Sullivan v. Green Mfg. Co., No. 1

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona
• Writing for the Court: SCHROEDER; WREN, P. J., and EUBANK
• Citation: 575 P.2d 811,118 Ariz. 181
• Parties: Charles SULLIVAN and Norma Sullivan, his wife, as surviving parents of Roger Dale Sullivan, Deceased, Appellants, v. GREEN MANUFACTURING CO., an Arizona Corporation, R. D. Scott and Jane Doe Scott, his wife, L. D. Scott and Jane Doe Scott, his wife, Scott and Scott dba Scott and Scott Trailers, Appellees. 3277.
• Decision Date: 27 December 1977
• Docket Number: CA-CIV,No. 1

Page 811

575 P.2d 811 118 Ariz. 181 Charles SULLIVAN and Norma Sullivan, his wife, as surviving parents of Roger Dale Sullivan, Deceased, Appellants,
v.
GREEN MANUFACTURING CO., an Arizona Corporation, R. D. Scott and Jane Doe Scott, his wife, L. D. Scott and Jane Doe Scott, his wife, Scott and Scott dba Scott and Scott Trailers, Appellees. No. 1 CA-CIV 3277. Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B. Dec. 27, 1977.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 1, 1978.
Review Denied Feb. 22, 1978.

[118 Ariz. 183]

Page 813

Robbins, Green, O'Grady & Abbuhl, P.A., by Timothy C. Gerking, Phoenix, for appellants.

Maud & Wildermuth by Oliver H. Maud, Jr., Casa Grande, for appellees Scott and Scott.

O'Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears by John H. Westover, Phoenix, for appellee Green Mfg.

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Judge.

This case arises out of a highway collision between an automobile and a truck pulling a loaded cotton trailer. The accident resulted in the death of appellants' son, Roger Sullivan, the driver of the automobile. Appellants Charles and Norma Sullivan brought this wrongful death action against a number of parties, including appellee Green Manufacturing Co. (Green), which manufactured the trailer, and appellees Scott and Scott Trailers (Scott), who sold it. This is an appeal from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Green and Scott.

Appellants' claim against these appellees is based upon the lack of brake equipment on the trailer. For purposes of this appeal from summary judgment, it is undisputed that the trailer was manufactured, sold, and operated without brakes in Arizona, and that this accident occurred when the driver of the truck was unable to stop in time to avoid the accident because of the lack of brakes on the trailer.

Appellants base their action against appellees on two theories. First, they urge that under an Arizona statute, the cotton trailer was required to be equipped with brakes, and that violation of that law constituted a prima facie showing of negligence shifting the burden to them to show the violation was without fault. O'Donnell v. Maves, 108 Ariz. 98, 492 P.2d 1205 (1972); Platt v. Gould, 26 Ariz.App. 315, 548 P.2d 28 (1976). Second, appellants argue that the brakeless trailer constituted an unreasonably dangerous product subjecting appellees to strict liability in tort. Since we conclude that summary judgment was inappropriate with respect to both theories, we reverse and remand to the trial court.

We turn first to appellants' contention that as a matter of Arizona statutory law, this trailer was required to be equipped with brakes. A.R.S. § 28-952(A) (3) and (4) provide that trailers weighing in excess of 3,000 lbs. be equipped with brakes. The subsections provide:

"3. Every trailer or semi-trailer of a gross weight of three thousand pounds or more when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the movement of and to stop and to hold the vehicle and so designed as to either be applied by the driver of the towing motor vehicle from its cab or be of a type which will operate automatically when the service brakes of the towing vehicle are applied, and the brakes shall be so designed and connected that in case of an accidental break-away of the towed vehicle the brakes shall be automatically applied.

4. Every new motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer sold in this state and operated upon the highways shall be equipped with service brakes upon all wheels of [118 Ariz. 184]

Page 814

every vehicle, except any motorcycle or motor-driven cycle, and except that any semi-trailer or trailer less than three thousand pounds gross weight need not be equipped with brakes and except that any semi-trailer or trailer less than six thousand pounds gross weight may have brakes only on all wheels of one axle and except that three axle truck tractors need only be equipped with brakes on all wheels of the two rear axles."

There is no question that this trailer ¹ at the time of the accident weighed more than 3,000 lbs., and that it was carrying cotton on a public highway from the farm to a cotton gin.

However, A.R.S. § 28-952 is part of a larger article containing a number of requirements for equipment on motor vehicles. A.R.S. § 28-921(C) exempts from the requirements of that article, among other types of vehicles, "implements of husbandry." Thus, the initial question to be decided is whether this trailer should be considered an implement of husbandry and, therefore, exempt from the brake requirements of A.R.S. § 28-952.

The definition of "implements of husbandry" was, at all times relevant to this case, contained in A.R.S. § 28-118, ² which reads as follows:

" 'Implements of husbandry' include, but are not limited to, vehicles designed primarily for agricultural purposes and used exclusively in the conduct of agricultural operations. Any implement or vehicle, whether self-propelled or otherwise, which is used exclusively for carrying products of farming from one part of a farm to another part thereof, or from one farm to another farm, and is used solely for agricultural purposes, including but not limited to the preparation of harvesting of cotton, alfalfa, grains and other farm crops, and which is only incidentally operated or moved on a highway whether as a trailer or self-propelled unit, shall constitute an implement of husbandry exempt from registration as a motor vehicle."

Appellants correctly point out that if the entire provision constitutes a definition of "implements of husbandry" then this cotton trailer did not fall within that definition, and was not exempt from the brake requirements. The second sentence of the provision expressly requires that the vehicle be used exclusively for carrying farm products "from one part of the farm to another part thereof, or from one farm to another farm," and further, that the vehicle be only "incidentally operated or moved on a highway . . . ." The record in this case establishes that cotton trailers are used for carrying cotton from a farm over public roads to a cotton gin, a commercial establishment not located on a farm. Since the trailer's principal purpose as a vehicle is to travel back and forth...