Sullivan v. Sapp

• Decision Date: 15 January 2004
• Docket Number: No. SC02-2490.,SC02-2490.
• Parties: Elizabeth SULLIVAN, etc., Appellant, v. Landon Cole SAPP, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

866 So.2d 28

Elizabeth SULLIVAN, etc., Appellant, v. Landon Cole SAPP, Appellee.

No. SC02-2490.

Supreme Court of Florida.

January 15, 2004.

George T. Reeves of Davis, Schnitker, Reeves & Browning, P.A., Madison, FL, for Appellant.

Harvey E. Baxter, Gainesville, FL, for Appellee.

LEWIS, J.

We have for review Sullivan v. Sapp, 829 So.2d 951 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), in which the First District Court of Appeal expressly declared section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. of the Florida Statutes (2001) unconstitutional as violative of the right of privacy as articulated in article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

A review of the procedural history of this case reveals that Frances Adrienne Sullivan gave birth to a son in September 1999. Subsequently, she filed a paternity action against Landon Cole Sapp, "to determine custody, parental responsibility, and child support under chapter 742, Florida Statutes." The final judgment of paternity was entered on March 14, 2001, which declared Sapp to be the natural father of the child,¹ and made further provision for Sullivan and Sapp to have shared parental responsibility. Additionally, the court determined that primary physical residence of the child would be with his mother, while his father would have the right to reasonable access and would be required to provide monetary child support. The trial court also determined and included a provision in the final judgment that the father would be eligible to claim the dependency exemption for the child for federal income tax purposes in even-numbered tax years, while the mother would be eligible to claim the exemption in odd-numbered tax years.

On March 20, 2001, the mother filed a timely motion for rehearing in the paternity action. The sole issue asserted for rehearing pertained to a clarification of the provision relating to the eligibility of each parent to claim the child as a dependent for federal income tax purposes. No other aspect of the final judgment was challenged on rehearing. Tragically, before the trial court had the opportunity to consider and rule on the motion for rehearing, the mother, Frances Adrienne Sullivan, was killed in an automobile accident. Following the mother's death, the child's maternal grandmother, Elizabeth Sullivan, filed a "Motion to Intervene and for the Award of Reasonable Visitation to Grandparent," seeking to intervene in the paternity action that was pending on rehearing and requesting grandparent visitation rights pursuant to section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. of the Florida Statutes (2001).² Notably, in her motion to intervene and for visitation rights, the grandmother only alleged that, "The award of visitation for the maternal grandparent in this instance is in the child's best interest." This statement was not explained or expanded upon, nor did the grandmother present any claim that the child would suffer any harm due to a lack of interaction with the maternal grandmother or for any other reason.

In response to the grandmother's motion to intervene and for visitation rights, the father filed a "Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees." In his motion, the father argued that the mother's death rendered the pending motion for rehearing in the paternity action moot because the rehearing motion did not in any way attack the validity of the final judgment of paternity and the only issue on rehearing pertained to economic matters related to the dependency tax exemption. Subsequently, Elizabeth Sullivan filed a "Motion to Substitute Parties," in which she requested that the court substitute her, as personal representative of the estate of her daughter, as the petitioner in the paternity action in which rehearing was pending. In that motion, she affirmatively argued that the paternity action was not extinguished by the death of the mother, and that there were substantive issues remaining that required judicial resolution.

A hearing was conducted on October 2, 2001, to consider arguments on the grandmother's motion to intervene and motion for visitation, and on the father's motion to dismiss. Following this hearing, the trial court entered an order granting the father's motion to dismiss, and dismissed the motion to intervene and for visitation. The court held that the issue in which the grandmother sought to intervene, which related to the custody of and personal contact with the child, was no longer in dispute after the mother's death and was not the subject of pending rehearing consideration. The only question pending on rehearing was directed to economic considerations, and therefore there was no viable pending matter at issue in which she could intervene. The trial court relied upon Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Carlisle, 566 So.2d 1335 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), aff'd, 593 So.2d 505 (Fla.1992), to support its holding that the grandmother was not entitled to intervene in the paternity action. Additionally, the court determined that the ultimate relief sought by the grandmother, namely visitation rights, was not available to her based upon this Court's holdings in other grandparent visitation cases, such as Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1998), and Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla.1996).

