Sullivan v. Retirement Board of Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island

• Decision Date: 14 September 2011
• Docket Number: C.A. PC/10-0069
• Parties: BRIAN SULLIVAN v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF RHODE ISLAND, by and through its Chairman, FRANK CAPRIO, and its Members, William B. Finelli, Vice Chairman, Gary R. Alger, Daniel L. Beardsley, Frank R. Benell, Jr., Rosemary Booth Gallogly, Roger P. Boudreau, Michael R. Boyce, M. Carl Heintzelman, John P. Maguire, John J. Meehan, Louis M. Prata, Linda C. Riendeau, Susan K. Rodrigues, and Jean Rondeau
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

BRIAN SULLIVAN v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF RHODE ISLAND, by and through its Chairman, FRANK CAPRIO, and its Members, William B. Finelli, Vice Chairman, Gary R. Alger, Daniel L. Beardsley, Frank R. Benell, Jr., Rosemary Booth Gallogly, Roger P. Boudreau, Michael R. Boyce, M. Carl Heintzelman, John P. Maguire, John J. Meehan, Louis M. Prata, Linda C. Riendeau, Susan K. Rodrigues, and Jean Rondeau

C.A. No. PC/10-0069

Superior Court of Rhode Island

September 14, 2011

DECISION

VOGEL J.

Brian Sullivan ("Sullivan" or "Plaintiff") brings this appeal from a decision of the Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island ("Board"), which found that he was not eligible to purchase service retirement credits pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 36-9-26. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15. For the reasons set forth below, this Court reverses the decision of the Board.

I Facts and Travel

This case involves the proverbial Hobson's choice.^1[] In 1983, Sullivan, a full-time teacher for the Newport School Department, received notice that he was being laid off from his teaching position for the following year for financial reasons. Later, he was offered an option, to return, but only on a part-time basis. His Hobson's choice was to return part-time or to accept the total layoff. Just as a glass that is half full also is half empty, the fact that Sullivan, a full-time teacher, was invited to work only on a part-time basis essentially means that he also was laid off on a part-time basis.

However what Sullivan did not realize was that his choice would end up penalizing him when he sought to retire. Had Sullivan refused the offer of part-time employment and stayed out of work, or had he obtained alternate unrelated employment during that school year, he could have purchased retirement credits after he returned to full-time teaching and been eligible to retire at the same time as if he never had been laid off. Conversely, by accepting the offer and providing part-time service to the school department, the Board claims that he sacrificed his right to purchase additional credits and retire with his class; namely, those who entered teaching at the beginning of the 1981-1982 school year. This Court finds that the Board's decision achieves an absurd result by denying him an opportunity to purchase credits that would have been available to him had he declined the part-time job offer.

The material facts in this case are not in dispute. Sullivan began working as a full-time teacher for the Newport School Department in the 1981-1982 school year. (Admin. Hearing Tr August 19, 2009, at 25:16-24.) The Plaintiff testified that in February 1983, he received a letter from the Superintendent of Schools advising him that he would be laid off for the 1983-1984 school year. Id. at 26:4-15. However, several months before the start of that school year Sullivan was notified that he would be recalled, but only on a part-time basis. Id. at 27:21-23. During the 1983-1984 school term, Sullivan made contributions to the Employees Retirement System of Rhode Island ("ERSRI") at a pro-rata rate based upon his part-time status, calculated at sixty-nine percent of the full-time rate. Id. at 48:10-12; 56:19-23. Sullivan returned to fulltime employment for the 1984-1985 school year, and at all times material hereto, he continued to teach on a full-time basis. Id. at 29:10-15.

In early 2009, Sullivan submitted a request to purchase layoff credit pursuant to § 36-9-26 for his partial layoff during the 1983-1984 school year.^2[] ERSRI denied that request. Sullivan appealed the decision, ultimately requesting and receiving a hearing before an administrative hearing officer.

