Sullivan v. Coventry Mun. Employees' Ret. Plan, C.A. No. KC-2012-1126
| Decision Date | 28 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. KC-2012-1126 |
| Parties | RICHARD P. SULLIVAN v. COVENTRY MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT PLAN, TED PRZYBYLA, as FINANCE DIRECTOR/TREASURER OF THE TOWN OF COVENTRY and GARY P. COTE, KERRY L. MCGEE, THADDEUS JENDZEJEC, KAREN M. CARLSON and GREGORY LABOISSONNIERE, in their capacities as MEMBERS OF THE TOWN COUNCIL OF THE TOWN OF COVENTRY AND AS ADMINISTRATORS OF THE TOWN PLAN |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
This case involves a dispute between Richard P. Sullivan (Plaintiff) and the Town of Coventry (the Town), through its Finance Director, the Coventry Town Council, and the Coventry Municipal Employees' Retirement Plan (collectively, Defendants) as to the denial of Plaintiff's request for a pension. Plaintiff filed the instant suit alleging a breach of contract and requesting a declaratory judgment setting forth his rights under the Town's pension plan. The matter before the Court is the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, in which they argue (1) that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide the matter and, in the alternative, (2) that the review of the decision of the Town Council sitting as Plan Administrator is subject to arbitrary and capricious review only and should be affirmed.
Plaintiff was employed by the Town in a variety of positions from February 1986 to December 2008. He served as a probate judge, an assistant solicitor, the Town Moderator, and Town Manager in that time. Based on his service in these various positions, he requested a pension from the Town.
After some apparent delay in the consideration of his request for a pension,1 Plaintiff filed the instant suit against the Town and other Defendants. A series of preliminary motions before the Court resulted in the Town Council, sitting as the Plan Administrator of the pension plan, being ordered to hold a hearing on Plaintiff's pension claim. At that hearing, conducted on January 15, 2015, Plaintiff was represented by counsel and presented testimony and evidence. Plaintiff then submitted a post-hearing memorandum, after which the Town Council convened on January 31, 2015 and voted to deny Plaintiff's request for a pension. The Town Council then issued a written decision explaining its reasoning.
Following this decision, Plaintiff petitioned the Supreme Court for review via writ of certiorari. In an order dated June 12, 2015, the Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's petition, "without prejudice, however, to the petitioner's right to prosecute his Superior Court action[.]" Sullivan v. Coventry Mun. Emps.' Ret. Plan, et al., No. 15-58-M.P. (June 12, 2015). The case is now before the Superior Court for resolution of the issues presented.
The instant case raises a vexing question as to the subject matter jurisdiction of the Superior Court in declaratory judgment actions seeking review of the decisions of town councils sitting as quasi-judicial entities. On the one hand, Defendants insist that the Court is without jurisdiction to decide the controversy before it, as the Supreme Court has held that review of quasi-judicial actions by a town council is available only through certiorari to the Supreme Court. Plaintiff asserts, on the contrary, that jurisdiction is provided through both the Superior Court's general jurisdiction under G.L. 1956 § 8-2-14 and its jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgments under G.L. 1956 §§ 9-30-1 and 9-30-2. Before the Court reaches this dispute, however, it must address the effect of the Supreme Court's denial of Plaintiff's petition for review by writ of certiorari.
Plaintiff contends that the denial of his petition for certiorari operates as a decision on the question of jurisdiction, insofar as he retains the right, as noted by the Supreme Court, to "prosecute his Superior Court action against the [Defendants] . . . to a conclusion." Sullivan, No. 15-58-M.P. Under the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, "[a] denial of a petition, without more, is not an adjudication on the merits and has no precedential effect, and such action is to be taken as being without prejudice to a further application to this Court or any court for the relief sought." Sup. Ct. R. App. P. 13(e) (Rule 13(e)).
