Summerchase Ltd. Partnership I v. City of Gonzales, Civil Action No. 94-2695-B-M2.
| Citation | 970 F.Supp. 522 |
| Decision Date | 17 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 94-2695-B-M2. |
| Parties | SUMMERCHASE LTD. PARTNERSHIP I, et al. v. CITY OF GONZALES, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Rodolfo Jesus Aguilar, Jr., Shannan Sweeney Rieger, Michael H. Rubin, McGlinchey, Stafford, Lang, Baton Rouge, LA, Eddie Douglas Austin, Jr., Lake Charles, LA, for plaintiffs.
Timothy Earle Pujol, Percy, Pujol, O'Brian & Wiley, James Conner Percy, R. Ryland Percy, III, Timmy J. Fontenot, Gonzales, LA, James Conner Percy, Baton Rouge, LA, Joseph C. Wiley, Gonzales, LA, for defendants.
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs2 filed this suit because defendants have refused to allow Summerchase to build an apartment complex3 designed for low income inhabitants within the City of Gonzales, Parish of Ascension, State of Louisiana. Summerchase argues defendants' refusal to grant the building permits necessary for construction violates the following provisions of federal law: (1) the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"),4 (2) the Fifth Amendment "takings" clause,5 (3) procedural due process, and (4) substantive due process. After the suit was filed, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of plaintiffs' claims. The parties have fully briefed and argued the issues involved in this case. After considering the oral arguments presented by the parties and reviewing the entire record, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."6
The well-established criteria that there must be no genuine issue of material fact before summary judgment will issue insures that a properly supported motion will not be defeated simply by the "existence of some alleged factual dispute."7 In determining the "materiality" of facts it is necessary to refer to the underlying substantive law.8 It is only those factual disputes that might affect the action's outcome under governing law which can properly preclude summary judgment. Disputes over facts which have no effect on the motion's resolution are irrelevant.9 Even if a fact is material, a factual dispute will not prevent summary judgment if the dispute is not "genuine." Such a conclusion is reached when the evidence could not lead a rational trier of fact to return a verdict for the non-moving party.10 In examining the record, the Court will view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the non-moving party.11
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact.12 Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on the issue at trial, the movant may discharge its burden by simply informing the Court of the basis for its motion and either producing evidence that negates the existence of a material element in the non-moving party's claim or defense or identifying to the Court those portions of the record which demonstrate the lack of proof supporting a crucial element of the non-movant's case.13
Once the moving party makes the proper showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to designate "specific facts" in the record, by way of non-conclusory affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions on file, which evidence that there is a genuine issue for trial.14 Because it bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the non-moving party is required to establish each element crucial to its action "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non[-]moving party's case necessarily, renders all other facts immaterial."15 The non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the moving party's pleadings and "must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."16 When all the evidence presented by both parties "could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial'" and summary judgment is proper.17
(I) Fair Housing Act Violations
Summerchase maintains the revocation of the building permit and the prevention of construction of the Summerchase Development by defendants was done with discriminatory intent and/or had a discriminatory effect in violation of the FHA. Specifically, Summerchase alleges defendants not only intended to discriminate against minorities and families with children, but the actions of defendants had the effect of discriminating against minorities and families with children. Defendants deny these allegations. As alleged by Summerchase, a violation of the FHA may be shown either by proof of discriminatory intent or by a showing of "significant discriminatory effect."18 The Court will first address the issue of discriminatory intent.
Defendants contend Summerchase's complaint fails to provide fair notice of the FHA discriminatory, intent claim, and therefore, the FHA discriminatory intent claim should be dismissed. Defendants' contention is without merit. Summerchase's complaint adequately places defendants on notice of the FHA discriminatory intent claim in compliance with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court also finds there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute which preclude the Court from granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on Summerchase's FHA claim that defendants intended to discriminate against minorities. However, defendants have clearly established their entitlement to summary judgment on Summerchase's claim that defendants intended to discriminate against families with children. Summerchase presented only scant, unconvincing, and unsupported evidence in opposition to defendants motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the Court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to Summerchase's FHA claim that defendants' intended to discriminate against families with children.
