Sullivan v. State

• Decision Date: 24 September 1980
• Docket Number: No. 36541,36541
• Citation: Sullivan v. State, 271 S.E.2d 823, 246 Ga. 426 (Ga. 1980)
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: SULLIVAN v. The STATE.

Page 823

271 S.E.2d 823

246 Ga. 426

SULLIVAN v. The STATE.

No. 36541.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Submitted Aug. 8, 1980.

Decided Sept. 24, 1980.

G. F. Peterman, III, Macon, for appellant.

W. Don Thompson, Dist. Atty., Willis B. Sparks, III, Asst. Dist. Atty., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Mary Beth Westmoreland, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

MARSHALL, Justice.

The defendant appeals from his convictions of aggravated assault and murder, and his concurrent five-year and life sentences. The sole error enumerated is the denial of the appellant's motion challenging the array of the grand jury, which motion was filed after the return of the indictment and 30 minutes prior to the trial.

"A challenge to the array of grand jurors is waived unless timely filed. As stated in Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975) (cert. den. 425 U.S. 976, 96 S.Ct. 2177, 48 L.Ed.2d 800 (1976)): 'In order for such a motion to be entertained by the trial court, it must be made prior to the return of the indictment or the defendant must show that he had no knowledge, either actual or constructive, of such alleged illegal composition of the grand jury prior to the time the indictment was returned; otherwise, the objection is deemed to be waived. Estes v. State, 232 Ga. 703, 708, 208 S.E.2d 806 (1974). Accord, McHan v. State, 232 Ga. 470, 471(2), 207 S.E.2d 457 (1974); Simmons v. State, 226 Ga. 110, 111(1a), 172 S.E.2d 680 (1970); Williams v. State, 210 Ga. 665, 667, 82 S.E.2d 217 (1954).' " Tennon v. State, 235 Ga. 594(1), 220 S.E.2d 914 (1975); Hamby v. State, 243 Ga. 339(1), 253 S.E.2d 759 (1979).

The appellant complains that a pre-indictment challenge to the array was impossible because neither he nor his counsel knew before the indictment was returned that the incompetent grand juror ¹ was serving on the grand jury which indicted him. He argues furthermore that, under the cases of Reich v. State, 53 Ga. 73 (1874) and Cobb v. State, 218 Ga. 10(3), 126 S.E.2d 231 (1962), a plea in abatement filed on or before arraignment is also a proper method of challenging the array. The appellant concedes that his motion was not made at the calendar call, as required by the court rules, but contends that this did not constitute arraignment, because no plea was entered at that time, no jurors were present, and, immediately after the appellant's challenge to the grand jury was made, the state proceeded to formally arraign him.

The record shows that the appellant's counsel was retained at least one week prior to indictment; that he presumed that the Crawford County Grand Jury then in session would indict the appellant; that he came to Crawford County one week prior to indictment and discussed the question of bond with the trial judge, but apparently made no effort to learn who was on the grand jury; that about one week prior to calendar call he was given a copy of the indictment, which showed on its face that a Mr. Cochran, known to him to be a member of the county board of education, was one of the grand jurors; and that under the local court rule all pre-trial motions were to be filed by calendar call. The above shows that counsel had both actual and constructive knowledge of the composition of the grand jury so as to be able to file an objection thereto prior to the indictment.

Regarding the appellant's contention that he was nevertheless entitled to challenge the array by a plea in abatement at or before arraignment under Reich v. State, 53 Ga. 73, supra, and Cobb v. State, 218 Ga. 10(3), 126 S.E.2d 231, supra, although these cases appear to make this an unconditional right, they have been construed to apply only where there has been no opportunity to raise the objection before the indictment was found. See Parris v. State, 125 Ga....