Sullivan v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 12 December 1967
• Citation: 236 A.2d 906,155 Conn. 630
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: William F. SULLIVAN v. Norman K. MORGAN, Superintendent, Connecticut School for Boys, et al.

Page 906

236 A.2d 906

155 Conn. 630

William F. SULLIVAN v. Norman K. MORGAN, Superintendent, Connecticut School for Boys, et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Dec. 12, 1967.

Kalmen London, New Britain, with whom, on the brief, were David Brown, Meriden, and Robert A. Michalik, Meriden, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before ALCORN, HOUSE, COTTER, THIM and COVELLO, JJ.

COTTER, Justice.

The plaintiff brought this action on January 27, 1964, and in a substituted complaint alleged, in substance, that he was employed by the state of Connecticut in 1946 and was appointed boys' occupational supervisor at the Connecticut school for boys in Meriden in 1948; that he was admitted to the Connecticut Valley Hospital on April 10, 1958; that he was released form the hospital on February 3, 1959; and that he was dropped from the state payroll on July 28, 1958, when his employment at the school was terminated. He further alleged that he brought an action of mandamus to require the personnel appeal board to hold a hearing on his reinstatement. ¹ The board agreed to hold a hearing, which it subsequently did, and on October 29, 1963, it decided that the plaintiff was not dismissed from state service but was dropped 'after the expiration of all his rights when he was hospitalized,' so that no formal written notice of termination of employment was required, and that he had no right of appeal to the board as a result of any dismissal. These allegations of the substituted complaint were admitted, but an additional one to the effect that he was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard as provided in General Statutes § 5-56 was denied by the defendants.

The court found the following with minor corrections: The plaintiff was arrested about April 10, 1958, in connection with a series of fires then under investigation, he entered the state hospital at Middletown under a temporary commitment instead of being prosecuted, and a month later he was formally committed to that hospital by the Probate Court. He was kept on the state payroll from April 10 to July 28, 1958, with full pay and was credited with all of his accrued sick leave and vacation pay. On July 28, 1958, while hospitalized, the plaintiff was dropped from the state payroll without his knowledge or consent. He wrote a letter dabout August 6, 1958, which was not introduced into evidence, concerning his employment status. The superintendent of the school for boys wrote a letter dated August 8, 1958, to the plaintiff addressed to him at the Connecticut state hospital. The letter, which the plaintiff introduced in evidence, advised the plaintiff about his being dropped from state service and also stated in part as follows: 'I realize that a job placement for you when you leave the hospital is of great concern to you but surely you realize that it would be impossible for you to return to the school.' While he was still hospitalized, the plaintiff communicated with the president of an employee labor union, who was also an employee of the hospital, about assisting him in getting his job back. On February 3, 1959, he was released from the hospital. After his release, he worked three weeks at another state institution and also obtained unemployemtn compensation. The court concluded that the action of the superintendent constituted a dismissal and that the dismissal was ineffective under General Statutes § 5-56 because proper notice had not been given to the plaintiff. The judgment ordered that the plaintiff be reinstated to his former position, that he be restored to the roster of the state employees with restoration of full benefits, and that he receive full pay retroactive to July 28, 1958.

The court erroneously concluded that, because of the role played by state officials both in having the plaintiff committed to a mental institution and subsequently in removing him from office without his knowledge and consent, the state is estopped from asserting as a defense the plaintiff's inability to perform services from July 28, 1958, to February 3, 1959. The subordinate facts fail to support the court's conclusion, as required by Practice Book § 619. See State v. American News Co., 152 Conn. 101, 114, 203 A.2d 296; Schroder v. Battistoni, 151 Conn. 458, 462, 199 A.2d 10; Pet Car Products, Inc. v. Barnett, 150 Conn. 42, 53, 184 A.2d 797; State v. Metrusky, 140 Conn. 26, 30, 97 A.2d 574. There is also error in the judgment ordering full pay to the plaintiff retroactive to July 28, 1958, in view of the court's findings that the plaintiff had been employed and had received unemployment compensation payments at various times during this period.

Since this case, because of the errors discussed above, must be remanded for a new trial, we briefly discuss questions which appear to be of importance on a retrial under the circumstances appearing in the record before us.

The question whether a plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence in taking steps to test the legality of the termination of his employment was considered in such cases as Norris v. United States, 257 U.S. 77, 80, 42 S.Ct. 9, 66 L.Ed.136; Nicholas v. United States, 257 U.S. 71, 76, 42 S.Ct. 7, 66 L.Ed. 133; United...