Summers v. Howard University

• Decision Date: 22 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 98-2692 SSH.,CIV. A. 98-2692 SSH.
• Citation: 127 F.Supp.2d 27
• Parties: Frank SUMMERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HOWARD UNIVERSITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

127 F.Supp.2d 27

Frank SUMMERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HOWARD UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

No. CIV. A. 98-2692 SSH.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

December 22, 2000.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Kennedy & Dolan, Silver Spring, MD, for Plaintiffs.

Leroy T. Jenkins, Jr., Howard University, Office of Legal Affairs, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

STANLEY S. HARRIS, District Judge.

Before the Court are defendant's Amended Motion To Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment, plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the parties' respective oppositions to these motions, and plaintiffs' reply to defendant's opposition.¹ Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and the entire record in this case, the Court grants in part and denies in part defendant's motion, and denies plaintiffs' motion. Although findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Summers v. Department of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1079-80 (D.C.Cir.1998), the Court sets forth its reasoning.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are security personnel — security officers ("SOs") and special police officers ("SPOs") — employed in defendant Howard University's campus police department.² Plaintiffs' amended complaint asserts claims for overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA" or the "Act"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and, alternatively, claims for breach of contract under the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA").³ Plaintiffs' first claim alleges that, since July 1998, defendant has required plaintiffs to work eight-and-a-half-hour daily shifts, while compensating them for only eight-hour shifts; although plaintiffs are given a half-hour meal break during their shifts, they contend that these breaks constitute compensable "work" under the FLSA because defendant imposes a number of restrictions on their activity during these periods. Am. Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiffs contend that defendant's policies violate 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), and that they are entitled to compensation for 150 minutes of overtime per five-day work week at a rate of one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay; plaintiffs seek recovery for this amount, and a commensurate amount of liquidated damages, under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Id. ¶¶ 12-20. Alternatively, plaintiffs seek overtime compensation for their purported meal periods under the terms of the CBA. Id. ¶¶ 23-28.⁴ Plaintiffs' second claim alleges that defendant has violated the FLSA by failing to compensate them for "pre-shift and post-shift work"; plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to approximately 150 minutes of overtime compensation per five-day work week and a commensurate amount of liquidated damages. Id. ¶¶ 29-39. Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to overtime compensation for their alleged pre- and post-shift work under the terms of the CBA. Id. ¶¶ 40-45. Finally, plaintiffs allege that defendant has violated the CBA by failing to provide plaintiffs with two ten-minute breaks per work shift.⁵ Id. ¶¶ 46-51.

DISCUSSION

A. Defendant's Motion To Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiffs' breach of contract claims on the ground that plaintiffs did not submit their claims to arbitration as required by the CBA.⁶ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) states that a motion making any of the defenses listed therein "shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted." Because defendant filed its motion to dismiss in this case after it filed its amended answer, its motion runs afoul of the restriction in Rule 12(b). Nevertheless, the Court will exercise its discretion and treat defendant's motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).⁷ See Hallberg v. Pasco County, Florida, 1996 WL 153673, *2 (M.D.Fla. Mar.18, 1996); Perkins v. University of Ill. at Chicago, 1995 WL 680758, *1 (N.D.Ill. Nov.14, 1995); Eldridge v. Springs Indust., Inc., 882 F.Supp. 356, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1995). In resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must "view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Peters v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d 1483, 1485 (D.C.Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "A court will grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings only if, after the close of the pleadings, no material fact remains in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Transworld Prods. Co. v. Canteen Corp., 908 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C.1995).

On a Rule 12(c) motion, "[i]f ... matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 ...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Summary judgment may be granted only if the pleadings and evidence "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a summary judgment motion, all evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Mere allegations in the pleadings, however, are not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion; if the moving party shows that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The CBA establishes elaborate procedures for presenting employee grievances for internal review and, if necessary, arbitration (the "Grievance/Arbitration Procedures"). See Def.'s Sept. 20, 2000, Praecipe (hereinafter "Praecipe"), Ex. B, Article 15. An aggrieved employee must first discuss a grievance with the employee's immediate supervisor within ten days of the date of the grievance or the employee's knowledge of its occurrence. See id., Article 15.3 (Step One). If the grievance is not resolved, it must be presented in writing to the Director of Security within three days of the meeting with the supervisor; the Director of Security then must meet with the aggrieved employee and the President of the Metropolitan Special Police Officers Federation (the "Union"), and provide a written decision within ten days of receiving the written grievance. See id. (Step Two). The Union may appeal the Director of Security's decision to Howard University's Director of Employee and Labor Relations or the Chief Executive of the Hospital, who must render a written decision within 21 days. See id. (Step Three). The Union may appeal the subsequent decision within seven days, which triggers the arbitration process. See id. (Step Four).

Defendant alleges that plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of the Grievance/Arbitration Procedures and that this alleged failure bars them from asserting their contract claims in this case.⁸ Under both federal law and the law of the District of Columbia, there is a strong policy favoring arbitration where parties to an agreement have established a mechanism for submitting claims to arbitration. See, e.g., In re District No. 1-Pacific Coast Dist., Marine Eng'rs' Beneficial, 723 F.2d 70, 77 (D.C.Cir.1983) (citing United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960)); Masurovsky v. Green, 687 A.2d 198, 201 (D.C.1996). Where an agreement contains an arbitration provision, a court must require the parties to submit disputed claims to arbitration absent an indication that the parties intended to exclude the subject matter of the claims from the scope of the arbitration provision. See In re District No. 1-Pacific Coast Dist., Marine Eng'rs' Beneficial, 723 F.2d at 77; Masurovsky, 687 A.2d at 201-02. In this case, although the CBA does not contain an express provision stating that all grievances must be submitted pursuant to the Grievance/Arbitration Procedures, the language of Article 15 suggests that those procedures are mandatory. See, e.g., Praecipe, Ex. B, Article 15.3 (Step One) ("The aggrieved employee and the Union representative, if requested, shall discuss the grievance with the employee's immediate supervisor ...."); id., Article 15.3 (Step Two) ("If the grievance is not resolved at Step 1, it shall be presented in writing to the Director of Security ...."); id., Article 15.8 ("In the event that the Employer fails to meet the time constraints stated herein, the aggrieved employee shall have the right to proceed to the next grievance level."). In any event, there is no indication that the parties to the CBA intended to exclude the subject-matter of plaintiffs' contract claims — overtime compensation and rest breaks — from the scope of the arbitration provisions. Accordingly, plaintiffs must pursue their contract claims pursuant to the Grievance/Arbitration Procedures.⁹

Plaintiffs do not allege that they have availed themselves of the grievance procedures with respect to their overtime claims under the CBA, but do allege that their break claim has been grieved administratively. See Pls.' Opp'n at 2 n. 2. In support of their allegation, plaintiffs supply copies of two grievance forms indicating that, on January 11 and February 21, 1999, plaintiff Paul Cook (and the Union on his behalf) requested that defendant allow him to take two ten-minute breaks per shift as required by Article 8.5.1 of the CBA; the February 21st request indicates that Mr. Cook's supervisor denied his request.¹⁰ The Court finds these grievance forms insufficient to satisfy the Grievance/Arbitration Procedures because they represent only one plaintiff's attempts to exhaust those...