Sullivan v. Mortensen
| Decision Date | 12 July 1945 |
| Citation | 132 Conn. 289,43 A.2d 731 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | SULLIVAN v. MORTENSEN et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Wynne, Judge.
Action by Thomas F. Sullivan against William H. Mortensen and others for an injunction restraining named defendant from voting in a meeting of the police commissioners to break a tie existing with respect to plaintiff and his position as assistant chief of police and for other relief, brought to the superior court and tried to the court. Judgment for defendants, and appeal by plaintiff.
No error.
John W. Joy, of Hartford (Francis P. Rohrmayer, of Hartford, on the brief), for appellant (plaintiff).
Samuel H. Aron, of Hartford (Frank Covello, of Hartford, on the brief), for appellees (defendants).
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.
The question of law involved is whether the position of assistant chief of police of the city of Hartford, which the plaintiff claims to hold, was legally created.
The undisputed facts are as follows: The plaintiff became a member of the Hartford police force in 1915 and had risen to the position of lieutenant on October 14, 1942. Sometime prior to that date an unofficial survey had been made of the police department, and on August 22, 1942, a report, known as the ‘Wilson Report,’ was filed with the board of police commissioners of Hartford recommending, together with other changes in the department, the appointment of an assistant chief of police who should be second in authority to the chief and superior in rank to the two deputy chiefs, and who should perform the duties of the chief in his absence. The report further recommended that necessary changes in the ordinances should be made to carry out its suggestions. At a meeting of the board of police commissioners on September 24, 1942, it was voted that the report be accepted and that the city's corporation counsel be requested to draw up such ordinances or changes in existing ordinances as were necessary to carry the plan into effect. A list of suggested changes was sent to the corporation counsel, including one that § 285 of the ordinances, relating to the personnel of the police force, be amended to include the position of assistant chief of police, and that § 307, which prescribed the duties of two deputy chiefs, be amended to eliminate any conflict in duties of the several offices. No action was taken on these suggestions by the corporation counsel. The director of finance and budget wrote the board of police commissioners a letter in which he stated that, subject to the approval of the board of finance, the position of assistant chief of police was entered on the salary schedule. On October 14, 1942, the board of police commissioners voted that the plaintiff be ‘elected’ to the position of assistant chief. It was assumed that his duties were to be those defined in the Wilson report. The plaintiff immediately assumed the position of assistant chief and from then to the date of this action was held out as and considered himself to be the incumbent of that position. On October 23, 1942, the board of finance voted to approve the recommendation of the director of finance that the position of assistant chief of police be added to the ‘Standard Salary Schedule’ and fixed a minimum salary for the incumbent at a considerable increase over his salary as lieutenant. Both the police board and board of finance assumed that the position was properly created and the appointment of the plaintiff properly made. On March 14, 1944, the police board, under a new chairman, asked the corporation counsel for an opinion as to the previous action of the board in creating the position of assistant chief and in appointing the plaintiff to fill in. It received an opinion that the action was illegal. A resolution was then offered at a meeting of the board that it consider itself bound by the opinion. An amendment was offered that the opinion be placed on file and the plaintiff left in his position as assistant chief. The vote on both the amendment and the resolution resulted in a tie. The president of the police board invited the mayor of the city, as an ex officio member of the board with power to break a tie vote, to attend a subsequent meeting. The mayor intended to attend such a meeting and vote, if necessary, to break the tie. Before he could carry out his intention, this action was instituted and a temporary injunction issued restraining him from so doing.
Between the date of the plaintiff's appointment and the bringing of this action, two annual budgets were adopted by the court of common council. The board of police commissioners, as required, submitted to the board of finance a lump sum estimate for salaries, with a supplemental list including a salary for an assistant chief. The board of finance submitted to the court of common council a similar total salary list for the various city departments with a so-called personnel supplement, not required, but furnished for the council's information, which included the position and salary of an assistant chief of police. The budgets were adopted, stating salary items in lump sum totals for the various departments. The resolutions adopting them did not include the personnel supplement. The only action taken by the court of common council in relation to the Wilson report was in March, 1943, when it appointed a committee ‘to investigate the operation of the Wilson Plan employed by the Police Department.’ The following month, majority and...
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Burke v. Board of Representatives of City of Stamford
...Union No. 145 v. City of Shelton, 147 Conn. 401, 405, 161 A.2d 587; Jack v. Torrant, 136 Conn. 414, 419, 71 A.2d 705; Sullivan v. Mortensen, 132 Conn, 289, 295, 43 A.2d 731. In the instant case, the charter does not require that the board of representatives shall act only by ordinance or re......
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Jack v. Torrant
...in a number of decisions of this court, among which are: Keegan v. Town of Thompson, 103 Conn. 418, 425, 130 A. 707; Sullivan v. Mortensen, 132 Conn. 289, 295, 43 A.2d 731; Rule v. City of Stamford, 121 Conn. 447, 451, 185 A. 178. The plaintiffs contend, however, that upon the facts found t......
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Morris v. Town of Newington
...be taken by ordinance. Food, Beverage & Express Drivers Local Union v. Shelton, 147 Conn. 401, 405, 161 A.2d 587; Sullivan v. Mortensen, 132 Conn. 289, 295, 43 A.2d 731; 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.) § 15.03. The enumeration of "specific powers in addition to all powers grant......
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Ziomek v. Bartimole
...without modification, abridgment or change. State ex rel. Huntington v. McNulty, 151 Conn. 447, 449, 199 A.2d 5; Sullivan v. Mortensen, 132 Conn. 289, 295, 43 A.2d 731. This is especially so as applied to the statute under consideration, wherein it is contemplated and provided that applican......