Summers v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 1-89-3098

• Decision Date: 28 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 1-89-3098,1-89-3098
• Citation: 574 N.E.2d 206,158 Ill.Dec. 412,214 Ill.App.3d 878
• Parties: , 158 Ill.Dec. 412 Ruby SUMMERS, Administrator of the Estate of James Summers, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES TOBACCO COMPANY and Aetna Life & Casualty Company, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 206

574 N.E.2d 206 214 Ill.App.3d 878, 158 Ill.Dec. 412 Ruby SUMMERS, Administrator of the Estate of James Summers,
Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES TOBACCO COMPANY and Aetna Life & Casualty
Company, Defendants-Appellees. No. 1-89-3098. Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, First Division. May 28, 1991.

Page 208

[214 Ill.App.3d 879] [158 Ill.Dec. 414] James J. McGraw, Anna Marek, Hanover Park, for plaintiff-appellant.

Glass, Hill, Dallmeyer & Roth, Ltd., Northbrook (Michael M. Roth, of counsel), for U.S. Tobacco Co.

Tribler & Orpett, P.C., Chicago (D.J. Sartorio, Philip R. King, of counsel), for Aetna Life & Cas. Co.

Justice BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Ruby Summers, as administrator of the estate of James Summers, deceased (plaintiff), filed a two-count complaint against defendants United States Tobacco Company (U.S. Tobacco) and Aetna Life & Casualty Company (Aetna) alleging that the termination of decedent's employment and health benefits were in violation of: (1) The Employment Retirement Investment Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1988)); (2) the "bad faith" provision of the Illinois Insurance Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 73, par. 767); and (3) various State common-law theories, including breach of contract and wrongful discharge. Pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-619), the circuit court granted defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on Federal preemption and other grounds. We affirm.

The record reflects that plaintiff is the court-appointed administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, James Summers (the deceased). Prior to his death on June 11, 1987, the deceased had worked [214 Ill.App.3d 880] as an electrician for U.S. Tobacco since January 6, 1986. As a condition of his employment, the deceased was required to join the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, No. 134, which, during the duration of the deceased's employment, was a party to a collective-bargaining agreement with U.S. Tobacco (the union agreement). This agreement governed the deceased's rights as to such matters as allowable sick days, health benefits, leaves of absence, termination of employment for "just cause," and grievance procedures to review terminations.

The deceased's absence from work began on January 16, 1987, and continued until his death. Under the union agreement, the deceased was entitled to and given a 30-day leave of absence without pay after his five allowable sick days were exhausted on January 22, 1987. After the initial 30-day period expired, and although not required by the union agreement, U.S. Tobacco extended the deceased's leave of absence status for two additional 30-day periods. On April 28, 1987, U.S. Tobacco removed the deceased from his leave of absence status and thereafter terminated him for "just cause" due to excessive absenteeism. The deceased never instituted any grievance procedure following his termination and elected to convert his group medical insurance to an individual policy.

Count I of plaintiff's complaint, brought against U.S. Tobacco, alleges that while employed, the deceased had received better than average job evaluations. Plaintiff alleges that on or about April 10, 1987, U.S. Tobacco learned that the deceased was totally disabled, but nevertheless terminated the deceased due to his illness on May 1, 1987, in violation of section 510 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988)), and cancelled his major medical insurance policy with Aetna. Plaintiff alleges that U.S. Tobacco personnel advised the deceased to get Aetna's converted coverage as a terminated employee so that his bills would get paid, but that this coverage proved insufficient by over $50,000. As a proximate result of U.S. Tobacco's conduct, plaintiff alleges that the deceased and his family suffered loss of wages, benefits, severe emotional distress and humiliation.

Count II of the complaint, brought against both U.S. Tobacco and Aetna, alleges that on or about the latter part of 1986, U.S. Tobacco entered into an employment agreement with the deceased in which he was entitled to major medical coverage, vacation pay, profit sharing, sick pay and other benefits. Plaintiff further alleges that on May 1, 1987, the deceased was wrongfully dismissed without a proper hearing; that his dismissal was unwarranted and unjust since his illness was to be

Page 209

[158 Ill.Dec. 415] covered and was so covered up until the time it was learned [214 Ill.App.3d 881] the deceased was terminated by U.S. Tobacco; and that this cancellation was without cause and in violation of section 510 of ERISA and section 767 of the Illinois Insurance Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 73, par. 767). Count II concludes by alleging that as a result of U.S. Tobacco and Aetna's breaches of employment and major medical coverage contracts, the deceased has suffered lost wages, vacation pay, health and welfare premiums that were once paid, unpaid medical bills, mental anguish and distress due to harassment by various medical professionals.

U.S. Tobacco's motion to dismiss interpreted plaintiff's suit as setting forth a theory of "wrongful discharge." Under this interpretation, U.S. Tobacco contended that its decisions relating to (1) placing the deceased on a leave of absence status, (2) removing him from that status, and (3) terminating him for "just cause" based on his excessive absenteeism, were all consistent with the union agreement. Moreover, U.S. Tobacco contended that to the extent the deceased's discharge was inconsistent with the union agreement, section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (the LMRA) (29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988) required dismissal because the LMRA either preempted...