Sullivan v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 05 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:15-cv-00376-EPG |
| Parties | SUSAN R. SULLIVAN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Plaintiff, Susan R. Sullivan ("Plaintiff" or "Sullivan"), seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("SSA Act"). The matter is currently before the Court on the parties' briefs, which were submitted without oral argument to the Honorable Erica P. Grosjean, United States Magistrate Judge.1 Upon a review of the administrative record, the Court finds the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and the case is remanded to the agency for further proceedings.
A prior application for disability benefits filed by Sullivan was denied on August 18,2008. AR 19, 155.2 Sullivan refiled the application for SSI under review in this case on May 25, 2010. AR 362. The 2010 application alleged a disability onset date of September 1, 1997. AR 19, 362. Sullivan requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (AR 44), and the ALJ heard the case on May 28, 2014 (AR 53). Sullivan was found not disabled by decision dated August 18, 2014. AR 46. The Appeals Council denied Sullivan's appeal, rendering the order the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 1-3. Sullivan filed the complaint for judicial review in this Court on March 8, 2015, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) to review the final decision of the Commissioner.
Sullivan challenges the Commissioner's decision concerning the 2010 application, arguing that: (1) the ALJ impermissibly reopened her prior application; (2) the ALJ improperly assessed her mental impairment at step two of the analysis; (3) the ALJ's mental residual functional capacity ("RFC") evaluation is unsupported; and (4) the ALJ did not properly consider her chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"). (ECF No. 17, p. 9.) Sullivan argues that the Court should reverse and remand with instructions to determine Sullivan's onset date of disability and award benefits accordingly. (Id., p. 22; ECF No. 23, p. 4). The Commissioner opposes each of these arguments. (ECF No. 20).
Sullivan was 48 years old on the date of her 2010 application, and 53 years old when the ALJ issued the decision denying benefits. AR 83. She left school in the 9th grade and obtained a work permit at age 16. AR 502. Her previous employment included landscaping, a nurse's aide, and work for a cannery. Id. Sullivan's medical history includes cerebral vascular accident, cognitive disorder, major depressive disorder, Eustachian tube dysfunction, headaches, poor eyesight, arthritis, COPD, borderline intellectual functioning, and other physical aches and pains in her back, hips, knees and hands. AR 459, 495, 500-02, 505, 511, 516, 608. She testified that her impairments of depression, physical pain, memory issues, problems focusing, confusion, stress intolerance, anhedonia, panic attacks, incontinence, comprehension, and difficultybreathing prevent her from working. AR 58-59, 64-68, 73, 77, 80.
III. THE DISABILITY DETERMINATION PROCESS
To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, a plaintiff must establish that he or she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a disability only if:
. . . his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To achieve uniformity in the decision-making process, the Commissioner has established a sequential five-step process for evaluating a claimant's alleged disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)-(f). The ALJ proceeds through the steps and stops upon reaching a dispositive finding that the claimant is or is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)(4). The ALJ must consider objective medical evidence and opinion testimony. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
Specifically, the ALJ is required to determine: (1) whether a claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period of alleged disability, (2) whether the claimant had medically-determinable "severe" impairments,3 (3) whether these impairments meet or are medically equivalent to one of the listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) whether the claimant retained the RFC to perform his or her past relevant work,4 and (5) whether the claimant had the ability to perform other jobs existing in significant numbers at the regional and national level. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f).
Using the Social Security Administration's five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determined that Sullivan did not meet the disability standard. AR 46. In particular, the ALJ found that Sullivan had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 25, 2010, the application date. AR 23. Further, the ALJ identified depression, anxiety disorder, obesity, and chronic pulmonary disease as severe impairments. Id. The ALJ also determined that Sullivan does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 26. Based on a review of the entire record, the ALJ determined that Sullivan had the RFC to perform light work (20 CFR § 416.967(b)) except that:
[Sullivan] can never climb ladders[,] ropes or scaffolds. She can frequently stoop and crouch. She can frequently handle objects (gross manipulation) with the right hand. She must avoid all exposure to excessive vibration, and concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dust and gases. She should avoid concentrated exposure to poorly ventilated areas. Work is limited to simple, as defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles as SVP levels 1 and 2, as routine and repetitive. She needs to work in a low stress job, as defined as having only occasional decision making only occasional changes in a work setting. She can have occasional interaction with the general public and only occasional interaction with coworkers.
AR 28. The ALJ determined Sullivan had no past relevant work. AR 44. The ALJ found that Sullivan was 48 years old on the date of application, which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced age (20 C.F.R. § 416.963). A.R. 45. Furthermore, the ALJ found that Sullivan had limited education and was able to communicate in English. Id. Based on the RFC, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Sullivan can perform, such assembler of small products, bottle packer, and bottle line attendant. Id.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, this Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner'sdecision to determine whether: (1) it is supported by substantial evidence; and (2) it applies the correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007).
"Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). It is "relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. "Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld." Id.
Sullivan argues that ALJ reopened the prior proceeding on her 2006-08 application for benefits by reweighing the medical opinions that were also considered in the prior proceeding. (ECF No. 17, pp. 15-16.) Due to the alleged reopening, Sullivan maintains that the prior denial of benefits does not have a preclusive, res judicata effect on the instant proceedings, and this Court may find that Sullivan was disabled going back to 2006, the year of the prior application. (ECF No. 23, p. 3).
With respect to reopening a prior application, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has provided as follows:
A decision of the Secretary declining to reopen a claim is not judicially reviewable. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). This court has held, however, that we will examine the record to determine whether or not a reopening has occurred. A reopening, and thus a waiver of any claim of administrative res judicata, will be found "where the administrative process does not address an earlier decision, but instead reviews the entire record in the new proceeding and reaches a decision on the merits ..." Kane v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 1130, 1132 (3d Cir.1985). See also Purter v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1985). It is not our role to determine whether the Secretary had good cause for reopening, for in that respect his decision is not judicially...
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