Sullivan v. Mayo, A-360

Citation106 So.2d 4
Decision Date28 October 1958
Docket NumberNo. A-360,A-360
PartiesJohn P. SULLIVAN, Petitioner, v. Nathan MAYO, Commissioner of Agriculture, and Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Florida (US)

W. J. Oven, Jr., Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Keen, O'Kelley & Spitz and Burnis T. Coleman, Tallahassee, for respondents.

DREW, E. HARRIS, Associate Judge.

This cause is before the Court on petition for writ of certiorari to review an order of the Florida Industrial Commission reversing an order of its deputy by which the claimant Sullivan, petitioner in this Court, was awarded a lump sum settlement of his claim under the Workmen's Compensation Law, F.S. § 440.20(10), F.S.A.

In December, 1955, the petitioner sustained a compensable injury which resulted in permanent total disability (paraplegia with complete paralysis of lower extremities from a point above the waist), for which he was awarded and has continuously received weekly compensation in the amount of $35. Petition for lump sum settlement under the above cited provision was filed in May, 1957, based upon petitioner's need for funds to construct a home adapted to his disability; to launch a home business venture which can be operated by petitioner's family; to purchase an automobile designed to be operated by a paraplegic; and to develop certain realty presently owned by petitioner so that it would in the future provide income more adequate than compensation payments for family support.

For reasons hereinafter set forth it will be unnecessary to review in detail the evidence before the deputy. In his attack upon the Commission's order the petitioner relies heavily upon the substantial evidence rule-that a reviewing body should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial forum unless there is no competent substantial evidence to sustain its findings.

This argument is, however, inapplicable in the situation at bar. The cases applying that rule to findings of a deputy commissioner in workmen's compensation proceedings are squarely predicated on the fact that in the determination of compensation claims the law itself makes the deputy the trier of facts and charges him with the duty of deciding the issues and entering an order accordingly. F.S. § 440.25, F.S.A United States Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., Fla., 55 So.2d 741. In the case of a petition for lump sum payment, however, dealing only with the manner of payment as opposed to claimant's right to compensation, the statute provides that lump sum payment shall be made 'whenever the commission determines that it is for the best interests of a person entitled to compensation.' F.S. § 440.20(10), F.S.A. The reasoning in the case of Tamiami Trail Tours v. Carter, Fla., 80 So.2d 322, is therefore controlling. Although the Commission possesses the authority to delegate to a duly authorized representative or subordinate agent the duty of conducting a hearing and making recommendations on such issues under such reasonable rules and regulations as it may promulgate, the commission nevertheless functions in this proceeding not as an appellate forum, but as a body vested under the law with the primary duty and power to determine the issues de novo. The order entered by the deputy in the premises therefore carried no presumptions of correctness since he was not, under the statute, charged with the duty of deciding these issues.

we find also that the statutory provision for review of the Commission's orders relates only to 'compensation orders', providing specifically for certiorari proceedings in the district courts of appeal to review 'orders of the full commission entered pursuant to § 440.25.' F.S. § 440.27(1), F.S.A. Plainly this does not include the order under consideration. We, therefore, treat the petition as one for review by certiorari under Sec. 5(3) of Article V of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A., vesting this Court with jurisdiction to 'issue writs of * * * certiorari'. Also see Rule 4.1, Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A. as amended July 1, 1958. In so doing it is pertinent to observe, before proceeding further, that the scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the commission, in the disposition of the cause, materially departed from or failed to observe essential requirements of the law. Florida Jurisprudence, Vol. 5, page 514, para. 24 and the cases there cited.

The mandate of the statute here involved is simply that the...

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10 cases
  • Sullivan v. Mayo
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • June 17, 1960
    ...a condition to the award. An earlier order regarding this settlement was before the District Court of Appeal, First District. Sullivan v. Mayo et al., 106 So.2d 4. In order to eliminate potential confusion as to jurisdiction we note at the outset that the order presently under consideration......
  • State ex rel. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Florida Indus. Commission, 31891
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • April 3, 1963
    ...of permanency, the award to be made, and other essentially controlling factors. He is the trier of the facts, as we said in Sullivan v. Mayo, Fla.App., 106 So.2d 4. In this case the court observed: 'In the case of a petition for lump sum payment, however, dealing only with the manner of pay......
  • Star Employment Service, Inc. v. Florida Indus. Commission
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • June 15, 1960
    ...5(3), which reads in part as follows: 'A district court of appeal may issue writs of * * * certiorari * * *.' See Sullivan v. Mayo, Fla.App. 1st Dist., 106 So.2d 4. Absent legislative action it is also clear from Article V, Section 26(10) that it is contemplated that all orders of the Flori......
  • Colonial Restaurant Corp. v. State Dept. of Commerce, 70--881
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 26, 1971
    ...held that an award of 'compensation' is prerequisite to an award of attorney's fee * * *.' (Emphasis added.) See also Sullivan v. Mayo, Fla.App.1958, 106 So.2d 4. We conclude therefore that Section 440.34(1) does not support the award of attorneys' fees for the collection of delinquent asse......
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