Sullivan v. State, S-18-0215

Citation444 P.3d 1257
Decision Date16 July 2019
Docket NumberS-18-0215
Parties Monty Dwayne SULLIVAN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

Representing Appellant: Office of the State Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Valerie Schoneberger, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Schoneberger.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; Christyne M. Martens, Deputy Attorney General; Russell Farr, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Farr.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

DAVIS, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Monty Sullivan filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act claiming new evidence showed he was innocent of the first-degree sexual abuse of a minor for which he was convicted in 2009. The district court dismissed the petition for failing to identify newly discovered evidence and for making conclusory claims, and Mr. Sullivan appeals. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. Sullivan presents two issues on appeal, which he states as follows:

I. Did the district court err in finding Mr. Sullivan did not present newly discovered evidence in his post-conviction petition for determination of factual innocence?
II. Was this denial premature in light of the district court’s refusal to grant Mr. Sullivan an evidentiary hearing?
FACTS

[¶3] Mr. Sullivan was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor in 2009. We described the underlying facts in our decision affirming the conviction:

In February of 2009, the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) took K.T., a minor child who was then nine years old, to the Child Advocacy Project (CAP) in Casper, Wyoming, to be interviewed. During the interview, K.T. revealed that on two separate occasions in her grandmother’s bedroom, Sullivan attempted to have sex with her but because it was too painful, K.T. stated that Sullivan anally raped her when she was seven and eight years old. K.T. also revealed that Sullivan made her taste his semen, and that there were occasions when Sullivan made her sit on his lap while he watched pornography on the computer. During one specific instance, K.T. recalled that Sullivan was rubbing K.T.’s private area through her clothes.
The Thermopolis Police Department interviewed Sullivan after learning of the CAP interview with K.T. They informed Sullivan of K.T.’s allegations, which he initially denied. Eventually, Sullivan admitted to law enforcement that he had done to K.T. what she alleged him to have done.

Sullivan v. State , 2011 WY 46, ¶¶ 3-4, 247 P.3d 879, 880-81 (Wyo. 2011) (footnote omitted).

[¶4] In 2011, following this Court’s mandate affirming the judgment against him, Mr. Sullivan filed a petition for post-conviction relief. He claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to assert ineffective assistance of counsel in his direct appeal. Mr. Sullivan argued several grounds for his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, including: 1) failure to challenge his confession to law enforcement; 2) failure to depose the victim’s physician; 3) failure to present expert testimony regarding alleged defects in the victim interview; and 4) failure to present evidence of sexual abuse of the victim by her uncle. The district court denied Mr. Sullivan’s petition, and this Court denied his petition for a writ of review.

[¶5] On April 23, 2018, Mr. Sullivan filed a pro se petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act (hereinafter "Act" or "Factual Innocence Act"). As grounds for his petition, he asserted newly discovered evidence consisting of: 1) a defense counsel interview of the victim’s physician during which the physician stated that he found limited signs of sexual abuse, that he referred the victim to a gynecologist, and that the record contained no indication that a rectal examination of the victim had been performed; 2) the victim’s prior allegations against her biological father and uncle; 3) a February 22, 2018 newspaper article reporting that the victim’s uncle, Glenn Tanner, had pled guilty to the 2007 second-degree sexual abuse of an unnamed minor; and 4) an assertion that law enforcement witnesses lied when they testified that Mr. Sullivan confessed to first-degree sexual abuse of the victim.

[¶6] On August 13, 2018, the district court entered an order summarily denying Mr. Sullivan’s actual innocence petition because it failed to cite newly discovered evidence and made irrelevant and conclusory allegations. Mr. Sullivan filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶7] We review a district court’s summary dismissal of a factual innocence petition de novo. Parkhurst v. State , 2019 WY 63, ¶ 9, 443 P.3d 834, 836 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Miller v. State , 340 P.3d 795, 796 (Utah App. 2014) (per curiam)). This appeal also presents a question of statutory interpretation concerning a district court’s grounds for dismissing a factual innocence petition, which is a question of law that we likewise review de novo. Parkhurst , ¶ 9, 443 P.3d at 836.

DISCUSSION

[¶8] Mr. Sullivan contends the district court erred in finding that he had not presented newly discovered evidence to support his factual innocence petition and that its dismissal of his petition was thus premature.

A. Initial Review Requirement under the Act

[¶9] The legislature enacted the Factual Innocence Act in 2018. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-12-401 to 407 (LexisNexis 2019). The Act allows a person convicted of a felony offense to petition for a hearing to establish that he or she is factually innocent, sets forth specific requirements for the petition, and it mandates a two-stage process before the district court. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-12-403, 404; see also Brown v. State , 308 P.3d 486, 493-94 (Utah 2013) (interpreting Utah’s similarly structured act). The district court is required to first review the petition to see that it meets certain of the Act’s requirements. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-12-403(c), 404(b). If it does not, the district court is required to dismiss the petition.

