Summers v. W.Va. Dep't of Homeland Sec.
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:22-cv-00148 |
| Decision Date | 21 December 2023 |
| Parties | CHARLES SUMMERS, Plaintiff, v. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
The Court has reviewed Defendant D.A. Lester's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document 84), the Memorandum in Support of Defendant D.A. Lester's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document 85) Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document 88), the Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document 89), Defendant D. A. Lester's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document 99), Plaintiff's Joint Response in Opposition to the Motions for Partial Summary Judgment Filed by The Defendants (Document 101)[1], and Defendant D.A Lester's Reply in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document 104), as well as all attached exhibits. For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's motion should be denied, and that Deputy Lester's motion should be granted.
The Plaintiff, Charlotte Summers, initiated this action with a Complaint (Document 1) filed on March 27, 2022. She named the West Virginia Department of Homeland Security (WVDHS), the West Virginia State Police (WVSP), and Trooper R. Lindsey of the West Virginia State Police as Defendants. Ms. Summers subsequently moved to amend to add parties correct allegations in the wake of discovery, and make typographical corrections. The Court granted her motion, and she filed her First Amended Complaint (Document 13). In addition to the original three Defendants, Ms. Summers named the Summers County Commission, the Summers County Sheriff's Department, and D.A. Lester. The Court granted a motion to dismiss the Summers County Commission and the Summers County Sheriff's Department. Mr. Lester also moved to dismiss, asserting a statute of limitations defense which the Court denied. Mr. Lester reasserted the statute of limitations defense in a subsequent motion for summary judgment, which the Court also denied. Ms. Summers died during the pendency of the litigation, and the Court entered an order on February 16, 2023, substituting Charles Summers, her son and representative of her estate, as Plaintiff. On December 17, 2023, the Court was advised that a settlement had been reached as to the claims against WVDHS, WVSP and Trooper Lindsey.
The relevant remaining claims are as follows: Count I - Unreasonable Search and Seizure in Violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as to Deputy Lester; Count II - Use of Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, as to Deputy Lester; Count IV - Battery, as to Deputy Lester.
Trooper Lindsey came to Ms. Summers' property on March 31, 2020, to arrest her son, David Summers, pursuant to an arrest warrant. He had secured Mr. Summers in his cruiser and began driving away when Ms. Summers cursed at him and ordered him off of her property. Trooper Lindsey contended she threw a metal object that appeared to be a piece of an aluminum door frame in the direction of his cruiser, while Ms. Summers and David Summers deny that she threw an object. Ms. Summers was 75 years old and frail. Trooper Lindsey got out of the vehicle, followed her into her home and tased her in the back. She fell to the floor, suffering a broken nose and abrasions to her arms and legs. Trooper Lindsey continued to tase her while she was on the ground and handcuffed her. Deputy Lester arrived on the scene after Ms. Summers had been restrained, at which time Trooper Lindsey requested his assistance in transporting Ms. Summers from the floor to a police cruiser. David Summers contends Trooper Lindsey and Deputy Lester then dragged Ms. Summers across concrete and gravel from her home to Deputy Lester's cruiser. Ms. Summers' injuries later became infected, eventually requiring amputation of one leg. She died on January 7, 2023.
In a sworn statement, David Summers described the events of March 31, 2020. Trooper Lindsey arrived to arrest him and declined to allow him to speak to his mother before taking him to his police cruiser and beginning to drive away. He heard his mother come out and ask what was going on, and Trooper Lindsey ordered her back into the house. She refused and again asked what was going on, and Trooper Lindsey got out of his vehicle and walked back toward the house, following Ms. Summers. David Summers could no longer see them, but he heard the screen door open, then heard a pop or pow sound that he believes was the taser. Trooper Lindsey called for an ambulance, and the Sheriff and two other officers pulled in. David Summers observed them “dragging my mom through the concrete pad, the carport, of course, and all through the gravel, all the way to the vehicle,” to put her in the sheriff's deputy's car. (David Summers Statement at 14:16-18) (Document 88-5.) He said that his mother appeared to be unconscious or semiconscious. David Summers stated that he believed it was (Id. at 15:8-11.) That is consistent with his deposition testimony, in which he described observing Trooper Linsey and a sheriff's deputy dragging his mother out of the house and to the cruiser.
Deputy Lester testified that he responded to either a radio call from Trooper Lindsey requesting assistance or a dispatch call directing him to assist Trooper Lindsey at Ms. Summers' residence. He arrived at the residence after Trooper Lindsey had tased Ms. Summers and assisted Trooper Lindsey in helping Ms. Summers stand up and walk to a vehicle by placing a hand under her right armpit and a hand in her hand. He indicated that she was not in handcuffs at the time, and she walked with the assistance of both officers. He stated that he did not recall seeing any injuries, blood, or abrasions on her face or legs, and he denied dragging her to the cruiser.
Trooper Lindsey described the incident in a police report. His report notes that (Lindsey Rep. at 1) (Document 88-3.) The report further notes that a deputy called EMS, and Trooper Ellison accompanied Ms. Summers to the hospital, but provides no description of her injuries or how she incurred those injuries. Photographs of Ms. Summers in the hospital reveal a cut across her nose, blood on her face, and bloody abrasions on her arm and legs.
The well-established standard in consideration of a motion for summary judgment is that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)-(c); see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 549 (1999); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S 242, 247 (1986); Hoschar v. Appalachian Power Co., 739 F.3d 163, 169 (4th Cir. 2014). A “material fact” is a fact that could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). A “genuine issue” concerning a material fact exists when the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. FDIC v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169, 180 (4th Cir. 2013); News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 576.
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. When determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must view all of the factual evidence, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hoschar, 739 F.3d at 169. However, the nonmoving party must offer some “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. “At the summary judgment stage, the non-moving party must come forward with more than ‘mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another' to resist dismissal of the action.” Perry v. Kappos, No.11-1476, 2012 WL 2130908, at *3 (4th Cir. June 13, 2012) (unpublished decision) (quoting Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985)).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court will not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, nor will it make determinations of credibility. N. Am. Precast, Inc. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 2008 WL 906334, *3 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 31, 2008) (Copenhaver, J.) (citing Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1986). If disputes over a material fact exist that “can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party,” summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. If, however, the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case,” then summary judgment should be granted because “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element . . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
When presented with motions for summary judgment from both parties, courts apply the same standard of review. Tastee Treats, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 2008 WL 2836701 (S.D. W.Va. July 21, 2008) (Johnston, J.) aff'd, ...
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