O'SULLIVAN v. Rhode Island Hosp., No. 2003-70-Appeal.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
• Writing for the Court: ROBINSON, Justice.
• Citation: 874 A.2d 179
• Docket Number: No. 2003-70-Appeal.
• Decision Date: 26 May 2005
• Parties: Thomas Noel O'SULLIVAN, individually, as executor of the estate of Julia Mary Walsh O'Sullivan, and as natural parent and next friend of Kieran O'Sullivan, Clodagh O'Sullivan and Aoife O'Sullivan, minors v. RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL et al.

874 A.2d 179

Thomas Noel O'SULLIVAN, individually, as executor of the estate of Julia Mary Walsh O'Sullivan, and as natural parent and next friend of Kieran O'Sullivan, Clodagh O'Sullivan and Aoife O'Sullivan, minors
v.
RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL et al

No. 2003-70-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 26, 2005.

874 A.2d 180

Howard B. Klein, Providence, for Plaintiff

Maurene Souza, Providence, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

ROBINSON, Justice.

The appeal in this wrongful death case requires us to consider the applicability of the specific statute of limitations that is an integral part of our wrongful death statute against the background of a most unusual series of events that preceded the tragic death of the plaintiff's decedent. The result that we reach in this case is a function of the highly unusual fact pattern that is set forth in the record; we have dealt with that fact pattern with our attention constantly fixed on the relevant statutory language as construed pursuant to established principles of statutory construction.

This case first came before this Court on February 5, 2004, in accordance with an order directing both parties to show cause why the issues on appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the arguments of counsel at that show-cause hearing, we determined that cause had been shown; and the case was therefore placed on the regular calendar for full briefing and argument. After considering the briefs that have been submitted and the oral arguments of counsel, we now reverse and remand the case for a trial on the merits.

Facts and Travel¹

874 A.2d 181

The plaintiff, Thomas Noel O'Sullivan,² is the widower of Julia Mary Walsh O'Sullivan, who died of pneumonia at the age of thirty-four, leaving three young children (Kieran O'Sullivan, Clodagh O'Sullivan, and Aoife O'Sullivan)

On February 8, 1999, Mrs. O'Sullivan was taken by ambulance to Newport Hospital, complaining of nausea, vomiting, decreased appetite and persistent fever. Before she was discharged from Newport Hospital that same day, she was rehydrated with a saline solution, and diagnostic tests were performed by that hospital.

The next day, Mrs. O'Sullivan was again transported by ambulance to Newport Hospital, with worsening symptoms. She was rehydrated as she had been on the previous day, but no new diagnostic tests were performed, and she was again discharged.

On February 11, 1999, Mrs. O'Sullivan was taken to Newport Hospital for a third time. Her symptoms were even worse than before, and this time she was admitted to Newport Hospital as a patient. While hospitalized, she was for the first time diagnosed as suffering from severe bilateral pneumonia and severe neutropenia.³

On February 12, 1999, Newport Hospital transferred Mrs. O'Sullivan to Rhode Island Hospital. She spent almost three weeks in the intensive care unit of Rhode Island Hospital, and she eventually died there on March 1, 1999.

Mrs. O'Sullivan's husband promptly obtained legal counsel in connection with his wife's untimely death; and on April 1, 1999, his attorney made a request to Rhode Island Hospital for Mrs. O'Sullivan's medical records. On June 8, 1999, plaintiff received from Rhode Island Hospital an "abstract" of the medical records. On June 28, 1999, having made a further request, plaintiff received the complete medical records from Rhode Island Hospital—including an autopsy report, which indicated that the "direct cause" of Mrs. O'Sullivan's death was "likely due to the bilateral bronchopneumonia and ARDS [Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome]."