Sullivan interpreted the term layoff to include his part-time employment during the 1983-1984 school year. He claimed that he was partially laid off and did not return to "active membership" until he resumed full-time employment in September 1984. For its part, ERSRI claimed that Sullivan never relinquished his active status in spite of working less than full time during the 1983-1984 school year. ERSRI disputed the contention that Sullivan suffered a partial layoff qualifying him to purchase retirement credits.

The hearing officer rendered his decision on November 5, 2009, denying Sullivan's appeal. The hearing officer rejected Sullivan's contention that he was partially laid off during the 1983-1984 school year and thereby entitled to purchase retirement credits under § 36-9-26. Instead, the hearing officer found that Sullivan was not laid off because he never relinquished his active status in spite of working less than full time during the 1983-1984 school year. In so ruling, the hearing officer concluded that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "layoff" did not encompass a reduction in hours. (Decision of Hearing Officer, November 5, 2009.)

On December 9, 2009, the Board affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. From that decision, Sullivan took a timely appeal to the Superior Court.

II Standard of Review

The Court reviews a contested administrative decision pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15(g). This section provides that:

"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4)Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Sec. 42-35-15(g).

In reviewing an agency's decision, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on questions of fact. See Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Assoc., Ltd. v. Nolan, 755 A.2d 799, 805 (R.I. 2000). Accordingly, such review of an administrative decision is "limited to an examination of the certified record to determine if there is any legally competent evidence therein to support the agency's decision." Id. (quoting Barrington Sch. Comm. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 608 A.2d 1126, 1138 (R.I. 1992)). "Legally competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means an amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Town of Burrillville v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 921 A.2d 113, 118 (R.I. 2007). However, "[q]uestions of law determined by the administrative agency are not binding upon [the Court] and may be freely reviewed to determine the relevant law and its applicability to the facts presented in the record." Dep't of Envt'l Mgmt. v. Labor Rels. Bd., 799 A.2d 274, 277 (R.I. 2002) (citing Carmody v. Rhode Island Conflict of Interest Commission, 509 A.2d 453, 458 (R.I. 1986)).

However, "[a]lthough this Court affords the factual findings of an administrative agency great deference, questions of law—including statutory interpretation—are reviewed de novo." Heritage Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Marques, 14 A.3d 932, 936 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Iselin v. Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island, 943 A.2d 1045, 1049 (R.I. 2008)). It is axiomatic, however, that while a court of review addresses questions of statutory interpretation on a de novo basis, it is a "well-recognized doctrine of administrative law that deference will be accorded to an administrative agency when it interprets a statute whose administration and enforcement have been entrusted to the agency . . . even when the agency's interpretation is not the only permissible interpretation that could be applied." Auto Body Ass'n of Rhode Island v. State Dept. of Business Regulation, 996 A.2d 91, 97 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Pawtucket Power Associates Limited Partnership v. City of Pawtucket, 622 A.2d 452, 456-57 (R.I. 1993)). Notwithstanding this deference, however, the Court always remains "the final arbiter of questions of statutory construction." Rossi v. Employees' Retirement System, 895 A.2d 106, 113 (R.I. 2006).

III Analysis

Chapter 9 of title 36 of Rhode Island General Laws governs membership and service credits for public officers and employees' contributions to the Retirement System. Public school teachers are among those that are covered by the statutory scheme. At issue in this case is a dispute over the meaning of § 36-9-26, entitled Credits for layoffs.

Recently our Supreme Court succinctly stated that when interpreting a statute,

"our ultimate goal is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent. We have further stated that [t]he plain statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent. And we have indicated that "a clear and unambiguous statute will be literally construed. Accordingly, when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 2008-334-Appeal, slip op. at 53 (R.I., filed July 12, 2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

However "[t]he plain meaning approach" does not constitute "the equivalent of myopic literalism, and it is entirely proper for [the Court] to look to the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context." Generation Realty,...