Sumner v. Staton

• Decision Date: 06 October 1909
• Citation: 65 S.E. 902,151 N.C. 198
• Parties: SUMNER et al. v. STATON.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

65 S.E. 902

151 N.C. 198

SUMNER et al. v. STATON.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

October 6, 1909

Appeal from Superior Court, Edgecombe county; O. H. Allen, Judge.

Action by L. E. Sumner and others against L. L. Staton, individually and as executor of Charlotte A. Knight and another.From a judgment denying a motion for injunction and receiver plaintiffs appeal.Reversed.

Proceedings in the probate court to caveat a will, contested on the ground of undue influence on the part of the residuary legatee, who also claims title by deeds procured from the testator by the same means, will give adequate relief as against a legatee who sets up no title except by devise not connected with the title of the fraudulent legatee, and the interference of the court of equity is unnecessary.

A motion for an injunction and receiver.The court, being of opinion "that it had no jurisdiction of that part of said action in which it is sought to set aside the will of Mrs. Charlotte A. Knight for alleged fraud," etc denied the motion for injunction and receiver.

F. S Spruill, for appellants.

Aycock & Winston and G. M. T. Fountain, for appellee.

BROWN J.

On the argument and in appellant's brief exception is particularly taken to the opinion of his honor that the fact that the defendant, L. L. Staton, is sole residuary legatee under the will of Charlotte A. Knight will, in a measure, affect the original equitable jurisdiction of the superior court to declare said Staton a trustee ex maleficio in respect to the property conveyed to him by certain deeds executed by Mrs. Knight, and deprives that court of jurisdiction to make such interlocutory orders as are necessary to preserve the property during the pendency of the action.This feature of the case is the only matter presented for our consideration.

It appears that Mrs. Knight was the absolute owner of a considerable estate, consisting of valuable real and personal property, which she conveyed to the defendant, L. L. Staton, by two deeds, one dated May 2, 1900, and the other May 4, 1906.On the 16th of March, 1904, Mrs. Knight executed a will, in which she made a few insignificant bequests of spoons and other articles of personalty of small value, and then devised the "Bennett Jenkins place" to Bettie L. Sumner, and all the residue of her estate, real and personal, to Dr. L. L. Staton and Henry Johnson as residuary legatees, and appointed Dr. Staton executor of her will.No specific bequest or devise is made to him or to Johnson.On September 25, 1906, Mrs. Knight, by a codicil to her will, revoked the devise to Bettie S. Sumner and devised the "Bennett Jenkins place" to Sallie Baker Staton, daughter of Dr. Staton, and at the same time revoked the devise to Henry Johnson, and made Dr. Staton her sole residuary legatee.It is contended that a court of equity cannot interfere with the property conveyed to Dr. Staton in the deeds until the devise by will is set aside by a separate proceeding commenced before the clerk (the probate court), wherein the issue of devisavit vel non may be raised by a caveat, and transferred to the superior court for determination.It is manifest that if the deeds are set aside, Dr. Staton will take the property as residuary legatee, and if the devise only is set aside, he will take it under the deeds.So both must be set aside to give the full relief asked.As the probate court has no equitable jurisdiction to set aside the deeds, the question arises, Must the plaintiffs prosecute two independent proceeding, commenced in different jurisdictions, which may terminate differently, or will a court of equity, if the facts be as alleged, convert said defendant into a trustee for plaintiffs' benefit, notwithstanding the fact that one of the methods by which he can claim title to the same property conveyed in the deeds is by a residuary clause in a will?

The plaintiffs are the next of kin and heirs at law of Mrs. Knight.They allege that the defendant, Dr. Staton, was for many years before her death the physician, confidant, and adviser of Mrs. Knight, who was an old, feeble, childless widow, greatly addicted to the use of drugs, of weak mind, and easily influenced, and that she was dominated by the superior mind and will of her confidential physician, upon whom she was largely dependent.Plaintiffs aver that Dr. Staton, taking advantage of his relations to Mrs. Knight, formed the design to acquire title to practically all of her estate, and that in pursuance of his scheme he wrongfully and fraudulently caused Mrs. Knight to execute the deeds referred to, and for further protection to his title caused her to make him sole residuary legatee under her will.These grave charges are fully met and denied by Dr. Staton in his answer.