[¶10] The district court dismissed Mr. Sullivan’s petition after initial review. To begin our discussion, then, we must determine how a district court is to view a petition’s allegations or averments in conducting the initial review required by sections 403(c) and 404(b) of the Act. In doing so, we are guided by our rules of statutory interpretation.

"When we interpret statutes, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and we ‘attempt to determine the legislature’s intent based primarily on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.’ " Fugle v. Sublette County School Dist. No. 9 , 2015 WY 98, ¶ 8, 353 P.3d 732, 734 (Wyo. 2015) (quoting Krenning v. Heart Mountain Irrigation Dist. , 2009 WY 11, ¶ 9, 200 P.3d 774, 778 (Wyo. 2009) ). "Where legislative intent is discernible a court should give effect to the ‘most likely, most reasonable, interpretation of the statute, given its design and purpose.’ " Adekale v. State , 2015 WY 30, ¶ 12, 344 P.3d 761, 765 (Wyo. 2015) (quoting Rodriguez v. Casey , 2002 WY 111, ¶ 20, 50 P.3d 323, 329 (Wyo. 2002) ).
We therefore construe each statutory provision in pari materia , giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence according to their arrangement and connection. To ascertain the meaning of a given law, we also consider all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose and strive to interpret them harmoniously. We presume that the legislature has acted in a thoughtful and rational manner with full knowledge of existing law, and that it intended new statutory provisions to be read in harmony with existing law and as part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence. When the words used convey a specific and obvious meaning, we need not go farther and engage in statutory construction.
PacifiCorp, Inc. v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue , 2017 WY 106, ¶ 10, 401 P.3d 905, 908-09 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting Nicodemus v. Lampert , 2014 WY 135, ¶ 13, 336 P.3d 671, 674 (Wyo. 2014) ).

Wyo. Jet Center, LLC v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd. , 2019 WY 6, ¶ 12, 432 P.3d 910, 915 (Wyo. 2019).

[¶11] Sections 403 and 404 of the Act set forth the requirements for the petition and mandate initial review by the district court. Section 403 provides in relevant part:

(b) The petition shall contain an assertion of factual innocence under oath by the petitioner and shall aver, with supporting affidavits or other credible documents, that:
(i) Newly discovered evidence exists that, if credible, establishes a bona fide issue of factual innocence;
(ii) The specific evidence identified by the petitioner establishes innocence and is material to the case and the determination of factual innocence;
(iii) The material evidence identified by the petitioner is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known, is not reliant solely upon recantation of testimony by a witness against the petitioner and is not merely impeachment evidence;
(iv) When viewed with all other evidence in the case, whether admitted during trial or not, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates that the petitioner is factually innocent; and
(v) Newly discovered evidence claimed in the petition is distinguishable from any claims made in prior petitions.
(c) The court shall review the petition in accordance with the procedures in W.S. 7-12-404, and make a finding whether the petition has satisfied the requirements of subsection (b) of this section. If the court finds the petition does not meet all the requirements of subsection (b) of this section, it shall dismiss the petition without prejudice and send notice of the dismissal to the petitioner, the district attorney, and the attorney general .

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-403 (emphasis added).

[¶12] Section 404(b) of the Act directs that "[t]he assigned district judge shall conduct an initial...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Dugan v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • November 6, 2019
    ...106, ¶ 10, 401 P.3d 905, 908-09 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting Nicodemus v. Lampert , 2014 WY 135, ¶ 13, 336 P.3d 671, 674 (Wyo. 2014) ). Sullivan v. State , 2019 WY 71, ¶ 10, 444 P.3d 1257, 1259-60 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Wyo. Jet Center, LLC v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd. , 2019 WY 6, ¶ 12, 432 P.3d 910,......
  • MH v. First Judicial Dist. Court of Laramie Cnty.
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • June 10, 2020
    ...the presumption "that the legislature has acted in a thoughtful and rational manner with full knowledge of existing law, ..." Sullivan v. State , 2019 WY 71, ¶ 10, 444 P.3d 1257, 1260 (Wyo. 2019), we must conclude that it did not intend to provide a mechanism for correction of some informat......
  • WyoLaw, LLC v. Wyo. Office of Attorney General
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • May 5, 2021
    ...given its design and purpose.'" Lozano v. Cir. Ct. of Sixth Jud. Dist., 2020 WY 44, ¶ 15, 460 P.3d 721, 728 (Wyo. 2020)(quoting Sullivan v. State, 2019 WY 71, ¶ 10, 444 P.3d 1257, 1260 (Wyo. 2019)). We presume that the legislature acts with full knowledge of existing law, and that it intend......
  • Life Care Ctr. of Casper v. Barrett
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • May 5, 2020
    ...governing the appointment of a wrongful death representative, which is likewise a question of law that we review de novo. Sullivan v. State , 2019 WY 71, ¶ 7, 444 P.3d 1257, 1259 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Parkhurst v. State , 2019 WY 63, ¶ 9, 443 P.3d 834, 836 (Wyo. 2019) ).DISCUSSION A. District......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT