Sullivan v. Griffin

Decision Date04 June 1945
Citation61 N.E.2d 330,318 Mass. 359
PartiesROSE SULLIVAN, administratrix, v. GORDON H. GRIFFIN (and a companion case [1]).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

May 10, 1945.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., LUMMUS, QUA RONAN, & WILKINS, JJ.

Proximate Cause. Negligence, Violation of law, Motor vehicle. Evidence Relevancy and materiality.

Evidence of a violation by the owner of an automobile of a municipal ordinance prohibiting parking it on a sidewalk, and of G. L (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section 13, prohibiting leaving it standing on a way "unattended without first locking or making it fast," while evidence of negligence in an action against the owner, would not have warranted a finding that such negligence was the proximate cause of personal injury and death of a pedestrian who was struck by the automobile while it was driven by a companion of one who had stolen it from where it stood on the sidewalk unattended and unlocked; and a verdict for the defendant in an action for such injury and death properly was ordered.

At the trial of an action for personal injuries and death of a pedestrian resulting from his being struck by an automobile of the defendant which had been stolen by a companion of the operator after the defendant had left it unattended and unlocked on a sidewalk in violation of an ordinance and of a statute, evidence that the automobile had been stolen before was irrelevant on the material issue of the case, whether the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the injuries and death, and was excluded properly.

TWO ACTIONS OF TORT. Writs in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston dated April 7, 1942.

On removal to the Superior Court, the actions were tried together before Dillon, J.

J. E. Hannigan, for the plaintiff.

C.

W. O'Brien, for the defendant.

WILKINS, J. The administratrix of the estate of John J. Sullivan brings two actions of tort, one for death and one for personal injuries of her intestate, who was struck by the defendant's automobile, which was operated by boys who had misappropriated it. At the conclusion of the evidence the judge allowed the defendant's motions for directed verdicts. The plaintiff's exceptions relate to the granting of these motions and to the exclusion of evidence.

We briefly recite the facts most favorable to the plaintiff which the jury could have found. The defendant resided in the Faneuil district of Boston on Bigelow Street about one hundred fifty feet from a main thoroughfare. There was a garage under his house with an open area between the garage doors and the sidewalk. About 4 P.M. on November 19, 1941, he returned from shopping and backed his automobile partially into the driveway in front of the garage. The front wheels were on the sidewalk, and the automobile extended nearly across the sidewalk to the gutter. The defendant left the ignition key in the automobile, the window of which was open, and went into his house, from which he could not see the automobile. The defendant knew that if he left his automobile "on the sidewalk or on a public street with the key in the ignition where it could be seen by thieves going by, with the door open, there was danger that they would come in and get in the car and drive it away." Later two boys removed the key and went to Oak Square three quarters of a mile away where they met two other boys named Benson and Kelley. Benson took the key, and Kelley and he went to the defendant's automobile, and pushed it out into the street. They started the engine, and with Benson operating drove about the neighborhood for an hour after picking up the two boys who had taken the key. The automobile was then parked on a street near Oak Square at a point about one mile from the defendant's house. About 6 P.M. Benson and Kelley returned, and, with a new third boy, drove around the neighborhood, being later joined by still another boy named

Crowley, who "pushed Benson over" and "took charge." "Crowley was a boy who stole cars." About 6:30 P.M., while driven by Crowley through Oak Square at sixty miles an hour the automobile, after passing a street car on the left, struck the intestate and knocked him down. By Article IV, Section 7, of the traffic rules and regulations of the city of Boston then in force it was provided: "No driver shall stop, stand or park a vehicle in any of the following...

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