Sullivan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.
| Decision Date | 26 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Case No.: 8:19-cv-00300-GLS |
| Parties | HAROLD SULLIVAN, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Pending before this Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority ("WMATA"). (ECF No. 30). Plaintiff Harold Sullivan ("Plaintiff") filed an opposition, and WMATA has filed its reply. (ECF Nos. 31, 32). The matter has been fully briefed. Upon review of the pleadings and the record, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See L.R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on December 6, 2018, alleging that he suffered injuries following a fall on February 3, 2016. Plaintiff maintains that his fall occurred due to WMATA's negligence. (ECF No. 1, Exhibit 1).1
The following facts are undisputed. On the morning of February 3, 2016, before 8:49 a.m., Plaintiff arrived at the Branch Avenue Metrorail station,2 operated by WMATA, in order to catch the train to work.3 (Deposition of Plaintiff Harold Sullivan, p.2, lines 4-11, "Sullivan Dep. 2:4-11"). By the time that Plaintiff arrived there, it had been raining for a significant period of time.4 Plaintiff paid his fare, entered the station, and walked down the stairs to the platform. (Sullivan Dep. 20:3-16). As Plaintiff descended the stairs, he heard the train announcement, and also noticed that there was a train waiting at the platform. (Sullivan Dep. 23:1-10). Plaintiff was unaware of how long the train was there. (Sullivan Dep. 22:2-21). Plaintiff was walking at a brisk pace as he approached the waiting train. (Sullivan Dep. 53:5-7; Def.'s Ex. 6, p. 5). When Plaintiff approached the door of the waiting train, he decided to go to the next train car and pivoted to the right in order to do so. (Sullivan Dep. 23:3-13). As Plaintiff pivoted to the right, his right foot began to slide from under him and he fell back doing "like an end zone split dance." (Sullivan Dep. 23:13-17). Plaintiff claims he fell on the granite edge5 of the platform due to it being wet because of the rain. (Sullivan Dep. 25:15-20). Two men helped Plaintiff to stand up and then he boarded the train. (Sullivan Dep. 28:11-20). At approximately 8:49 A.M., Plaintiff arrived at the L'Enfant Plaza Metrorail station and reported the incident to Mr. Smith, the on-duty station manager. (Sullivan Dep. 30:16-21). Plaintiff claims he suffered a broken fibula as a result of the fall. (Sullivan Dep. 35).
Motions for summary judgment shall be granted only if there are no genuine issues as to any material fact, such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987) (internal citation omitted). The burden can be satisfied through the submission of, e.g., pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir. 1984). To defeat motions for summary judgment, on the other hand, the nonmoving party cannot simply cast "metaphysical doubt" on the material facts, but rather must provide specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
The Court must construe the facts and documentary materials submitted by the parties, including the credibility and weight of particular evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions. Masson v. N.Y. Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 495, 520 (1991) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255)). A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create an issue of material fact. See Barwick, 736 F.2d at 958-59 (citing Seago, 42 F.R.D. at 632). Summary judgment is inappropriate if any material factual issue "may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
To establish a cause of action for negligence in Maryland, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury; (2) the defendantbreached that duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered actual loss or injury; and (4) the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty. See Todd v. Mass Transit Admin., 373 Md. 149, 155, 816 A.2d 930 (Md. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Negligence is a relative concept and must be decided on the facts of each particular case; ordinarily, it is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. See Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 246 A.2d 549 (1965).6
Under Maryland law, a possessor of land must exercise reasonable care to "protect [an] invitee from injury caused by an unreasonable risk," which the invitee would be unlikely to perceive in exercising ordinary care for his/her own safety, and about which the owner knows or could have discovered in the exercise of reasonable care. Casper v. Chas. F. Smith & Son, Inc., 316 Md. 573, 582, 560 A.2d 1130 (Md. 1989); see also Blood v. Hamani P'ship, 143 Md. App. 375, 384, 795 A.2d 135 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2002)(plaintiff must proffer evidence of a dangerous condition, awareness of the landowner, and failure to exercise ordinary care to cure the defect).
