Sun Ins. Office of London v. Mitchell
Decision Date | 23 April 1914 |
Docket Number | 594 |
Citation | 65 So. 143,186 Ala. 420 |
Parties | SUN INS. OFFICE OF LONDON v. MITCHELL. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from City Court of Gadsden; John H. Disque, Judge.
Assumpsit by W.J.F. Mitchell against the Sun Insurance Office of London. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
The declaration was in code form for action on the policy of fire insurance for loss by fire. Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that he applied to H.B. Myers, the agent of defendant, resident at Gadsden, for insurance on his storehouse and stock of merchandise in Alabama City, a town just outside of Gadsden, and that the rate and amount of insurance, the term and the subject-matter were agreed upon with the specific understanding that the insurance began forthwith, and that the insurance company could cancel the contract if they chose. Plaintiff introduced in evidence a certificate of the secretary of state, showing that H.B Myers, of Gadsden, is duly appointed agent of the Sun Insurance Office, incorporated under the laws of Great Britain, and reciting: "This certificate, issued in compliance with section 4561, Code 1907, authorizes the said agent to transact the business of fire insurance for said company during the year 1912." The introduction of the certificate was objected to by defendant, on the grounds that it does not show that said Myers was the general agent, nor that he had authority to write insurance at the place where the fire occurred, and because it was illegal and immaterial. The property was destroyed by fire about two weeks after the alleged agreement, before any policy was issued, and its value was duly proved.
Myers was a witness for defendant, and admitted the application and negotiation for insurance at the time specified by plaintiff but denied that the contract or terms of insurance were agreed upon; his statement being to the effect that he agreed only to submit the application to the company, and, if they accepted the risk, he would go out and inspect the property that he told plaintiff that none of the companies wrote outside of the home town unless he personally inspected the property; and that as soon as he heard from the company he would go out, and, if it showed up all right, he would be glad to write him, but that there was no reference to when the policy was to be written or when to be paid for. All this was denied by plaintiff.
Defendant introduced in evidence its commission to Myers under which he was acting as its agent, as follows (after setting out the head and branch office, the streets and towns, and the date of founding): Then follows the signing and sealing by the manager and the countersigning by the secretary.
On cross-examination, Myers testified that he wrote the defendant company about plaintiff's application on the same day it was made, and that, when plaintiff inquired about the matter immediately after the fire, he told him that he had the company's consent to write the insurance. This, he stated was not true, although he thought at the time he had an unopened letter from the company, upon which assumption he had made the statement. Several charges were requested by defendant, including the general affirmative charge, which are not necessary to be here set out.
The oral charge of the court was as follows:
Culli & Martin, of Gadsden, for appellant.
Goodhue & Brindley, of Gadsden, for appellee.
Both counts of the complaint are in code form, and are not subject to the grounds of demurrer assigned.
The certificate of the secretary of state was properly admitted in evidence. Prima facie it established the general agency of Myers for the defendant company, and authorized him to transact the business of fire insurance for the company in the state of Alabama.
An agent who is authorized to solicit and receive applications for fire insurance, and, at his discretion, to countersign and issue policies of insurance intrusted to him by the company for that purpose, must be regarded quoad hoc as the general agent of the company. 19 Cyc. 780, B, b, and cases cited; I...
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