Summerville v. Innovative Images, LLC, A19A0258

• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
• Writing for the Court: Barnes, Presiding Judge.
• Citation: 349 Ga.App. 592,826 S.E.2d 391
• Parties: SUMMERVILLE et al. v. INNOVATIVE IMAGES, LLC; and vice versa.
• Docket Number: A19A0321,A19A0258
• Decision Date: 15 March 2019

349 Ga.App. 592
826 S.E.2d 391

SUMMERVILLE et al.
v.
INNOVATIVE IMAGES, LLC; and vice versa.

A19A0258
A19A0321

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 15, 2019

826 S.E.2d 394

Kathryn S. Whitlock, Atlanta, for Appellant

Warren Raymond Hinds, Roswell, for Appellee.

Warren Raymond Hinds, Roswell, for Appellant.

Kathryn S. Whitlock, Atlanta, for Appellee.

Barnes, Presiding Judge.

349 Ga.App. 592

Innovative Images, LLC ("Innovative") sued James Darren Summerville, Summerville Moore, P. C., and the Summerville Firm, LLC (collectively, "the Summerville Defendants") for legal malpractice. The Summerville Defendants acknowledged service of the summons and the complaint but did not file a timely answer. The trial court subsequently granted the Summerville Defendants' motion to open default but denied their motion to compel arbitration on the ground that the arbitration clause contained in the parties' attorney-client contract was unconscionable. The trial court issued a certificate of immediate review from its order denying the motion to compel arbitration, and the Summerville Defendants filed an application for interlocutory appeal. This Court granted the application, leading to the Summerville Defendants' appeal of the trial court's order denying

349 Ga.App. 593

their motion to compel arbitration in Case No. A19A0258. In Case No. A19A0321, Innovative cross-appeals from the trial court's order granting the Summerville Defendants' motion to open the default. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the trial court's order denying the Summerville Defendants' motion to compel arbitration, and we affirm the trial court's order granting their motion to open the default.

Case No. A19A0258

1. The Summerville Defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to compel arbitration.

Under the Georgia Arbitration Code ("GAC"), OCGA § 9-9-1 et seq., "a party may seek an order compelling arbitration, and upon a challenge to the validity of the agreement, the trial court ‘shall summarily hear and determine that issue and, accordingly, grant or deny the application for an order to arbitrate.’ " Kindred Nursing Centers v. Chrzanowski , 338 Ga. App. 708, 713 (1), 791 S.E.2d 601 (2016), quoting OCGA § 9-9-6 (a). Whether the contracting parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration and the validity of the arbitration provision are questions for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provided otherwise in their contract. Salinas v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. , 347 Ga. App. 480, 482 (1), 819 S.E.2d 903 (2018) ; Harris v. Albany Lime & Cement Co. , 291 Ga. App. 474, 475 (1), 662 S.E.2d 160 (2008).

Guided by these principles, we turn to the factual and procedural background pertinent to the main appeal in this case. In July 2013, Innovative retained Mr. Summerville and his law firm to represent it in post-trial proceedings following an adverse civil judgment, and the parties executed an attorney-client engagement agreement that set out the terms of the representation (the "Engagement

826 S.E.2d 395

Agreement"). A section of the Engagement Agreement entitled "Other Important Terms" included a choice-of-law clause stating that the "agreement and its performance are governed by the laws of the State of Georgia." That section of the Engagement Agreement also included an arbitration clause (the "Arbitration Clause" or the "Clause") stating:

Any dispute arising under this agreement will be submitted to arbitration in Atlanta, Georgia under the rules and procedures of the State Bar of Georgia Committee on the Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes, if concerning fees, or by an arbitrator to be agreed to by the parties, if concerning any other matter. Alternatively, you may choose to arbitrate any dispute arising under this agreement in Atlanta by a

349 Ga.App. 594

single arbitrator provided through the Atlanta office of Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service ("JAMS"). The decision of any such arbitrator or arbitrators shall be binding, conclusive, and not appealable. In the event a dispute is not or cannot be arbitrated, the parties consent to the jurisdiction of and venue in the courts of Fulton County, Georgia.

