Sullivan v. Crowell
| Decision Date | 03 February 1978 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 77-1067E,77-1082E and 77-2691. |
| Citation | 444 F. Supp. 606 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
| Parties | John H. SULLIVAN, and Roy R. Anderson, Individually, and on behalf of themselves and all other resident citizens and qualified electors of Henderson County, Tennessee, similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Gentry CROWELL, Secretary of State of the State of Tennessee, Ray Blanton, Governor of the State of Tennessee, Brooks McLemore, Attorney General of the State of Tennessee, David Collins, Coordinator of Elections of the State of Tennessee, and James E. Harpster, Jack C. Seaton, Tommy Powell, Richard Holcomb and Lytle Landers, Commissioners of the State Board of Elections, Defendants. Alice ALGOOD, James A. Choate, Kenneth L. Fisher, Thomas Woodall, and Jason O. Young, Jr., Individually, on behalf of themselves and all other resident citizens and qualified electors of Benton, Carroll, Dickson, Dyer, Gibson, Henry, Hickman, Houston, Humphreys, Lake, Lewis, Maury, Montgomery, Obion, Stewart and Weakley Counties in Tennessee, similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Gentry CROWELL, Secretary of State of the State of Tennessee, Ray Blanton, Governor of the State of Tennessee, Brooks McLemore, Attorney General of the State of Tennessee, David Collins, Coordinator of Elections of the State of Tennessee, and James E. Harpster, Jack C. Seaton, Tommy Powell, Richard Holcomb, and Lytle Landers, Commissioners of the State Board of Elections, Defendants. Jack E. NELSON, Jr., and Richard Mader, Individually, on behalf of themselves and all other resident citizens and qualified electors of Knox County, Tennessee, similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Gentry CROWELL, Secretary of State of the State of Tennessee, Ray Blanton, Governor of the State of Tennessee, Brooks McLemore, Attorney General of the State of Tennessee, David Collins, Coordinator of Elections of the State of Tennessee, James E. Harpster, Jack C. Seaton, Tommy Powell, Richard Holcomb, and Lytle Landers, Commissioners of the State Board of Elections, and William Banks, C. Gordon Baer, Michael Y. Rowland, Edna Smyre, and Richard W. Krieg, Commissioners of the Knox County Election Commission, Defendants. |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Robert Walker, Heiskell, Donelson, Adams, Williams & Kirsch, John L. Ryder, Laughlin, Halle, Regan, Clark & Gibson, Memphis, Tenn., for plaintiffs.
Kenneth R. Herrell, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Tennessee, Nashville, Tenn., for all defendants except Knox County Election Commissioners.
Charles A. Maner, Jr., Knox County Law Director, Dale C. Workman, Knoxville, Tenn., for Knox County Election Commission.
Before: PHILLIPS, Chief Circuit Judge, BROWN, Chief District Judge, and WELLFORD, District Judge.
These actions were brought to challenge the constitutionality of several statutes adopted by the legislature of the State of Tennessee in 1976 and 1977, which effected a reapportionment of voters in several legislative districts throughout the state. The plaintiffs in the Algood case contend additionally that the use of a two-member legislative district violates the federal and state constitutions. The plaintiffs in the Nelson case, in addition to challenging the constitutionality of the reapportionment statute there involved, urge that the practice of the Knox County Election Commission in permitting some voters to remain registered in voting precincts in which they do not live violates the federal constitution and state legislation.
This three-judge court was impaneled to consider the constitutionality of the reapportionment statutes and the statutory two-member legislative district under the federal constitution. Because the three cases involve common questions of law and fact, they were consolidated. All three cases were submitted for decision on the basis of stipulations of fact, depositions, and answers to interrogatories on file, as well as briefs and oral argument on the legal issues involved.
Plaintiffs in all three cases seek declaratory and injunctive relief, and an award of attorneys fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976. Plaintiffs urge the importance of class certification to avoid problems of mootness. Defendants do not strongly oppose certification. The court feels that certification is proper under F.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(2), providing the class is properly confined to those persons whose voting power is diluted by the present scheme of apportionment, and it is understood that class certification would in no event affect the amount of attorneys fees to be awarded. See White v. Crowell, 434 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D.Tenn.1977).
Accordingly, the court certifies the following classes:
Apportionment among House Districts 65, 70, 72 and 80 was altered by the enactment on May 20, 1977 of Chapter 304 of the Public Acts of 1977, by the Tennessee General Assembly.
The effects of Chapter 304 on voter distribution within those four districts are demonstrated in the following table, which reflects changes in real population and in percentage variance from the "ideal" district of 39,638 voters.1
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1390, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964).
It is obvious that in adopting Chapter 304, the Tennessee General Assembly significantly increased population disparities among the four voting districts concerned. The maximum percentage variance2 increased from 2.34 percent to 21.78 percent. The State has not attempted to equalize the populations of those districts as nearly as practicable; to the contrary, the State has moved away from equality. This substantial dilution of voting rights is constitutionally impermissible, in the absence of any legitimate justification. Reynolds v. Sims, supra; White v. Crowell, supra.
The court is aware that the creation of fairly large population differentials may be constitutionally permissible where they result from the even-handed implementation of a rational state policy. For example, the Supreme Court has held reasonable variations constitutional where they have resulted from an attempt to maintain existing political subdivision lines. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1972).
Brief of the Attorney General at 5. However, the record does not show that these reapportionment measures have significantly reduced the division of magisterial districts in the affected counties. Nor does the record show an attempt by the State to effect a statewide policy of "putting the counties back together." On this record, the court does not find any relationship between county unification and the reapportionment legislation before the court.
Accordingly, it is the conclusion of the court that Chapter 304 of the Public Acts of 1977 unconstitutionally infringes rights guaranteed to plaintiffs by the Fourteenth Amendment, since the effect of that legislation has been to substantially reduce population equality in legislative districts while serving no discernible rational state policy.
Apportionment among House Districts 64, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75, 76, 77 and 78 was altered by the enactment on March 28, 1976 of Chapters 625 and 632 of the Public Acts of 1976, by the Tennessee General Assembly.
The following table demonstrates the effect of Chapters 625 and 632 on real population and percentage variances from ideal district size in those districts.
Chapters 625 and 632 (Algood)
Before Enactment After Enactment
Population % Variance Population % Variance
District 64 39,106 - 1.34 39,501 - 10.43
District 67 39,826 + 0.47 39,544 - 0.23
District 68 40,058 + 1.05 36,844 - 7.04
District 69 39,481 - 0.39...To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Covington v. North Carolina
...to comply with Voting Rights Act, notwithstanding that such districts were not subject to original challenge); Sullivan v. Crowell , 444 F.Supp. 606, 611–12 (W.D. Tenn. 1978) (finding that legislative remedial plan enacted to cure one-person, one-vote violations violated state constitution)......
- McHugh v. TEAMSTERS PENSION TRUST FUND OF PHILA.
-
Thomas v. Bryant
...of a statewide legislative body on substantial federal constitutional grounds." (emphasis added)); Sullivan v. Crowell , 444 F. Supp. 606, 615 n.6 (W.D. Tenn. 1978) (three-judge court) ("Congress did not intend to require a three-judge court in the state legislative apportionment context ex......
-
Mader v. Crowell
...subject matter jurisdiction on the court," this State law question falls within the court's pendent jurisdiction. Sullivan v. Crowell, 444 F.Supp. 606 (W.D.Tenn.1978). See generally United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Seals v. Quarterly County C......