Summerchase also alleges defendants' refusal to grant a permit necessary for the construction of the Summerchase Development has a discriminatory effect against families with children and minorities. "The discriminatory effect of a rule arises in two contexts: adverse impact on a particular minority group and harm to the community generally by the perpetuation of segregation."19 In other words, discriminatory effect may be proven by either (1) a showing of disparate impact, or (2) a showing of segregative effect. The Court now turns to a discussion of the merits of the claims of discriminatory effect beginning with the discriminatory effect of defendants' actions on families with children.
Summerchase has presented little or no evidence of the disparate impact or segregative effect on families with children because of defendants' refusal to grant a permit necessary for the construction of the Summerchase Development. Defendants have established their entitlement to summary judgment on this claim as a matter of fact and law. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment on defendants' claim that the refusal to grant Summerchase a permit necessary or the construction of the Summerchase Development has a discriminatory effect on families with children.
The Court will next discuss the merits of Summerchase's claim that defendants' refusal to grant a permit necessary for the construction of the Summerchase Development has a discriminatory effect because it has a disparate impact and a segregative effect on minorities. The Court will first discuss the merits of the disparate impact claim
"Under the disparate impact analysis, as other circuits have recognized, a prima facie case is established by showing that the challenged practice of the defendant actually or predictably results in racial discrimination; in other words that it has a discriminatory effect."20 Once a prima facie case of disparate impact is made, the burden shifts to the defendant to "prove that its actions furthered, in theory and Ln practice, a legitimate bona fide [compelling] governmental interest and that no alternative would serve that interest with less: discriminatory effect."21 In determining whether defendants' proffered reasons rise to the level of a compelling governmental interest, the Court must consider the following factors:
first, whether the ordinance in fact furthers the governmental interest asserted; second, whether the public interest. served by the ordinance is constitutionally permissible and is substantial enough to outweigh the private detriment caused by it; and third, whether less drastic means are available whereby the stated governmental interest may be attained.22
In support of the their argument that there is no disparate impact on minorities in this case, defendants rely on statistics based solely on the population in the region eligible for the Summerchase Development.23 Summerchase contends the Court should focus on the disproportionate effect on the entire population in the region, not just on the population eligible for the Summerchase Development.24
A summary of the evidence relied on by the parties is necessary for the Court to properly rule on the issue of whether the Court should utilize "absolute numbers" or "proportional numbers" in determining whether there is any disparate impact on minorities. The Court will first discuss the evidence of disparate...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bryan v. City of Madison, Miss.
...of Aldermen in the instant case acted arbitrarily or outside the legislative process. For instance, in Summerchase Limited Partnership I v. City of Gonzales, 970 F.Supp. 522 (M.D.La.1997), the Board of Aldermen for the City of Gonzales denied a developer's request for a building permit and ......
-
Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, Tex.
...844 F.2d 926, 937 (2nd Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15, 109 S.Ct. 276, 102 L.Ed.2d 180 (1988); see also, Summerchase Ltd. Partnership I v. City of Gonzales, 970 F.Supp. 522, 527-28 (M.D.La.1997). The Second Circuit's decision in Huntington is directly on point and has been accepted as the leading......
-
Orleans Fair Housing Center v. St. Bernard Parish, Civil Action No. 06-7185.
...Bradford because he used "proportional numbers" instead of "absolute numbers," relying upon Summerchase Ltd. Partnership v. City of Gonzales, et al., 970 F.Supp. 522, 528-529 (M.D.La.1997)(discussing Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-651, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d ......
-
New Cingular Wireless, PCS, LLC v. City-Parish of E. Baton Rouge
...or because the permit was approved based on a misrepresentation made by the property owner.); Summerchase Ltd. Partnership I v. City of Gonzales, 970 F. Supp. 522, 534 (M.D. La. 1997). The instant case is distinguishable from Dunn because we have determined that the permit was improperly is......