Sullivan v. Green Mfg. Co., 1
Citation | 575 P.2d 811,118 Ariz. 181 |
Decision Date | 27 December 1977 |
Docket Number | CA-CIV,No. 1,1 |
Parties | Charles SULLIVAN and Norma Sullivan, his wife, as surviving parents of Roger Dale Sullivan, Deceased, Appellants, v. GREEN MANUFACTURING CO., an Arizona Corporation, R. D. Scott and Jane Doe Scott, his wife, L. D. Scott and Jane Doe Scott, his wife, Scott and Scott dba Scott and Scott Trailers, Appellees. 3277. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Arizona |
This case arises out of a highway collision between an automobile and a truck pulling a loaded cotton trailer. The accident resulted in the death of appellants' son, Roger Sullivan, the driver of the automobile. Appellants Charles and Norma Sullivan brought this wrongful death action against a number of parties, including appellee Green Manufacturing Co. (Green), which manufactured the trailer, and appellees Scott and Scott Trailers (Scott), who sold it. This is an appeal from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Green and Scott.
Appellants' claim against these appellees is based upon the lack of brake equipment on the trailer. For purposes of this appeal from summary judgment, it is undisputed that the trailer was manufactured, sold, and operated without brakes in Arizona, and that this accident occurred when the driver of the truck was unable to stop in time to avoid the accident because of the lack of brakes on the trailer.
Appellants base their action against appellees on two theories. First, they urge that under an Arizona statute, the cotton trailer was required to be equipped with brakes, and that violation of that law constituted a prima facie showing of negligence shifting the burden to them to show the violation was without fault. O'Donnell v. Maves, 108 Ariz. 98, 492 P.2d 1205 (1972); Platt v. Gould, 26 Ariz.App. 315, 548 P.2d 28 (1976). Second, appellants argue that the brakeless trailer constituted an unreasonably dangerous product subjecting appellees to strict liability in tort. Since we conclude that summary judgment was inappropriate with respect to both theories, we reverse and remand to the trial court.
We turn first to appellants' contention that as a matter of Arizona statutory law, this trailer was required to be equipped with brakes. A.R.S. § 28-952(A) (3) and (4) provide that trailers weighing in excess of 3,000 lbs. be equipped with brakes. The subsections provide:
There is no question that this trailer 1 at the time of the accident weighed more than 3,000 lbs., and that it was carrying cotton on a public highway from the farm to a cotton gin.
However, A.R.S. § 28-952 is part of a larger article containing a number of requirements for equipment on motor vehicles. A.R.S. § 28-921(C) exempts from the requirements of that article, among other types of vehicles, "implements of husbandry." Thus, the initial question to be decided is whether this trailer should be considered an implement of husbandry and, therefore, exempt from the brake requirements of A.R.S. § 28-952.
The definition of "implements of husbandry" was, at all times relevant to this case, contained in A.R.S. § 28-118, 2 which reads as follows:
Appellants correctly point out that if the entire provision constitutes a definition of "implements of husbandry" then this cotton trailer did not fall within that definition, and was not exempt from the brake requirements. The second sentence of the provision expressly requires that the vehicle be used exclusively for carrying farm products "from one part of the farm to another part thereof, or from one farm to another farm," and further, that the vehicle be only "incidentally operated or moved on a highway . . . ." The record in this case establishes that cotton trailers are used for carrying cotton from a farm over public roads to a cotton gin, a commercial establishment not located on a farm. Since the trailer's principal purpose as a vehicle is to travel back and forth from farm to cotton gin on public highways, it cannot be said that the vehicle is "only incidentally operated or moved on a highway." Accordingly, if the second sentence of that provision contains definitional requirements, then the cotton trailer is not an implement of husbandry.
Appellees, nevertheless, in an effort to reach the broadest possible definition of "implement of husbandry" focus on the first sentence of that provision and argue that only the first sentence constitutes the definition of implement of husbandry. Under their theory, the only requirement is that the vehicle be "designed primarily for agricultural purposes and used exclusively in the conduct of agricultural operations." That requirement, at least arguably, is satisfied by this cotton trailer. Appellees urge that the second sentence relates only to an exemption from motor vehicle registration. Our reading of the section in the light of its legislative history compels us to conclude that appellees' interpretation is incorrect. We agree with appellants that the second sentence of the section was intended to define "implements of husbandry" rather than merely establish a limited class of agricultural vehicles exempt from motor vehicle registration requirements.
The provision in question was placed in the definitional portion of the statute, separate and apart from the substantive provisions relating to exemptions from motor vehicle licensing. These are contained in A.R.S. § 28-302. 3 In construing A.R.S. § 28-302, an opinion by the Attorney General has advised that both sentences of A.R.S. § 28-118 encompass definitional requirements for implements of husbandry. Op.Atty.Gen. 67-27 (1967).
Moreover, in a larger sense, we are concerned with the scope of an exemption from specific equipment requirements imposed for the protection of the public. Such exemptions should be construed narrowly. See Wisconsin Fertilizer Ass'n v. Karns, 52 Wis.2d 309, 190 N.W.2d 513 (1971).
The second sentence of A.R.S. § 28-118 was added to the first in 1960. In resolving any question of ambiguity with respect to the scope and purpose of that sentence, it is appropriate to look to the title of the act which created it. Police Pension Board of City of Phoenix v. Warren, 97 Ariz. 180, 398 P.2d 892 (1965); Nunez v. Superior Court in and for County of Pima, 18 Ariz.App. 462, 503 P.2d 420 (1972). That title declares an express intent on the part of the legislature to define the term "implements of husbandry." The title provided:
AN ACT
"RELATING TO AGRICULTURE; DEFINING IMPLEMENTS OF HUSBANDRY; EXEMPTING IMPLEMENTS OF HUSBANDRY FROM REGISTRATION AS MOTOR VEHICLES AND FROM THE LICENSE TAX IMPOSED UPON MOTOR CARRIERS, AND AMENDING SECTIONS 28-118, 28-302, 40-601, 40-613 AND 40-641, ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES." 1960 Ariz.Sess.Laws ch. 115 § 1.
The only provision in the body of the act which carries out such definitional intent is the amendment to A.R.S. § 28-118 adding the second sentence. We, therefore, conclude that this sentence was intended to define the phrase "implements of husbandry." Appellees were required to show that this trailer met those requirements in order to qualify for an exemption. This they have failed to do.
Appellees Scott, the sellers of the vehicle, advance one additional argument in connection with the issue of statutorily mandated brakes. They argue that even if the statute requires cotton trailers to be equipped with brakes, the duty is imposed solely upon the owner of the vehicle, and not upon the seller. That argument overlooks the clear provisions of A.R.S. § 28-952(A)(4) which requires brakes on every trailer "sold in this state . . . ."
The trial court, for the above reasons, erred in holding that the appellees were entitled to summary judgment on...
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