Sumpter v. White Plains Housing Authority
Decision Date | 13 January 1972 |
Parties | , 278 N.E.2d 892 In the Matter of Willie SUMPTER, Appellant, v. WHITE PLAINS HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent, and Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General of the State of New York, Intervenor-Respondent. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Martin A. Schwartz and Andrew L. Levy, White Plains, for appellant.
Alonzo J. Drummond, White Plains, for respondent.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Maria L. Marcus and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, new York City, of counsel), for intervenor-respondent.
Otto M. Bonaparte, Harold Weintraub, New York City, and Jeanne Hollingsworth for New York City Housing Authority, amicus curiae.
Petitioner, an applicant for housing in respondent Authority's apartments, challenges the determination which rejected his application without specification of any ground other than that he had been found 'not eligible for admission as a tenant'. The statute, however, provides that in such case the Authority shall file in its office a written record stating the reasons for ineligibility and shall advise the applicant that he may be apprised of the reasons at a personal interview at the office of the Authority (Public Housing Law, Consol. Laws, c. 44--A, § 156--a, as added by L.1968, ch. 224, eff. July 1, 1968).
The letter-determination being deficient in failing to state, as required by section 156--a, that the applicant might be 'apprised of the reason or reasons for such ineligibility at a personal interview', Special Term, 63 Misc.2d 654, 313 N.Y.S.2d 133, correctly annulled; and its remand to the Authority was for the purpose of 'a full evidentiary hearing'. The Appellate Division reversed, on the law, and granted the petition 'only to the extent that the matter is remitted to (the Authority) for action consistent with section 156--a of the Public Housing Law' (36 A.D.2d 728, 320 N.Y.2d 472).
Thus, the issue on this appeal, taken by our leave, is whether the Appellate Division was correct in rejecting Special Term's holding that petitioner was entitled to 'a full evidentiary hearing', the Special Term's conclusion in this respect being that 'the due process standards enunciated in Matter of Williams v. White Plains Housing Authority, 62 Misc.2d 613, 309 N.Y.S.2d 454, affd. 35 A.D.2d 965, 317 N.Y.S.2d 935 clearly were not met in this case'. (63 Misc.2d 655, 313 N.Y.S.2d 134.) The Appellate Division, in reversing, summarily disposed of Special Term's conclusion, stating: 'Nothing contained in * * * Williams * * * requires a contrary holding, since that case involved the eviction of a tenant already in public housing' (36 A.D.2d 728, 729, 320 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473). The distinction is critical, as the Appellate Division held. Similarly to be distinguished, as dealing with an attempted eviction, is Matter of Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Auth., 29 A.D.2d 338, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159, affd. 27 N.Y.2d 675, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1, 262 N.E.2d 211.
A somewhat different situation was presented in Matter of Fuller v. Urstadt, 28 N.Y.2d 315, 321 N.Y.S.2d 601, 270 N.E.2d 321, involving a tenant's asserted right of renewal of his lease in a Mitchell-Lama project; and Judge Breitel, writing for the court (p. 318, 321 N.Y.S.2d p. 603, 270 N.E.2d p. 232), said: Accordingly, we remanded 'to give the petitioners a limited hearing after advising them of the reasons for refusing to give them a renewal lease' (p. 319, 321 N.Y.S.2d p. 604, 270 N.E.2d p. 324). In the case at bar, the Appellate Division considered that 1 (36 A.D.2d 728, 729, 320 N.Y.S.2d 472).
The petitioner relies on Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 but nothing in that case suggests a result different from that at which the Appellate Division arrived in the case at bar. Goldberg held that due process required a full evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of welfare benefits being received. The court (p. 264, 90 S.Ct. p. 1018) said: (Emphasis as in original.)
It has long been settled that a party aggrieved by loss of a pre-existing right or privilege may enjoy procedural rights not available to one denied the right or privilege in the first instance. To draw upon common examples, applicants for a motor vehicle license receive specific notice of their rejection (which is required as to housing applicants found...
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