Sullivan v. Haug
| Decision Date | 17 October 1890 |
| Citation | 46 N.W. 795,82 Mich. 548 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | SULLIVAN v. HAUG, Police Justice. |
Application for mandamus.
James H. Pound, for relator. Allan H Frazer, for respondent.
The relator shows that on the 20th of March, 1890, he was arrested on a warrant issued by the police justice of the city of Detroit, charging him with an assault and battery upon one Thomas P. Murrin, of the same place, on March 17th; that he was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, was tried, convicted, and sentenced to pay a fine of $12, and $3 costs, and in default of such payment he be imprisoned in the Detroit House of Correction for the period of 20 days. He avers that his conviction and sentence is unjust; that he was acting in self-defense; that on the 3d day of April, 1890 under the general laws of this state authorizing appeals from courts of justices of the peace, he executed a bond in regular form, with ample and satisfactory sureties, and so conceded by Hon. Edmund Haug, police justice, aforesaid, and presented the same to him for the purpose of appealing said suit to the recorder's court of the city of Detroit, but said Edmund Haug refused to act upon said bond, and so notified relator, and told him that he should not, for the reason there was no section in the police court act which authorized the taking of an appeal in a case like this. Relator prays that a mandamus issue to the Honorable Edmund Haug, police justice, directing him to act in the matter, and make return to such appeal. The return of the police justice to the order to show cause admits the statements of the relator, respecting his arrest and conviction before a jury; and also the sentence pronounced. He further returns that within 48 hours of sentence, the said fine being paid under protest, a proper recognizance with satisfactory sureties was tendered to him, which he accepted, so far as regularity and sufficiency were concerned, to appeal said cause to the proper appellate court, said recognizance being drawn to answer either the recorder's or the circuit court, whichever might entertain such appeal, being authorized by law so to do; but that he refused to entertain such appeal in said cause, for the reason that the act creating the police court of the city of Detroit does not authorize appeals in such cases. Section 23 of "An act to establish the police court for the city of Detroit" reads as follows: Pub. Acts 1887, p. 389. The section allowing appeals from justices of the peace in criminal cases enacts that "the persons so charged with and convicted by any justice of the peace of any such offense may appeal from the judgment of such justice of the peace to the circuit court: provided, said person shall enter into a recognizance to the people of the state of Michigan, in a sum not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, within ten days after the rendition of the judgment, with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned to appear." etc. How. St. � 7109. The police court of Detroit was established in the first instance by Act 301 of the Session Laws of 1850. This act conferred upon the police court the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear all complaints, to conduct all examinations in criminal cases, and to try all offenses which by the laws of this state were then brought and established within the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, which might thereafter arise within the corporate limits of the city. It authorized justices of the peace to act as police justice in case of his absence or inability. The act was brief, and did not point out the method of procedure in the trial or examination of offenders, nor did it provide for any appeal from judgments rendered by such police court; neither did the general criminal laws of the state regulating proceedings in criminal cases before justices of the peace at that time allow an appeal. The general statute had been amended in 1849 so as to take away the right of appeal, and it was not restored until 1855. In 1859 the case of People v. Police Justice, 7 Mich. 456, came before this court for decision. One Jeschley and his wife had been convicted in the police court of assault and battery, and sentenced to pay fines, and in default to be confined in the county jail. The fines were not paid, and they were committed. They tendered a recognizance, which complied with the general laws where parties were convicted before a justice of the peace, and the justice refused to recognize an appeal on the ground that there was no appeal from police court on final judgment for a retrial of a question of fact. They applied to the circuit court for a mandamus to compel the justice to file the recognizance. On hearing, the circuit judge took the view that no appeal was allowed by statute, and denied the application. Upon review in this court, the members were equally divided in opinion, Mr. Chief Justice MARTIN and Mr. Justice MANNING holding that, as the police court act did not provide for an appeal, none existed; that when the right of appeal was restored from judgments of justices of the peace in criminal cases it did not, by implication, grant the right to appeal from judgments of the police court. Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, in an opinion concurred in by Mr. Justice CHRISTIANCY, held that the police act must be construed in connection with the general law, for it was from that law that the jurisdiction was transferred to be exercised by the police justice, and to that law the police justice was obliged to revert for his method of procedure, and consequently, when an amendment was made to the general law allowing appeals from judgments of justices, the inference was that appeals were allowed from the judgments of the police justice who looked to the general law for his model. The court being equally divided, the judgment of the circuit was affirmed, as the decision of this court. The position of the chief justice and Mr. Justice MANNING was acquiesced in, or at least was not questioned, until four years later, in 1863, the legislature provided, by amendment to the police court act, for appeals, where the sentence inflicted was a fine of $25 or over, or the imprisonment was 30 days or over, if within five days the party convicted should present an affidavit to a circuit judge or recorder, and such officer should allow the appeal. The law remained in this condition until 1885, when the legislature repealed the police court act, and enacted a new law, establishing a police court in the city of Detroit. This act allowed appeals in the same time and manner as provided in the general law from justices of the peace in criminal cases. This new act was amended in 1887, and contains the provision relative to appeals quoted above. The relator asks for a mandamus to compel the police justice to file his bond and certify the case to the circuit or recorder's court, chiefly upon two grounds: (1) That all persons accused of violation of the criminal laws of the state are of right entitled to the same rights and remedies, regardless of locality or the court in which he is tried. In other words, the administration of the general criminal law must be the same throughout the state. (2) That the constitution having vested the several circuit courts with appellate jurisdiction from all inferior tribunals, it is not competent for the legislature to deprive them of such appellate jurisdiction.
What the constitution guaranties is that the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury to be informed of the nature of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and have the assistance of counsel for his defense; and that he shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. All of these have been accorded to relator. But he complains that to allow a large portion of the citizens of this state the right of appeal to a superior tribunal, [1] and deny, under the same circumstances and conditions, that right to the citizens of Detroit, is a plain violation of the fundamental principle of equality which underlies a republican form of government, and recognized and guarantied by the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States. We think the position is fully met and answered in the opinion of Mr. Justice BRADLEY, in Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S., at page 30, where, speaking of a...
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