Summers v. City of McCall
| Decision Date | 29 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:13–CV–00203–EJL–CWD. |
| Citation | 84 F.Supp.3d 1126 |
| Parties | Gerald A. SUMMERS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF McCALL; a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, and Eugene Drabinski, City Manager for the City of McCall, Donald Baily, Mayor of the City of McCall and a City Council member, Dr. Marcia Witte, M.D., a member of the McCall City Council, Nicolas Swanson, a member of the McCall City Council, Jackie Aymon, a member of the McCall City Council, Laura Scott, a member of the McCall City Council, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Matthew C. Williams, Williams Law, P.L.L.C., Cascade, ID, for Plaintiff.
Bentley G. Stromberg, Clements Brown & McNichols, Lewiston, ID, for Defendants.
Pending before the Court in the above-entitled matter is the Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and related Motion to Strike. The parties have filed their responsive briefing and the matters are ripe for the Court's consideration. Having fully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court conclusively finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, this matter shall be decided on the record before this Court without oral argument.
Plaintiff, Gerald A. Summers was appointed as the Chief of Police for the City of McCall, Idaho in November of 2005 and held that position until his termination on April 11, 2013. The facts giving rise to the claims in this case primarily revolve around the actions of Defendant Eugene Drabinski who was the interim and later became the permanent City Manager of the Defendant City of McCall (the “City”).1 Mr. Summers claims that Mr. Drabinski retaliated against him for various reasons including: supporting another candidate for the City Manager position, reporting Mr. Drabinski's aggressive behavior towards Mr. Summers and his creating of a hostile work environment, conducting a criminal investigation of the Valley County Sheriff's Office, filing a Notice of Tort Claim against Valley County, and reporting Mr. Drabinski's driver's license violations. (Dkt. 1.)
Prior to his termination, Mr. Summers had worked for the City's police department for several years ultimately ascending to the position of Police Chief. In August of 2012, Mr. Drabinski was appointed interim City Manager by the City Council while the City searched for a permanent City Manager. Mr. Summers applied for the permanent position but was eliminated from contention mid-way through the process. Mr. Summers then shifted his support to another candidate with whom he had previously worked, Carol Brockmann. Later in the search process, Mr. Drabinski submitted his own application for the permanent position. The City Council eventually appointed Mr. Drabinski as the permanent City Manager in November of 2012.
While Mr. Drabinski was still acting as interim City Manager, he and Mr. Summers had many interactions given their respective positions in the City. These interactions reveal that the two disagreed about several matters and/or had difficulty working together and communicating. One particular circumstance occurred in September of 2012 during a meeting at the police department where Mr. Drabinski was presenting the results of a public survey he had put out concerning the City's police force.2 Mr. Summers disagreed with the accuracy and/or reliability of the survey. At the September 2012 meeting, Mr. Summers alleges that Mr. Drabinski became aggressive and threatening towards him prompting some who were present to report the actions to the City's Human Resources Manager. Other instances evidencing a conflict between the two arise from reports of Mr. Drabinski's driving violations, alleged retaliation and general threats of termination made by Mr. Drabinski towards Mr. Summers, Mr. Drabinski's accusations challenging Mr. Summers' loyalty and statements that Mr. Summers needed to “get on the bus,” and the circumstances surrounding Mr. Summers' relationship with the Valley County Sheriff's Office.
In January of 2013, after being appointed permanent City Manager, Mr. Drabinski met with Mr. Summers and asked for his resignation and/or threatened to fire him. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 66–68, 72.) Mr. Summers refused to resign and notified the City Council of Mr. Drabinski's retaliation. On February 1, 2013, Mr. Summers was place on paid administrative leave. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 75.) Mr. Summers alleges the City did not conduct any investigation into his reports of retaliation. On February 15, 2013, a Notice of Proposed Personnel Action was issued wherein Mr. Drabinski proposed that Mr. Summers be terminated. On February 21, 2013, the City Council held a closed session to take up the proposal to terminate Mr. Summers. At this session Mr. Drabinski gave his reasons for recommending that Mr. Summers be terminated and asked the City Council to approve his request. Mr. Summers was then given the opportunity to refute the allegations and present his position to the City Council. Thereafter, the City Council considered the proposal to terminate Mr. Summers in three separate sessions. Ultimately, on April 12, 2013, the City Council approved the proposed action and a Notice of Termination was sent to Mr. Summers. Thereafter, on April 30, 2013, Mr. Summers initiated this case by filing the instant Complaint raising the following claims:
(Dkt. 1.) The Defendants have filed this Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of the claims raised in the Complaint. (Dkt. 11.) The Court finds as follows.
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56 provides, in pertinent part, that judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The Supreme Court has made it clear that under Rule 56 summary judgment is mandated if the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element which is essential to the non-moving party's case and upon which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the non-moving party fails to make such a showing on any essential element, “there can be no ‘genuine issue of material fact,’ since a completely failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.3
Moreover, under Rule 56, it is clear that an issue, in order to preclude entry of summary judgment, must be both “material” and “genuine.” An issue is “material” if it affects the outcome of the litigation. An issue, before it may be considered “genuine,” must be established by “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute ... to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968) ). The Ninth Circuit cases are in accord. See, e.g., British Motor Car Distrib. v. San Francisco Automotive Indus. Welfare Fund, 882 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.1989).
Id. at 374 (citation omitted).
Of course, when applying the above standard, the court must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir.1992).
Defendants have filed a Motion to Strike portions of the Affidavit of Gerald A. Summers arguing the objectionable...
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