The complaint, it is true, unnecessarily and improperly divides what is really one cause of action into three, but we will consider the substance of the charges made, rather than the manner and form in which they are pleaded.

We concur generally in the position taken that, since the cases of Allen v. McPherson and Kerrick v. Bransby were decided by the House of Lords, it is well settled in Great Britain, where the question was debated pro and con for many years, that a court of equity will not entertain a bill, the sole object of which is to set aside the probate of a will upon the ground of fraud.This ruling has been followed by the Supreme Court of the United States(Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 504, 29 L.Ed. 599) and by other courts in this country very generally.It is to be borne in mind, however, that the principal reason assigned in support of the ruling is that the probate courts themselves have all the powers and machinery necessary to give full and adequate relief, and therefore equity will not interfere.Vide opinion of Justice Bradley, In re Broderick's Will,supra, page 510(29 L.Ed. 599).These plaintiffs are not seeking to set aside the probate of a will, but to convert the defendant, Dr. Staton, into a trustee ex maleficio, upon well-recognized grounds of legal fraud as laid down by Lord Hardwicke in Chesterfield v. Jansen, 2 Ves. 125, 1 Leading Cases in Eq. 341, and by Chief Justice Pearson in Lee v. Pearce,68 N.C. 80.That a court of equity may convert a party into a trustee upon the ground of fraud is undisputed.Wood v. Cherry,73 N.C. 110.And it would seem logically to follow that, where the fraudulent grantee has so fortified himself by various muniments that a court of law cannot give complete and adequate relief, a court of equity will undertake it.If the defendant claimed title to the property solely by virtue of the residuary clause in Mrs. Knight's will, then it would be undeniable that a proceeding to caveat the will in the probate court would give adequate relief, and we should dismiss this action.But in a case like this, where the muniments of title to the same property, alleged to be fraudulently appropriated, consist of two deeds and a residuary clause in a will, it is plainly manifest that the probate court cannot give an adequate remedy, and can afford only partial, if any, relief.An adequate remedy is not a partial remedy.It is a full and complete remedy, and one that is accommodated to the wrong which is to be redressed by it.It is not enough that there is some remedy at law; it must be as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity.In commenting upon this subject the Supreme Court of the United States says: "The jurisdiction in equity attaches unless the legal remedy, both in respect to the final relief and the mode of obtaining it, is as efficient as the remedy which equity would afford under the same circumstances."Gormley v. Clark,134 U.S. 338, 10 S.Ct. 554, 33 L.Ed. 909;Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 7 L.Ed. 655;Bispham, Eq.(6th Ed.) § 37.

There is another principle of equity jurisprudence equally well founded, and that is that equity will not suffer a right to be without a remedy."And it may be further observed," says Mr. Bispham, "that equity will not only not support a right to be unaccompanied by a remedy, but it will make the remedy when applied a complete one."This learned and accurate writer states another rule of equity courts which fits exactly such a condition as this case presents: "When a court of chancery acquires jurisdiction for any purpose, it will, as a general rule proceed to determine the whole cause, although in so doing it may decide questions which, standing alone, would furnish no basis of equitable jurisdiction."Bispham(6th Ed.) § 37.To the same effect are our own decisions.Oliver v. Wiley,75 N.C. 320;Devereux v. Devereux,81 N.C. 18.While a court of equity will not generally interfere to set aside the judgment or probate of a will procured by fraud, yet it has assumed jurisdiction to decree a trust where there is a gift to an executor(as alleged in this case), under such circumstances that it ought to be a trust for the testator's relations.1 Perry on Trusts, § 182.In the Broderick Case, supra, Mr. Justice Bradley notes that there are occasional exceptions to this rule of non interference by courts of equity with wills and devises, which, being placed on special grounds, tend rather to establish than to weaken its force.He cites a case which upon examination tends strongly to support our view.One who was both executor and residuary legatee to a will (as Dr. Staton is in Mrs. Knight's will) procured probate of a forged will by fraudulently inducing the testator's son to execute a deed consenting to and confirming its probate.Lord Hardwicke entertained a bill to declare the deed void, and compelled the executor to consent to a revocation of the probate, placing his judgment upon the...