Sullivan v. State

Citation77 N.E.3d 187
Decision Date25 May 2017
Docket NumberCourt of Appeals Case No. 52A02-1610-CR-2499
Parties Caleb SULLIVAN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Attorney for Appellant : Cara Schaefer Wieneke, Wieneke Law Office, LLC, Brooklyn, Indiana.

Attorneys for Appellee : Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Larry D. Allen, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana.

Baker, Judge.

[1] Caleb Sullivan appeals his convictions for Level 4 Felony Burglary,1 Level 6 Felony Conspiracy to Commit Dealing in a Controlled Substance,2 and Level 6 Felony Theft.3 Sullivan raises two arguments: (1) there is insufficient evidence supporting his convictions for burglary and theft; and (2) his convictions for conspiracy to commit dealing in a controlled substance and theft are barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy. Finding sufficient evidence and no double jeopardy violation, we affirm.

Facts

[2] On the night of September 23, 2015, Sullivan was staying in Peru with his friend, Wally Taylor, and Taylor's girlfriend, Jennifer Rairigh. Sullivan and Taylor were regular drug users and wanted to get high. Sullivan brought up the idea of robbing a nursing home where he used to work. Sullivan knew how to gain access to the nursing home and knew that there were narcotics inside. Sullivan and Taylor agreed to steal narcotics from the nursing facility and then sell those drugs for money to buy heroin.

[3] Around 1:00 a.m. on September 24, 2015, Taylor and Sullivan took Rairigh's minivan and drove to the Aperion Health Care nursing home facility. Sullivan exited the van to see who was working that night; when he returned, he told Taylor that his old boss, Doreen Brunner, was on duty. Sullivan donned a mask and blue surgical gloves, took a black BB-gun from the minivan, and entered the Aperion facility from the side entrance. Taylor waited in the minivan in the parking lot.

[4] Inside, Brunner looked up and saw a masked man approach the nurse's station in the common dining room area. Sullivan appeared to be holding a gun at his waist and ordered Brunner to "open the box." Tr. Vol. II p. 150-51. He flipped open a drawer on the cart where the narcotics were stored and told Brunner, "Hurry up. I'm not playing." Id. at 151. Brunner noticed that Sullivan was trying to disguise his voice. She unlocked the box and placed blister packs of narcotics into a bag that Sullivan handed her. Sullivan then asked for the code he could use to exit the facility, which she provided.4 Sullivan ran to the door, punched in the code, and exited the building.

[5] Brunner immediately called 911. Although Sullivan had been wearing a mask, Brunner recognized him from his gait and general body build. She also believed it was him because he knew the security code to enter the facility, knew that he needed a different code to exit the facility, and knew where the narcotics box was located.

[6] Following the burglary, Sullivan returned to the minivan, which Taylor drove back to Rairigh's home. Rairigh was angry because she had been trying to contact Taylor and he had not responded, so she refused to let the men inside the house. Sullivan and Taylor walked to an abandoned house a couple of blocks away, where they removed the medication from the blister packs. In total, Sullivan had taken 642 pills of controlled substances, including Vicodin

, Xanax, Percocet, Ultram, and Ambien. Sullivan and Taylor each took half of the pills. After they parted ways, Taylor sold sixty to seventy of the pills for a total of $400, or about $5 apiece.

[7] Police eventually found and arrested Sullivan. On September 30, 2015, the State charged Sullivan with multiple offenses. After a later amendment, Sullivan was ultimately charged with the following crimes: Level 4 felony burglary, Level 5 felony robbery, Level 6 felony residential entry, Level 6 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in a controlled substance, Level 6 felony theft, and Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance.

[8] On August 31, 2016, following a trial, a jury found Sullivan guilty as charged. The trial court vacated the residential entry conviction to avoid double jeopardy concerns. On September 30, 2016, following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Sullivan to the following concurrent terms: eight years, with two years suspended to probation, for Level 4 felony burglary; eight years, with two years suspended to probation, for Level 5 felony robbery; one year and 182 days for Level 6 felony conspiracy; one year and 182 days for Level 6 felony theft; and one year for Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. Sullivan now appeals.

Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency

[9] Sullivan argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for burglary and theft. When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the conviction. Gray v. State , 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). We will affirm if, based on the evidence and inferences, a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Bailey v. State , 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009).

