Sullivan v. People

• Decision Date: 06 January 1875
• Citation: 31 Mich. 1
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Daniel Sullivan v. The People

31 Mich. 1

Daniel Sullivan v. The People

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 6, 1875

Submitted on Briefs October 28, 1874.

Error to Houghton Circuit.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial awarded.

T. M Brady and Chipman, Dewey & Hawes, for plaintiff in error.

Isaac Marston, Attorney General, for the People.

OPINION

Christiancy J.:

The plaintiff in error was tried in the circuit court for the county of Houghton, upon an information charging him with having, on the 16th day of December, 1873, at, etc., willfully and feloniously, and of malice aforethought, assaulted, beaten and wounded one William W. Perry, with the intent, him, the said Perry, then and there to kill and murder.

The defendant below (plaintiff in error) was convicted, and sentenced to the state prison at Jackson for ten years.

"There was evidence" (as appears by the bill of exceptions) "tending to show that respondent, on the morning of January 2, 1874, confessed having assaulted complaining witness in the manner charged in the information." And for the purpose, as it would seem from the record, of avoiding the force of this confession as evidence, the defendant seems to have undertaken to prove that he was insane when he made the confession,--not when he committed the offense,--and several exceptions were taken to the judge's charge as to the burden of proof upon that question, the nature of the evidence given upon it, and to a clause in the charge implying that defendant must conclusively prove the insanity.

But we think all questions connected with, or growing out of that of insanity, are outside of the case as presented upon this record.

The bill states that "there was evidence given on the trial tending to show that respondent was insane on the night of the third or the morning of the fourth of January, 1874; and there was evidence tending to show that he was never insane." Now, the confession which the evidence tended to show, was made on the morning of the second of January, and the record does not show that there was any evidence tending to show that defendant was insane at the time, nor until the night of the third or morning of the fourth; and the clear implication from the record is, that there was no such evidence. It is, therefore, quite immaterial upon this record what rulings the court may have made connected with the question of insanity. They cannot be assigned as error upon this record.

But the defendant set up in defense, and introduced evidence tending to prove an alibi. But upon his preliminary examination before the examining magistrate, he offered no evidence whatever.

As to proof of the alibi, it is objected that the court instructed the jury that it must be proved conclusively, or beyond a doubt, to constitute a defense. Though such language was incidentally used in one part of the charge, I am strongly inclined to think such was not the fair meaning of the whole charge upon this subject when taken together. The whole charge upon this point, after properly defining an alibi, was this: "when such a defense is made and proven, it is conclusive. It is the best defense that can be interposed. It leaves no doubt of the innocence of the party accused; but it must be satisfactory. ...