinson filed in affidavit claiming damage to his automobile in the amount of $568.50. On 11 February 1954, the Director of Public Safety commanded the appellee Cheatham to post with his Department the prescribed form showing that he had the requisite liability insurance policy, or in the alternative to post bond in the amount of $568.50. The appellee was advised that unless he complied with this directive he was to turn over to the Department his driver's license, his registration certificates and license plates on or before 7 March 1954; such plates and licenses were subject to suspension under the terms of the Alabama Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act.

The appellee failed to post bond or give evidence of liability insurance and challenged the order of suspension. On 11 February 1954, the appellee took an appeal from the Director's order to the Circuit Court of Morgan County. The Circuit Court, without a jury, set aside the order of the Director. Appellant's motion for a new trial was overruled and the instant appeal was perfected.

The position of the appellee, both in the Court below and here, is that he was guilty of no fault or negligence in connection with the accident and, therefore, did not have to comply with the terms of the Act requiring the posting of security. The evidence of the appellee in the Trial Court tended to support his freedom from culpability in connection with the accident. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the appellee's contention. The most pertinent portion of such ruling is as follows:

'* * * The Court is of the opinion that by the action of the Director he affirms the liability of the appellant for damages resulting from the accident under consideration, and the appellant [appellee here] denies this liability. This is the issue. If the Court determines that there is no liability on the part of the appellant in such cases there is no necessity for the security required by the statute. The State contends that the question of liability, or non-liability of the appellant is not an issue in such cases; that all persons involved in an accident in which another person is injured or damaged must place the security as required by the statute, notwithstanding the fact that the person may be innocent and blameless with reference to the accident. The Court is of the opinion that this was not the intention of the legislature in the enactment of the statute under consideration. * * *.'

The Court further held that it was its opinion from the evidence that the appellee was not liable to anyone for damages from this accident, and that accordingly the order of the Director should be set aside.

The question for our decision is whether or not the possible or probable existence of civil liability for an automobile accident, is a consideration in determining whether or not a particular owner or driver of an automobile is required to comply with the applicable provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act. The language of the Act is as follows:

'Section 4--(Report Required Following Accident) The operator of every motor vehicle which is in any manner involved in an accident within this State, in which any person is killed or injured or in which damage to the property of any one person, including himself, in excess of $50.00 is sustained, shall within 10 days after such accident report the matter in writing to the Director. Such report, the form of which shall be prescribed by the Director, shall contain only such information as may be necessary to enable the Director to determine whether the requirements for the deposit of security under Section 5 are inapplicable by reason of the existence of insurance or other exceptions specified in this Act. The Director may rely upon the accuracy of the information unless and until he has reason to believe that the information is erroneous. If such operator be physically incapable of making such report, the owner of the motor vehicle involved in such accident shall, within 10 days after learning of the accident, make such report. The operator of the owner shall furnish such additional relevant information as the Director shall require.

'Section 5--(a) Security Required Unless Evidence of Insurance--When Security Determined--If 20 days after the receipt of a report of a motor vehicle accident within this State which has resulted in bodily injury or death, or damage to the property of any one person in excess of $50, the Director does not have on file evidence satisfactory to him that the person who would otherwise be required to file security under Subsection (b) of this Section has been released from liability, or has been finally adjudicated not to be liable, or has executed a duly acknowledged written agreement providing for the payment of an agreed amount in installments with respect to all claims for injuries or damages resulting from the accident, the Director shall determine the amount of security which shall be sufficient in his judgment to satisfy any judgment or judgments for damages resulting from such accident as may be recovered against each operator or owner.

'(b) Suspension--The Director shall, within 60 days after the receipt of such...