Sun Valley Co. v. City of Sun Valley

• Decision Date: 29 August 1985
• Docket Number: No. 15822,15822
• Citation: 109 Idaho 424,708 P.2d 147
• Parties: SUN VALLEY COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF SUN VALLEY, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 147

708 P.2d 147

109 Idaho 424

SUN VALLEY COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF SUN VALLEY, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15822.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Aug. 29, 1985.

Mark W. Russell of Kneeland, Laggis, Korb, Collier, Benjamin & Russell, Ketchum, Terry E. Coffin and David H. Leroy of Runft, Leroy, Coffin & O'Riordan, Boise, for defendant-appellant City of Sun Valley.

Carl Burke and Bobbi Killian Dominick of Elam, Burke & Boyd, Boise, for plaintiff-respondent, Sun Valley Co.

James W. Phillips, Ketchum, for amicus curiae Cities of Ketchum, McCall and Idaho City.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen. and Robie Russell, Deputy Atty. Gen., for amicus curiae, State of Idaho.

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.

In 1978, the Idaho legislature enacted the "City Property Tax Alternatives Act of 1978" I.C. § 50-1043 et seq. ¹ (the Act). The purpose of the Act, set out in the original legislation, was to remove from property owners the burden of providing tax dollars for those non-resident services provided by resort communities.

Pursuant to the Act, the City of Sun Valley (the City) passed Ordinance # 123. This ordinance imposed a 5% tax on hotel and motel rooms and liquor by the drink and was approved by the City voters on December 15, 1978. Since the tax was limited to a five-year duration, on November 22, 1983, a new ordinance, Ordinance # 165, was passed. This is the ordinance currently in effect. It imposes a 5% tax on motel and hotel rooms and liquor by the drink and is limited to a four-year duration.

On September 14, 1983, the Sun Valley Company (the Company) filed a declaratory judgment action against the City to determine the validity of the Act, its subsequent amendments and the local ordinance passed pursuant to the Act. The Company asserted that the Act was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the City, that it was an unconstitutional local or special law, and that it violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. On September 7, 1984, the Company filed a motion for summary judgment on all issues. After briefing and oral argument, the district court granted the Company's motion. The district court found that the Act delegated legislative authority to municipalities without adequate standards and therefore was unconstitutional. No ruling was made as to the Company's other challenges. This appeal followed.

I.

The City argues that the Act is not a delegation of legislative authority and therefore, standards are not required. We Art. 7, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution provides:

[109 Idaho 427] agree with the City. The Act is not a delegation of legislative authority, but rather an implementation of a constitutional authority that is not self-executing.

" § 6. Municipal corporations to impose their own taxes.--The legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, but may by law invest in the corporate authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation."

The intent of this section was first discussed in State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713, 213 P. 358 (1923).

"Manifestly, the reason for placing this limitation upon the legislative power to tax is to give local communities, organized as municipal corporations, the power to impose upon themselves for their needs only such burdens in the way of taxation as they themselves determine through their governing officials." Id. at 719, 213 P. at 359.

Initially this section was held to apply exclusively to property taxes. Leonardson v. Moon, 92 Idaho 796, 803, 451 P.2d 542, 549 (1969). Under this interpretation, cities had broad authority to "assess and collect [property] taxes for all purposes of such corporation." Hamilton v. McCall, 90 Idaho 253, 259, 409 P.2d 393, 397 (1965). Then, in Greater Boise Aud. v. Royal Inn of Boise, 106 Idaho 884, 684 P.2d 286 (1984), we overruled State v. Nelson and held that the section also pertained to excise taxes. It stands to reason, then, that if cities have broad powers of property taxation under art. 7, § 6, they also have broad powers to impose excise taxes if authorized by the legislature through implementing legislation.