On October 26, 2001, the grandmother filed a motion for rehearing. The trial court held another hearing on November 27, 2001, to address all of the issues remaining between the parties. The trial court issued its final order on January 22, 2002, granting the grandmother's motion to substitute parties, but denying both the motion for rehearing in the original paternity action, which had been filed before the mother's death, and the grandmother's motion for rehearing directed to her intervention and for the award of grandparent visitation.

On appeal, the First District affirmed the trial court's ruling, and held that "the grandmother's motion was contrary to Florida's right to privacy provision, Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution." Sullivan, 829 So.2d at 952. In its opinion, the district court did not address the issue as to whether the grandmother even had a right to intervene in the underlying paternity action. Instead, the court only addressed the substantive issue concerning the constitutionality of section 61.13(2)(b)2.c., which was relied upon by the grandmother in her motion for intervention and visitation. The district court held that this case is controlled by Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 2000), in which this Court determined that section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (1999), which attempted to confer standing on grandparents to request custody based solely on the best interests of the child, violated the natural parent's fundamental right to privacy. See Sullivan, 829 So.2d at 952

. In addition to Richardson, the district court noted that the reasoning outlined in Beagle, Von Eiff, and Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So.2d 26 (Fla.2000), supported the conclusion that section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. "is facially unconstitutional in that it intrudes on the father's fundamental privacy right to raise his child free from governmental interference." Sullivan, 829 So.2d at 952. A timely request for review by this Court followed.

Initially, we must address whether the death of the mother, after entry of the final judgment in the paternity action, but while the mother's motion for rehearing concerning economic issues was pending, rendered the entire action moot and divested the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the motion for rehearing or to render any further orders in the action. Under the controlling authority of this Court's decision in Gaines v. Sayne, 764 So.2d 578 (Fla.2000), we hold that the paternity judgment was not voided by the death of the mother and, further, the cause of action was not rendered totally moot by the mother's death. Therefore, the trial court retained jurisdiction to consider the economic matters pending in the motion for rehearing.

In Gaines, we considered "whether the death of a party after entry of a final decree of dissolution of marriage but prior to a decision on a timely motion for rehearing automatically voids the dissolution, abates the dissolution proceeding, and deprives the court of jurisdiction to render any further orders in the matter." 764 So.2d at 579. There we held, "[T]he entry of a written judgment of dissolution is not voided by the subsequent death of a party where any remaining issues properly raised on rehearing or appeal relate solely to matters collateral to the adjudication of dissolution." Id. at 586. Noting that on rehearing neither party had contested the finding that the marriage was broken or the trial court's adjudication of dissolution based upon that finding, this Court reasoned that, "all judicial labor on the issue of dissolution had ended upon the entry of the final judgment. Under these circumstances, to void the dissolution decree on the basis that [the wife] died while a motion for rehearing raising other issues was pending would be contrary to the parties' undisputed intent to be divorced and could lead to unjust and inequitable results." Id.

Consistency of logic and jurisprudence requires that we likewise hold here that the death of the mother after entry of the final paternity judgment, but while the motion for rehearing was pending as to only a single economic matter, did not void the paternity judgment, render the motion for rehearing moot, or divest the trial court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the remaining issues between the parties. As in Gaines, the trial court below had entered the final judgment in the paternity action, and the motion for rehearing, concerning only the tax issue, had been filed prior to the death of the mother. See Sullivan, 829 So.2d at 952

. On rehearing, the mother challenged only a collateral economic issue, namely which parent would have the right to claim the child as a dependant for federal income...