Sun Oil Co. of Pennsylvania v. Goldstein, Civ. A. No. N-77-1960.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1978
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. N-77-1960.
• Citation: Sun Oil Co. of Pennsylvania v. Goldstein, 453 F.Supp. 787 (D. Md. 1978)
• Parties: SUN OIL COMPANY OF PENNSYLVANIA v. Louis L. GOLDSTEIN, Comptroller of Treasury of State of Maryland, Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland and Sandra A. O'Connor, State's Attorney of Baltimore County.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

453 F. Supp. 787

SUN OIL COMPANY OF PENNSYLVANIA v.Louis L. GOLDSTEIN, Comptroller of Treasury of State of Maryland, Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland and Sandra A. O'Connor, State'sAttorney of Baltimore County.

Civ. A. No. N-77-1960.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

June 23, 1978.

Thomas D. Washburne, Baltimore, Md., and Milton Eisenberg, Francis J. O'Toole and Theodore C. Hirt, Washington, D. C., and Frank R. Roark, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Thomas M. Wilson, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Chief, Antitrust Div., and Charles O. Monk, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Francis Bill Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Md., for defendants.

NORTHROP, Chief Judge.

Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania (Sun), filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against Maryland Comptroller Louis L. Goldstein and Maryland Attorney GeneralFrancis B. Burch on November 22, 1977.Sandra A. O'Connor, State's Attorney for Baltimore County, was added as a partydefendant on February 24, 1978.

Plaintiff, a refiner of petroleum products, is a corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania with its principal place of business in that State.Plaintiff markets its products in Maryland and throughout the United States.Defendants are Maryland officials charged with the administration and enforcement of Md.Ann.Code Art. 56, § 157F(a) of the Maryland Motor Fuel Inspection Law, as amended by Chapter 870 of the Laws of Maryland, 1977.Sun, through its complaint, has challenged the constitutional and statutory validity of this section.This Court's jurisdiction is properly invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,1332,1343and2201.

Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was denied by the Court, after oral argument, on December 29, 1977.Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and on March 30, 1978, counsel presented oral argument in support of their respective positions.At the conclusion of this hearing, the Court granted plaintiff's motion on the questions of standing and ripeness and denied the motions of both parties in all other respects.

Subsequently, plaintiff scheduled the deposition of Maryland State SenatorC. Lawrence Wiser and requested the production by him of certain documents asserted to be relevant to the case.In response and on behalf of Senator Wiser, counsel for defendants filed a motion for protective order, asserting the Senator's privilege under the "Speech or Debate Clause" of Article 10 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Article I, § 6, cl. 1 of the United States Constitution.After oral argument on April 11, 1978, the Court denied the protective order, but granted a stay of the deposition pending appeal.¹The parties stipulated that the case should proceed without regard to the content of the proposed deposition of Senator Wiser, and the trial commenced on April 24, 1978.

I.

The pertinent portion of section 157F(a), referred to as the Conversion Moratorium Law (hereinafter CML), being challenged in this case reads as follows:

Certificates of registration shall not be issued to retail service station dealers marketing motor vehicle fuel through retail outlets enlarged, altered, or structurally modified (other than as may be required by appropriate governmental authority) in any way after July 1, 1977, and before July 1, 1979, unless the facilities contain enclosed work areas where service of motor vehicles is offered to customers, irrespective of whether or not motor vehicle fuel is purchased, including, but not limited to lubrication, oil change, tire repair, battery charge, and replacement of accessories such as fan belts, radiator hose and wiper blades.This restriction shall not apply to stations which do not have such enclosed work areas prior to the time that they are enlarged, altered or structurally modified.A service station which has been closed for 30 days or more prior to July 1, 1977, shall be considered as newly established, for the purposes of this section, at the time as it is reopened and offering motor vehicle fuel for sale to the general public.Md.Ann.Code, Art. 56 § 157F(a)(Supp. 1977).

Sun contends this law violates the Commerce, Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.

Sun's Commerce Clause claim, in essence, asserts that the statutory burdens imposed on the marketing of gasoline in interstate commerce by a specified class of retail service station dealers are not justified by any local public benefits directly attributable to the law.Sun also asserts that the law is invalid by virtue of the availability of less burdensome or nondiscriminatory alternatives.