This interpretation is supported by a plain reading of the section. The first clause of art. 7 § 6 states: "[t]he legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any ... city...." This clause is a limitation on the legislature's otherwise plenary powers in the area of taxation. Because of this clause, the legislature has no power to impose taxes for or on behalf of cities. The second clause of art. 7 § 6 allows the legislature to "invest in the corporate authorities ... the power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation." Thus the grant of taxing power to cities is not self-executing or unlimited. It is limited by what taxing power the legislature authorizes in its implementing legislation.

Additionally, the legislature itself recognized that it was not delegating its authority under the Act but was "investing" the power in municipalities. I.C. § 50-1044 provides that "[t]he voters of any resort city ... are hereby given the freedom to authorize their city government to adopt, implement, and collect one or more local-option nonproperty taxes as provided herein."

II.

The Company urges that the trial court properly determined that the Act was a delegation of legislative authority, and, thus, under art. 3, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution which provides that all legislative power is vested in the senate and house of representatives, the Act must contain meaningful standards. The Company's argument fails for three reasons. First, it ignores the plain language of art. 7, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution as discussed above. Second, even if the Act is a delegation of legislative authority, the Company's analysis under art. 3, § 1 is misconceived. Historically, this section (as similar sections in other state constitutions and as in the federal constitution) has been interpreted to limit the delegation of legislative authority to other branches of government. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85, 53 S.Ct. 42, 44, 77 L.Ed. 175 (1932). The non-delegation doctrine, as it is called, traditionally required that laws delegating legislative authority to either the executive branch or the judiciary contain meaningful "standards." These standards were to insure that decision makers in the other branches, who The third reason that respondent's delegation argument fails is because the non-delegation doctrine is not precisely applicable to this case. The non-delegation doctrine is a doctrine of administrative law. In the usual case, the challenger attacks an agency's authority to make legislative determinations. In the instant case, the "delegation" at issue, the Act, is not to the executive branch, but rather to another legislative body.

[109 Idaho 428] were not publicly accountable through the election process, would not act arbitrarily, capriciously or discriminatorily. However, because of the impracticality and the inflexibility of such a requirement, the non-delegation doctrine has long been dead in the federal courts, 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3.2 (1978), and has since been recast in many state courts. Id. § 3.14. The modern view is that broad delegation of legislative authority is proper and indeed necessary. Id. § 3.15 (Supp.1980) Instead of requiring standards to control discretion, the current view is that the legislation itself or the agency's internal guidelines should provide meaningful safeguards against arbitrary decision making; for example, a right to a hearing or judicial review of agency decision making. See Warren v. Marion County, 222 Or. 307, 353 P.2d 257 (1960).

III.

The Company contends that the Act does not contain the safeguards required by Greater Boise Aud. v. Royal Inn of Boise, supra. However, even if Greater Boise would require safeguards in the present case, there are sufficient safeguards in the Act:

First, under the Act any tax proposed by the City must be passed by a 60% majority vote and may not be increased without subsequent majority approval. I.C. § 50-1047 requires that the ordinance which is submitted to the voters state and define the specific tax, state the exact rate of the tax, state the purpose for which the revenue is to be used and state the duration of the tax. These public voting requirements ensure the tax will be reasonable because the tax may only be imposed by cities that derive the major portion of their economic well being from tourism. Also, the Act does not exempt the city residents from paying the tax they have approved. They will be buying liquor by the drink, beer, wine and making other purchases subject to a sales tax. It is unreasonable to assume that the city residents will impose a prohibitive tax upon themselves. Second, the election of local city council members who propose the tax is always a safeguard against arbitrary action by the city council. Finally, the legislature may always amend the Act, which it did in 1981 and again in 1984, or repeal the Act. Accordingly, even if the Company were correct that the Act requires safeguards, there are sufficient safeguards present in the Act.

Accordingly, the decision of the trial court with respect to this delegation issue is reversed.

IV.

In its motion for summary judgment, the Company also raised issues of whether the Act is a local or special law in violation of art. 3, § 19 of the Idaho Constitution, and whether the Act violates the Company's state and federal equal protection or due process rights. The district court, having ruled that the Act was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, did not reach these issues. However since the Company's motion for summary judgment stated that...