The order entered by the Supreme Court is only a denial of the petition, and the comment contained therein to the effect that Plaintiff retains the right to prosecute this action to aconclusion is merely a reiteration of the terms of Rule 13(e). The denial of his petition for review cannot operate to decide the issue of jurisdiction; the denial "has no precedential effect" and simply is not any kind of "adjudication on the merits" of the claims in his action. Id. The Plaintiff will not be prevented from seeking review after the conclusion of this action because the denial is without prejudice to further application to the Supreme Court. See Rule 13(e). The Supreme Court's order denying Plaintiff's petition for certiorari therefore does not decide the issue of this Court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Subject matter jurisdiction is "an indispensable requisite in any judicial proceeding." Zarrella v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 824 A.2d 1249, 1256 (R.I. 2003). It is "the very essence of the court's power to hear and decide a case" and is defined as "jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought[.]" Long v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1074, 1079 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 931 (9th ed. 2009)). It is well established that "a claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time." Id. at 1078 (quoting Pollard v. Acer Grp., 870 A.2d 429, 433 (R.I. 2005)).
It is clear, at least, that there is no appellate jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See G.L. 1956 § 42-35-1 (); see also § 42-35-15 (). The parties do not argue that there is any right to a direct appeal to the Superior Court from a decision of a town council acting as the plan administrator of a pension system. The question, then, is whether an appeal from a town council's quasi-judicialactions must be taken to the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari or may be entertained under the declaratory judgment jurisdiction of the Superior Court. See §§ 9-30-1, 9-30-2.
In Scolardi v. City of Providence, a plaintiff challenged the implementation of a decision of the City of Providence's Retirement Board via a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court. 751 A.2d 754, 755 (R.I. 2000). That case involved the city failing to pay pension benefits after its retirement board approved a pension. The Supreme Court noted that the declaratory judgment jurisdiction of the Superior Court did not extend to review of the retirement board's decision; the only avenue for relief available in the Superior Court was via a writ of mandamus to compel execution of the retirement board's decision. Id. at 755-56. The Supreme Court specifically held that:
Id. at 756.
It would appear then, that because decisions of a town council have no statutorily prescribed right to review in the Superior Court, jurisdiction does not lie in this Court.
The Supreme Court has decided differently in a related context, however. In Canario v. Culhane, 752 A.2d 476 (R.I. 2000), the Supreme Court held that § 9-30-2 afforded "a broad grant of jurisdiction to the Superior Court to determine the rights of any person that may arise under a statute not in its appellate capacity but as part of its original jurisdiction." Id. at 479. Section 9-30-2 provides, in relevant part:
"[a]ny person interested under a . . . written contract, or other writings constituting a contract . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . contract . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder." Sec. 9-30-2.
Under the logic of Canario, § 9-30-2 is so expansive as to confer original jurisdiction upon the Superior Court to review an agency determination on pension eligibility. However, the Court does not find the logic of Canario applicable to the instant case. In Canario, which involved a state trooper's request for a disability pension, the Superior Court had a vital role to play in developing a record and finding facts, a role that it need not play here. See 752 A.2d at 479-80. The state police superintendent did not conduct a full hearing, nor did proceedings appear to take place on the record. Instead, "[t]he superintendent investigated the events" surrounding the injury leading to the plaintiff's request for a disability pension and then made a determination. See id. at 478. None of the hallmarks of an adjudicative proceeding appear in the record of that case, nor does the state police superintendent appear to have acted in a formal quasi-judicial fashion.
Contrast this to the instant case and Scolardi, in which municipal councils conducted quasi-judicial hearings which afforded the parties seeking pensions the opportunity to be represented by counsel, to present evidence and testimony, and resulted in the development of a full record and formal written decision explaining the reasoning behind the outcome. See 751 A.2d at 754-55. A declaratory judgment action in the instant case affords no meaningful opportunity for the Superior Court to find facts, as that role has been fulfilled by the Town Council sitting as Plan Administrator. See Goncalves v. NMU Pension Trust, 818...
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