Plaintiff's claim under the Due Process Clause is two-fold: (1) that the challenged law requires maintenance of enclosed work areas on its various station properties as a form of public benefit, without assuring to Sun a fair return on its corporate investment in such facilities; and (2) that the law is based on an impermissible irrebuttable presumption that maintenance of the work areas at all retail service stations having those facilities on July 1, 1977, is required to assure an adequate supply of automotive repair, maintenance and emergency road services to motorists on Maryland highways.According to Sun, it necessarily follows that the law deprives owners of these specified facilities of the opportunity for a meaningful hearing to show that the statute impairs their property rights without conferring any public benefit.

Sun's final attack under the Equal Protection Clause focuses on the argument that there is no rational basis for the separate classifications created in the law.The exempt facilities include (1) all gasoline stations that did not provide automotive services before July 1, 1977, (2) all gasoline stations constructed without enclosed automotive service facilities after July 1, 1977, and (3) all service stations whose enclosed service areas were not in operation for at least 30 days prior to July 1, 1977.Sun argues that it is illogical to exempt from the law's requirements certain facilities which are in direct competition with the stations mandated to offer repair services, particularly in light of the purported statutory purpose, i. e., to assure an adequate supply of emergency repair facilities and to promote highway safety.

Defendants refute all of plaintiff's Constitutional challenges.They maintain that the law in question is not violative of the provisions of the Commerce Clause, Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.Defendants argue that, on its face, the law neither discriminates against interstate commerce, nor places more than a de minimus burden on Sun in relation to its total operation in Maryland.Defendants seek to establish that there are substantial benefits inuring to motorists utilizing the State highways.In sum, they advocate that the law accomplishes its legislative objective in a logical and not unduly burdensome manner, and that any less restrictive legislation would not produce the important local public benefits generated by this statute.

Defendants attack Sun's Due Process claim, asserting that the amendments to section 03.03.07, Subtitle 03, Title 03 of the Code of Maryland Regulations(COMAR), promulgated by the Comptroller of the Treasury, are sufficient to provide Sun with notice and hearing procedures.²Defendants assert that Sun's irrebuttable presumption argument is inapplicable, in view of the factual situation in this case.They dispute Sun's characterization that the law imposes public utility-type obligations on Sun's service stations.Finally, defendants state that the law is not vague and ambiguous, but is sufficiently defined so as to preclude speculation as to the meaning of its terms.

Defendants counter Sun's Equal Protection challenge by asserting that the law satisfies fourteenth amendment guarantees.They contend that the classifications created by the law are rationally related to the legitimate State interest of promoting motoring safety by insuring the continued availability of the type of automotive maintenance and emergency repair facility relied upon by a large segment of Maryland motorists.This contention is based on defendants' argument that the preservation of full service stations is a legitimate State interest, and that the law in question is within the realm of legislative power constitutionally granted to State legislatures.

II.

The Conversion Moratorium Law became effective on July 1, 1977 as to service station conversions, and as adopted, is a two-year moratorium terminating on July 1, 1979.The prohibitions contained in the law are enforceable through the Comptroller's control of the issuance of certificates of registration for retail service stations.Should a dealer convert a retail service station in violation of § 157F(a), the Comptroller has the statutory authority to withhold issuance of the registration certificate, which is the dealer's license to sell gasoline in the Maryland retail market.

The law provides that these certificates "shall not be issued to retail service station dealers marketing motor vehicle fuel through retail outlets enlarged, altered, or structurally modified . . . unless the facilities contain enclosed work areas where service of motor vehicles is offered to customers,"Md.Ann.Code, Art. 56, § 157F(a).The law further specifies certain types of repair services and parts to be offered at these retail service stations.However, exempt from its provisions are service stations which did not have enclosed work areas prior to structural modification, or whose enclosed work areas had been closed for 30 days or more prior to July 1, 1977.

So long as an enclosed repair service area is maintained, the law does not prevent the conversion of a station to gas-only self-service islands.Indeed, since the passage of the Conversion Moratorium Law, such facilities are on the increase in...