A. Burglary

[10] To convict Sullivan of Level 4 felony burglary, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he broke and entered a building or structure that is a dwelling of another person with the intent to commit a felony or theft in it. I.C. § 35-43-2-1(1). Sullivan argues that there is insufficient evidence establishing that the common dining room area of the nursing home is a dwelling. "Dwelling" is defined as "a building, structure, or other enclosed space, permanent or temporary, movable or fixed, that is a person's home or place of lodging." Ind. Code § 35-31-5.2-107.

[11] The legislature has imposed an increased penalty for burglarizing a dwelling "because of the potential danger to the probable occupants" of the dwelling. Howell v. State , 53 N.E.3d 546, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied . Here, there were at least twenty-two residents present in their rooms near the common dining area where the burglary occurred. In fact, the residents' rooms were so close to the area that Brunner worried that one of them might awaken during the burglary and be in danger, which is the very harm the legislature sought to prevent.

[12] Sullivan directs our attention to Robertson v. State , 765 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 2002), in support of his argument. In Robertson , our Supreme Court interpreted the statute prohibiting the unlicensed possession of a handgun outside of one's dwelling. In that case, the defendant had been convicted of that crime when he walked into the common hallway area of his apartment building while carrying an unlicensed handgun. Our Supreme Court ultimately concluded "that ‘dwelling’ does not include the common areas serving a person's apartment" because "the legislature cannot have intended to permit the carrying of unlicensed handguns in all apartment common areas that a person may claim as part of their place of lodging." Id. at 139-40.

[13] Sullivan argues that the common dining area in the nursing home facility is analogous to the common hallway area in the apartment building in Robertson . We disagree. While the nursing home facility contains private rooms that house one or two residents, those rooms do not constitute the entirety of the residents' living area. The residents eat all their meals and do all their activities in the dining room area; Brunner testified that "[e]verything they do is out there" and agreed that the area is "part of their living quarters[.]" Tr. p. 160.

[14] We question the applicability of the Robertson holding to the definition of "dwelling" in the context of the burglary statute, but we leave that question for another day, as we find this nursing home easily distinguishable from an apartment building. Here, it is apparent that the common dining area is a part of the residents' daily lives. They "dwell" in that area as much as they "dwell" in their private rooms. Consequently, we find sufficient evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that the nursing home constitutes a dwelling and Sullivan's conviction for Level 4 burglary.

B. Theft

[15] To convict Sullivan of Level 6 felony theft, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over the nursing home's medication, which had a fair market value of at least $750, with the intent to deprive the nursing home of any part of the medication's value or use. I.C. § 35-43-4-2. Sullivan argues that there is insufficient evidence establishing the value of the medication.

[16] At trial, Taylor testified that the two men divided up the 642 stolen pills. Taylor sold sixty to seventy pills out of his share for a total of approximately $400. He testified that the pills were worth about $5 each. Consequently, the total value of all the stolen pills would exceed $3,000.

[17] Sullivan argues that evidence of the black market value of the pills is improper. Instead, Sullivan contends that the State should have introduced evidence of the value of the pills in the commercial market—i.e. , pharmacy value. Sullivan notes that "[t]he issue of whether the black market value of controlled substances can be used for purposes of proving felony theft has not been addressed in Indiana." Appellant's Br. p. 11.

[18] In support of his argument, Sullivan directs our attention to Ridenour v. Furness , 546 N.E.2d 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), in which this Court reviewed the computation of damages for the illegal trapping of protected sport fish by commercial fishermen in Lake Michigan. Damages were to be calculated by measuring the "fair market value of the property at the time of loss." Id. at 325. In that case, however, there was no fair market value "because it is illegal in Indiana to sell the...

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2 cases
  • Brown v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • November 19, 2020
    ...violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. We apply a de novo standard of review to double jeopardy claims. Sullivan v. State , 77 N.E.3d 187, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied ; see also Wadle v. State , 151 N.E.3d 227, 237 (Ind. 2020) (noting that we review statutory and const......
  • Shepherd v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • September 14, 2020
    ...prohibitions against double jeopardy under the Indiana Constitution. We review double jeopardy issues de novo . Sullivan v. State , 77 N.E.3d 187, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied .[37] Between the time this case was fully briefed by the parties and the rendering of our decision, our......

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