Common carriers, such as WMATA, owe an elevated duty of care to passengers. Specifically, WMATA owes passengers "the highest degree of care to provide safe means and methods of transportation for them." Todd, supra, 373 Md. at 156. A common carrier, however, is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers; rather, it is bound to deliver passengers to their destination as expeditiously as possible, consistent with safety. Mass Transit Admin. v. Miller, 271 Md. 256, 259, 315 A.2d 772 (Md. 1974).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that WMATA breached its heightened duty of care when it failed to maintain the platform in a safe condition and failed to warn Plaintiff of the dangerous conditions present on the platform. (ECF No. 1-1). WMATA argues that summary judgment should be granted in its favor because Plaintiff has failed to establish that WMATA had actual or constructive notice of the condition for sufficient time to permit WMATA to discover the condition. (ECF 30-2, pp. 4-6). Alternatively, WMATA argues that even if it had actual or constructive notice, it did not have the duty to warn Plaintiff of an open and obvious condition. (ECF 30-2, p. 6-7).
In this case, the alleged dangerous condition is the wet/slippery platform due to the rain. In order to prevail on his claim of negligence, Plaintiff must prove either that defendant WMATA created the dangerous condition that caused his fall, or that WMATA had actual or constructive notice of that condition. Here, Plaintiff does not appear to pursue a theory that WMATA directly created the dangerous condition. Instead, Plaintiff's negligence claim turns on whether he can establish that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the slippery nature of the platform prior to his fall.
Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the possessor of land "had actual or constructive knowledge of [the existence of the dangerous condition]" prior to his injury. Lexington Mkt. Auth.v. Zappala, 233 Md. 444, 446, 197 A.2d 147 (1964). See also Maans v. Giant, 161 Md. App. 620, 627, 871 A.2d 627 (2005). In addition, WMATA has a duty to inspect and take reasonable precautions against foreseeable dangers on its premises. Tennant v. Shoppers Food, 115 Md. App. 381, 388, 693 A.2d 370 (1997). However, although WMATA has a duty to inspect its premises, it does not have a duty to "continuously inspect" its premises. Id. at 390. (emphasis added). (quoting Lexington Mkt. Auth.v. Zappala, 233 Md. 444, 446, 197 A.2d 147 (1964)).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence to support an inference that WMATA had actual notice of the platform's condition. In contrast, there is evidence that WMATA did not have actual notice. Specifically, according to William Martin (Risk Management Quality Control Manager of WMATA), he reviewed WMATA's safety and claims from the Branch Avenue Station for February 3, 2016 between opening and closing, and he stated that "WMATA received no reports of any incidents, accidents, or occurrences, which relate to the condition of the train platform" except for Plaintiff's claim. (ECF No. 30-10; Def.'s Exhibit 8). In addition, there is no testimony from any WMATA employee that he/she observed the condition of the platform prior to Plaintiff's fall. Accordingly, there is no evidence that WMATA had actual notice of the purportedly slippery condition of the platform prior to Plaintiff's fall.
In order to prove "constructive notice" of a dangerous condition, Plaintiff must show that "the condition existed for a length of time sufficient to permit a person under a duty to discover it if he had exercised ordinary care." Rawls v. Hochschild, 217 Md. 113, 117, 113 A.2d 405 (1955). Whether there has been sufficient time for a business proprietor to discover a dangerous condition depends on the circumstances such as "nature of the danger, the number of persons likely to be affected by it, the diligence required to discover or prevent it, opportunities and the means of knowledge, the foresight which a person of ordinary care and prudence would be expected to exercise under the circumstances, and the foreseeable consequences of the conditions." Deering Woods Condo. Ass'n v. Spoon, 377 Md. 250, 264, 833 A.2d 17 (2003). See also Rehn v. Westfield Am., 153 Md....
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