On November 4, 1999, plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Newport Hospital and certain physicians affiliated with that hospital. But no action was commenced against the Rhode Island Hospital defendants⁴ until June 6, 2002 (more than three years after the date of Mrs. O'Sullivan's death, but less than three years after plaintiff received the abstract of Rhode Island Hospital's medical records).⁵

After they were served, the Rhode Island Hospital defendants moved to dismiss

874 A.2d 182

the case under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the wrongful death action against them was time-barred pursuant to the three-year statute of limitations period set forth in Rhode Island's wrongful death statute, G.L.1956 § 10-7-2.⁶

The plaintiff objected to defendants' motion to dismiss, and filed an affidavit to support his objection. The court then converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff argued before the Superior Court (as he does before us) that the statute of limitations was tolled from the date of Mrs. O'Sullivan's death until at least the date of his receipt of the abstract of her medical records from Rhode Island Hospital.

The defendants argued in reply that the date of Mrs. O'Sullivan's death at Rhode Island Hospital was the date upon which the statute of limitations should be deemed to have begun running. They asserted that the statutory tolling provision of § 10-7-2 should not apply to this case because plaintiff had not met his alleged burden of proving that Mrs. O'Sullivan's injury was "latent or undiscoverable" at the time of her death. The defendants contend that Mrs. O'Sullivan's death itself was the injury which put plaintiff on notice that he should investigate with reasonable diligence any claims against potential defendants. They further argued that plaintiff failed to establish that he exercised reasonable diligence in bringing claims against all potential defendants within what defendants contend was the statute of limitations period—three years from the date of Mrs. O'Sullivan's actual death.⁷

After considering the oral and written arguments of counsel, the motion justice granted summary judgment in favor of the Rhode Island Hospital defendants on January 29, 2003. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews the granting of a summary judgment motion on a de novo basis. Martellini v. Little Angels Day Care, Inc., 847 A.2d 838, 842 (R.I. 2004); Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 859 (R.I.1997). In so doing, we use the same criteria as the motion justice used. Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I. 1996); O'Hara v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 574 A.2d 135, 136 (R.I. 1990). We will affirm a summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and we conclude that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743, 750 (R.I.2004).

Although we recognize that there are situations in which the viability of a particular statute of limitations defense will present a factual issue that must be resolved by the trier of fact, it is also true that there are many situations in which the

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question can be resolved in accordance with Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Morris v. Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994) ("In an appropriate case, [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 56 can be employed to determine the applicability of a statutory time bar to a particular set of facts."); Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1387 (10th Cir.1985) (recognizing that summary judgment should not be granted when there is "a viable issue of fact" about the beginning of the limitations period, but also stating that "cases involving statute of limitations defenses frequently lend themselves to summary disposition"); see also Bader v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc., 505 A.2d 1162, 1166 (R.I.1986). The case at bar is a case in which the Rule 56 option was entirely appropriate; there was no dispute between the parties as to the material facts, but rather only as to the legal conclusion to be drawn

Analysis

The issue before us is whether the carefully worded statute of limitations provisions contained in § 10-7-2 caused the three-year limitations period applicable to this case to be tolled from March 1, 1999 (the date of Mrs. O'Sullivan's death) until at least June 8, 1999 (the date on which plaintiff received an abstract of his wife's medical records from Rhode Island Hospital).⁸

In Rhode Island, the wrongful death statute provides that a wrongful death action ordinarily must be commenced within three years after the death of the person. See § 10-7-2 ("Except as otherwise provided, every action brought pursuant to this chapter shall be commenced within three (3) years after the death of the person."). Very significantly, however, the same statute also contains a tolling provision "[w]ith respect to any death caused by any wrongful act, neglect or default which is not known at the time of death * * *." Id. The statute goes on to provide that, in the latter situation, an action "shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time that the wrongful act, neglect or default is discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered." Id.⁹

874 A.2d 184

Under the Rhode Island statute, with its explicit exception-recognizing language, the date of death of an individual is clearly not the measuring point in all cases. For this reason, we unhesitatingly reject the argument of the Rhode Island Hospital defendants that the fact of death always triggers the running of the wrongful death statute of limitations. Such a generalization is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute¹⁰ and is far too procrustean to apply to the wide variety of situations that can present themselves. See, e.g., Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter International, 694 P.2d 143 (Alaska 1984) (holding that the statute of limitation was tolled and the wrongful death claim did not accrue until the wreckage of a crashed helicopter and the bodies of decedents were discovered, some eight years after the fatal accident). Any...