Sullivan v. Davidson Trucking, Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:17-CV-805-RDP |
| Parties | DONALD RYAN SULLIVAN, Plaintiff, v. DAVIDSON TRUCKING, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This matter is before the court on Defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment.1 (Doc. # 92). Consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in McBride v. Sharpe, 981 F.2d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 1993), the court has provided the pro se Plaintiff, Donald Ryan Sullivan, "express, [eighteen]-day notice of the summary judgment rules, of his right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition to the motion, and of the consequences of default."2 (Doc. # 97). The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. (Docs. # 94, 95, 96). For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's Motion (Doc. # 92) is due to be granted, and this case is due to be dismissed without prejudice.
This case stems from a collision between an Amtrak train and a dump truck. Plaintiff Donald Ryan Sullivan is a resident of Tickfaw, Louisiana, and at all relevant times, an employee of Defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"). (Doc. # 74 at ¶¶ 1, 5; Doc. # 95-1 at 13, 16). Plaintiff started working for Amtrak in 2009 and worked in several positions. (Doc. # 95-1 at 13, 16). At the time of the collision, Plaintiff was an on-board service attendant ("train attendant"). (Doc. # 74 at ¶ 5). In that job, Plaintiff was responsible for assigning seating in the passenger cars, helping passengers on and off the train, assisting with luggage loading and removal, and serving meals. (Doc. # 95-1 at 13).
On November 6, 2015, Plaintiff was on a train carrying passengers to and from the Louisiana State University ("LSU") v. Alabama football game. (Doc. # 95-1 at 44). As the train approached the railroad crossing in Bessemer, Alabama, a dump truck owned by Defendant Davidson Trucking, Inc. ("Davidson"), and operated by its employee, David Wayne Hatcher ("Hatcher"),4 approached the railroad crossing. (Doc. # 74 at ¶ 7). The railroad crossing was equipped with warning signs, signals, crossbucks, flashing lights, and crossing gates. (Doc. # 92-1 at ¶ 3). The Amtrak train was visible from the crossing and the horn was audibly blowing. (Id. at ¶ 6). Despite the fact that the Amtrak train was within hazardous proximity, Hatcher drove past the flashing lights, around the lowered crossing gate, and onto the railroad tracks. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5). The Amtrak train and dump truck collided. (Id. at ¶¶ 7).
At the time of the collision, Plaintiff was in the lounge car with another service attendant,Alfred Hall, and the conductor, Elliott Badger. (Doc. # 95-1 at 45). Plaintiff was sitting down in a booth as the train approached the railroad crossing. (Id. at 47). Plaintiff was just starting to stand up to leave the booth when the train collided with the dump truck. (Id.). Immediately after the collision, Plaintiff sat back down. (Id.). Plaintiff testified that he did not know what happened until the engineer radioed the conductor and said that the train collided with a truck. (Id. at 49). As a result of the collision, Plaintiff claims that he has suffered severe, permanent, and disabling injuries. (Doc. # 74 at ¶ 16).
Plaintiff filed this case on October 26, 2016, in the Eastern District of Louisiana. (Doc. # 1). The case was transferred to the Northern District of Alabama on May 16, 2017. (Docs. # 30, 31). Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint on May 21, 2018.5 (Doc. # 74). In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following: (1) violation of the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., against Amtrak; and (2) negligence against Davidson.6 (Id. at 4-8). The federal "hook" in this case is Plaintiff's FELA claim against Amtrak, the court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over the remaining state law cause of action against Davidson. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367; 42 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.
Specifically, in the Operative Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Amtrak violated FELA in the following ways:
(Doc. # 74 at 4-5). Amtrak filed its Answer to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and asserted a cross claim against Davidson. (Doc. # 75). In the cross claim, Amtrak alleges that Davidson is solely liable for the collision, as well as Plaintiff's injuries. (Id. at 17-24). Aside from stating that Defendant Davidson is wholly liable for the accident, Amtrak does not allege any independent cause of action against Defendant Davidson. Instead, it appears that Amtrak's cross claim is a "claim" in name only. Thus, the court construes this "claim" as an affirmative defense for indemnity.
On February 28, 2020, Amtrak filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 92). Amtrak argues that Davidson is solely liable for Plaintiff's injuries under Alabama law. (Doc. # 92). To support its assertions, Amtrak attached Davidson's responses to its Requests for Admission. (Doc. # 92-1) In its responses, Davidson concedes that Hatcher's failure to stop, look, and listen at the railroad crossing was a violation of Alabama Code § 32-5A-150, and the sole cause of the collision. (Doc. # 92-1 at ¶¶ 9, 10). Amtrak argues that Davidson's admissions absolve it of any liability to Plaintiff for any injuries sustained as a result of the November 6, 2015 collision. In responsive briefing, Plaintiff argues that Amtrak should share part of the responsibility, not for the accident itself, but for his resulting injuries. (Doc. # 94 at 1). Davidson did not file any responsive briefing. The court addresses each argument, in turn
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and -- by pointing to affidavits, or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on file -- designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249.
When faced with a "properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the nonmoving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere allegations." Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson teaches, under Rule 56(c) a plaintiff may not simply rest on her allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of proof at trial, she must come forward withat least some evidence to support each element essential to her case at trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. "[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment 'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
Summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. "Summary judgment may be granted if the non-moving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative." Sawyer v. Sw. Airlines Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51).
"[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Essentially, the inquiry is 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Sawyer, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (quoting Anderson, ...
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