Sullivan v. Maddox, 2011–CA–00820–COA.
Decision Date | 29 August 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 2011–CA–00820–COA.,2011–CA–00820–COA. |
Citation | 122 So.3d 75 |
Parties | Dempsey SULLIVAN and Terrell Stubbs, Appellants v. Samuel MADDOX and Steve Maddox, Appellees. |
Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
W. Terrell Stubbs, attorney for appellants.
James Burvon Sykes III, Jackson, L. Wesley Broadhead, Mendenhall, attorneys for appellees.
Before IRVING, P.J., CARLTON and MAXWELL, JJ.
CARLTON, J., for the Court:
¶ 1. Dempsey Sullivan and Terrell Stubbs (collectively, Sullivan) appeal the Simpson County Chancery Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Samuel Maddox and Steve Maddox (collectively, the Maddoxes). Sullivan also appeals the chancellor's imposition of sanctions against Sullivan pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and also the chancellor's denial of Sullivan's motion to recuse.1 This case concerns Sullivan's attempt to confirm and quiet title, by adverse possession, to property with a title vested in the United States. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. On August 26, 2005, Sullivan filed a complaint in the Simpson County Chancery Court seeking to confirm and quiet his title to approximately eleven acres of real property in Simpson County, Mississippi.2 Sullivan filed his complaint in response to the Maddoxes' claim to the same parcel of land. In his complaint, Sullivan claimed that he possessed the subject property by virtue of actual possession, thus fulfilling the adverse-possession requirements set forth in Mississippi Code Annotated section 15–1–13 (Rev.2012). Sullivan acknowledged that no accurate description of the real property existed, asserting no survey had been made or could be made prior to the filing of his complaint. Sullivan also requested and received a temporary injunction requiring the Maddoxes to remain on their side of the fence on the property.
¶ 3. In response to the injunction, the Maddoxes filed a counterclaim and third-party complaint on October 7, 2005. The Maddoxes later filed a joint motion for summary judgment on April 6, 2011, asserting that title to the subject property was vested in the United States, and therefore, neither Sullivan nor the Maddoxes could make a claim to the property. In support of their argument, the Maddoxes provided an affidavit from Charles Hugh Craft, a licensed professional surveyor (PLS), who opined that the United States had never issued a patent conveying the property out of the public domain. Sullivan responded to this allegation by maintaining that he had possessed the property exclusively for thirty-nine years.
¶ 4. Then, on April 12, 2011, Sullivan filed a motion for the chancellor's recusal. The Maddoxes responded by asserting that the motion for recusal had fatal defects because it failed to comply with the express dictates of Uniform Chancery Court Rule 1.11. Specifically, the Maddoxes alleged that Sullivan had failed to timely file the motion 3 and that the motion did not include the mandatory affidavit “setting forth the factual basis underlying the asserted grounds for recusal.” See UCCR 1.11.
¶ 5. On May 3, 2011, the parties appeared in the Simpson County Chancery Court for a hearing. The chancellor heard Sullivan's motion for recusal first. The motion for recusal alleged that Wesley Broadhead, one of the attorneys representing the Maddoxes, had previously represented the husband of the chancery court administrator in a criminal appeal pending in the Simpson County Circuit Court. The chancellor took judicial notice of this fact, and the chancellor also acknowledged to both parties in open court that Sullivan's counsel, Terrell Stubbs, had previously represented the chancery court administrator in a divorce action. The chancellor noted that Stubbs had failed to disclose this prior relationship. In ruling on the motion for recusal, the record shows the chancellor acknowledged “the question posed by the motion to recuse was if a reasonable person would doubt the court's impartiality to the litigants in this case because an attorney for the litigants represented the husband of the court administrator” in a pending criminal appeal. The chancellor denied the motion to recuse, finding that the motion for recusal failed to comply with Rule 1.11. The chancellor also held that the basis stated in the motion for recusal constituted insufficient grounds for recusal under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
¶ 6. The chancellor's order granting summary judgment reflects that on the morning of trial, Sullivan's counsel attempted to make a proffer alleging an unreported campaign contribution to the chancellor, without providing a motion for recusal on this basis or a supporting affidavit setting forth any facts underlying the allegation. The chancellor determined that the unsubstantiated accusation directed at the chancellor constituted a derogatory remark alleging misconduct, and he determined that Sullivan's counsel asserted the remark as a threat.