In October 2017, Innovative filed the present legal malpractice action in the State Court of Fulton County against the Summerville Defendants for the allegedly negligent post-trial representation of Innovative in the underlying civil suit, asserting claims for breach of professional negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duties. During the course of the litigation,¹ the Summerville Defendants filed a motion to stay discovery, compel arbitration, and dismiss the legal malpractice action based on the Arbitration Clause (the "Motion to Compel Arbitration"). Innovative opposed the Motion to Compel Arbitration, contending, among other things, that the Arbitration Clause was unconscionable because the Summerville Defendants had not advised Innovative of the possible disadvantages associated with arbitration.

The trial court denied the Summerville Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration, agreeing with Innovative that the Arbitration Clause was unconscionable. The trial court reasoned that although the GAC does not prohibit the arbitration of legal malpractice claims, Rule 1.4 (b) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (the "State Bar Rules")² and American Bar Association ("ABA") Formal Opinion 02-425³ support imposing a legal requirement on attorneys to explain to their prospective clients the possible disadvantages of binding arbitration clauses contained in attorney-client engagement contracts, such as the waiver of the right to a jury trial, the potential waiver of broad discovery, and the waiver of the right to appeal. And, because there was no evidence in the record that the Summerville Defendants explained the Arbitration Clause to their prospective

349 Ga.App. 595

client, Innovative, before the Engagement Agreement was signed, the trial court found that the Arbitration Clause was unconscionable and thus unenforceable.

(a) The Summerville Defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their Motion to Compel Arbitration on the ground that the Arbitration Clause was unconscionable. We agree.

"An unconscionable contract is one abhorrent to good morals and conscience. It is one where one of the parties takes a fraudulent advantage of another. It is an agreement that no sane person not acting under a delusion would make and that no honest person would take advantage of." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) William J. Cooney, P.C. v. Rowland , 240 Ga. App. 703, 704, 524 S.E.2d 730 (1999). A contract is not

826 S.E.2d 396

unconscionable if permitted by statute. Avery v. Aladdin Products Div. &c. , 128 Ga. App. 266, 267 (2), 196 S.E.2d 357 (1973). See William J. Cooney, P.C. , 240 Ga. App. at 704, 524 S.E.2d 730 ("That which the law itself specifically permits cannot be unconscionable."). Moreover, in determining whether a contract is unconscionable, we must bear in mind that "Georgia law recognizes and protects the freedom of parties to contract," William J. Cooney, P.C. , 240 Ga. App. at 705, 524 S.E.2d 730, and

contracts will not be avoided by the courts as against public policy, except where the case is free from doubt and where an injury to the public interest clearly appears. Absent a limiting statute or controlling public policy, parties may contract with one another on whatever terms they wish[,] and the written contract defines the full extent of their rights and duties.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hall v. Fruehauf Corp. , 179 Ga. App. 362, 362, 346 S.E.2d 582 (1986).

As to arbitration clauses, "Georgia has ... enacted the [GAC], evidencing the legislature's conclusion that arbitration is not in violation of the public policy of this State and, therefore, cannot be said, per se, to be unconscionable." Results Oriented v. Crawford , 245 Ga. App. 432, 437 (1) (a), 538 S.E.2d 73 (2000), aff'd, Crawford v. Results Oriented , 273 Ga. 884, 548 S.E.2d 342 (2001). See Order Homes v. Iverson , 300 Ga. App. 332, 334-335 (1), 685 S.E.2d 304 (2009) ("In enacting the GAC, the General Assembly established a clear public policy in favor of arbitration.") (punctuation and footnote omitted). Furthermore, an arbitration clause is not unconscionable because the contracting parties have differing levels of sophistication

349 Ga.App. 596

or different understandings of how arbitration is conducted. See Crawford v. Great American Cash Advance , 284 Ga. App. 690, 693-694 (1) (c), 644 S.E.2d 522 (2007). And, when a party signs a contract containing an arbitration clause, the party is presumed to have read and understood the clause. Holt & Holt v. Choate Constr. Co. , 271 Ga. App. 292, 294 (1), 609 S.E.2d 103 (2004). See also Northwest Plaza v. Northeast Enterprises , 305 Ga. App. 182...