¶ 7. After hearing oral argument on the Maddoxes' joint motion for summary judgment, the chancellor determined that title to the subject property had indeed previously vested in the United States, and thus held that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(n),4 the parties could not adversely possess sovereign property. The chancellor also explained that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to award title to real property if that property still constituted part of the public domain and still vested in the United States.
¶ 8. In his May 25, 2011 judgment, the chancellor noted that after the hearing on May 3, 2011, Sullivan's counsel, Stubbs, informed the chancellor of the following:
Prior to the filing of the complaint ... on or about August 26, 2005, [Stubbs] had informed [Sullivan] that he had a poor or weak case against the [Maddoxes] due to the fact that there was no government survey, [that] no patent issued out of the United States of America, that he had no description of the boundaries of the land in dispute[, that] he had no color of title and that he could not deraign title in the pleadings....
The record further reflects that Stubbs informed the chancellor that he had required Sullivan to sign a waiver acknowledging that Stubbs had advised him of the problems with Sullivan's claim. The chancellor acknowledged that Sullivan's expert witness, Bill Miller, PLS, confirmed in his deposition testimony that the United States had issued no patent conveying the subject real property.
¶ 9. Based on these findings, the chancellor entered an order granting summary judgment on May 25, 2011, dismissing the claims of all parties with prejudice. The chancellor ordered that sanctions would be assessed on May 31, 2011. On May 19, 2011, the Maddoxes filed a motion for sanctions against Sullivan and Stubbs, alleging that both Sullivan and Stubbs were aware prior to the commencement of the suit that the lawsuit “was without hope of success” and requesting sanctions under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act.
¶ 10. On May 31, 2011, the parties appeared before the chancellor on the Maddoxes' motion for sanctions. The Maddoxes filed the sanctions motion after the chancellor had determined Sullivan's complaint and motion for recusal were frivolous. The Maddoxes called Steven Maddox and two practicing attorneys, Wayne Easterling and Robert Germany, as witnesses in support of the motion for sanctions. On direct examination, Steven's counsel moved to admit the following: a letter from the office of Attorney R.K. Houston; statements from the office of Attorney David Ringer; and invoices from the Maddoxes' attorney, Russ Sykes. The chancellor admitted this evidence over the objection of Sullivan's counsel.
¶ 11. On June 15, 2011, the chancellor entered a final judgment imposing sanctions by awarding the Maddoxes attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs in the amount of $42,922.91, to be paid jointly by Sullivan and his counsel, Stubbs. In sanctioning Sullivan and Stubbs, the chancellor specifically found that the following actions demonstrated frivolous pleadings had been filed and frivolous arguments had been made for the purposes of harassment and delay, without substantial justification, and with disrespect for the integrity of the court: (1) Stubbs's admission that before commencement of the action he had advised Sullivan of the weakness of his claim to confirm and quiet title; (2) Sullivan and Stubbs's failure to abandon the claim after their expert witness testified in his deposition that the United States had issued no patent for the subject property; (3) Sullivan and Stubbs's failure to make any effort to determine the validity of the claim before raising it; and (4) the filing of an improper motion for recusal and false allegations against the court. The chancellor held that these various actions constituted a willful violation of Rule 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act, as well as Rule 8.2(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct ( ).
¶ 12. On July 8, 2011, Sullivan appealed the final judgment, asserting seven assignments of error, which are listed in his brief as follows:
I. Whether the chancellor erred in precluding [Sullivan from having] a fair opportunity to present evidence on his motion for recusal or make a proffer on the record, in considering ex parte communications, and [in] testifying against [Sullivan] and his counsel in denying said motion.
II. Whether the chancellor erred by granting the [Maddoxes'] joint motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist and the Maddoxes did not have standing to assert the interests of the United States of America.
III. Whether the chancellor erred in precluding [Sullivan from receiving] a fair opportunity to present evidence on his ...
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