Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat. Laboratories
| Decision Date | 29 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 94 CV 2330 NG VVP.,94 CV 2330 NG VVP. |
| Citation | 424 F.Supp.2d 545 |
| Parties | Muthu SUNDARAM, Plaintiff, v. BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORIES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Muthu S. Sundaram, Parlin, NJ, pro se.
David B. Ross, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fair-weather & Geraldson, Devjani Mishra, Seyfarth Shaaw, New York, NY, for Defendants.
In a sixty-five page report and recommendation ("R & R") dated January 19, 2006, Magistrate Judge Viktor V. Pohorelsky recommends that judgment be granted in favor of defendants. Specifically, Judge Pohorelsky recommends that the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment be denied; that the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint be granted; that the plaintiffs motion to strike portions of the record be denied in part and dismissed as moot in part; and that the defendants' motion to strike portions of the record be granted in part and denied in part. The pro se plaintiff has filed objections, which have been reviewed de novo pursuant to Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To begin with, plaintiff claims that Judge Pohorelsky did not rule on his motion for summary judgment and that the motions to strike were not within his referral jurisdiction. Both claims are clearly incorrect.
Judge Pohorelsky's R & R exhaustively examines each of the claims raised by the plaintiff. For example, in an impeccable and detailed analysis, which plaintiff does not refute, he concludes that many of the claims are either time-barred or that the court has no jurisdiction over them. The court adopts Judge Pohorelsky's analyses and conclusions at to these issues. The court also adopts Judge Pohorelsky's conclusion that the federal enclave doctrine bars plaintiffs state law claims of discrimination and breach of implied contract. Plaintiffs argument that the R & R, in this respect, rests on Judge Pohorelsky's "personal opinion" (Objections at p. 27) is simply wrong. Judge Pohorelsky's conclusion that Brookhaven National Laboratories is a federal enclave and that plaintiffs claims are barred is fully supported by the law and the indisputable facts. See Schiappa, Sr. v. Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC, 403 F.Supp.2d 230, 236-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
With respect to whether summary judgment is appropriate on plaintiffs remaining Title VII and ADEA claims and state discrimination claim, Judge Pohorelsky has generously read plaintiffs claims, accurately described the applicable law and applied it with care and sensitivity to plaintiffs' pro se status (even though plaintiff is law-trained). Judge Pohorelsky's conclusions that plaintiff has either failed to establish an inference of discrimination sufficient to make a prima facie case or that no reasonable juror could conclude, on the basis of all of the facts, that he was discriminated against, or retaliated against, on the basis of his race, color, national origin or age are fully supported and plaintiffs objections are without merit. Judge Pohorelsky addressed all of the underlying factual issues, including whether plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence of proper comparators. Plaintiff's complaints about the R & R either mischaracterize the R & R or are simply not supported in the evidence.
Finally, the R & R correctly rejects plaintiffs claims under ERISA and state claims of breach of the covenant of fair dealing and fraud.
In sum, the R & R is adopted in its entirety and the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment for the defendants dismissing this action.
SO ORDERED.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Both the plaintiff Dr. Muthu Sundaram and the defendants—Brookhaven National Laboratory, Associated Universities, Inc., Dr. Leon Petrakis and Meyer Steinberg— have made motions for summary judgment in this employment discrimination case. As an adjunct to these motions, the plaintiff and the defendants have each moved to strike a portion of the record submitted by the other in support of their respective positions on the motions. These motions have been referred to me by Judge Gershon for a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). As detailed below, I recommend that (1) the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment be denied, (2) the defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted, (3) the plaintiffs motion to strike portions of the record be denied in part and dismissed in part as moot, and (4) the defendants' motion to strike portions of the record be granted in part and denied in part.
The following facts are not in dispute unless otherwise indicated.1 Dr. Sundaram's claims here arise from his extended employment as a research scientist at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, a research laboratory owned by the United States Department of Energy ("DOE") and operated by Associated Universities, Inc. under a contract with DOE. Def. LR 56.1 Stmt ¶ 5. When the plaintiffs employment commenced on September 1, 1981, he was placed on the Scientific Staff in a tenure track position where he served for seven years under a series of term appointments ranging in duration from one to two years. Id. ¶¶ 36-41. In 1988, after he failed to receive tenure, the plaintiff was placed on the Professional Staff, id. ¶ 47, where he continued his employment for three more years until September 30, 1991 under a variety of arrangements. Id. ¶¶ 48, 51, 54, 63, 64, 74, 80, 84, 94, 101, 103, 106. The last arrangement was a term appointment for a period of one year running from October 1, 1990 through September 30, 1991.2 Id. ¶¶ 106, 108.
Throughout his ten years at Brookhaven, the plaintiff worked as a coal chemist in the Department of Applied Science ("DAS"). Id. ¶¶ 3, 36-37, 50. Funding for the work done by that department, as well as for most of the laboratory's operations, came primarily from the DOE in the form of grants for specific research programs authorized by the DOE. Id. ¶¶ 21-28. In the late 1980's, government funding for research at the laboratory declined significantly, such that the Process Science Group of the DAS, the group to which the plaintiff was assigned during most of his employment at the laboratory, experienced a decline in its budget from $2.2 million in 1986 to $660,000 in 1990. Id. ¶¶ 56, 58.3 The Chairman of the DAS at that time, Dr. Petrakis, reorganized the department in early 1990 and reassigned the plaintiff to the Applied Physics Division headed by Dr. Kelvin Lynn. Id. ¶¶ 56, 64. Although the plaintiff disputes whether lack of funding was the real reason his employment was ultimately terminated, he does not dispute that funding for his new position in the Applied Physics Division was in short supply. Sundaram Dep. 190; Sundaram Dep. Exs. 19, 20.4 Thus in mid-May 1990, the plaintiff received a four and one-half month appointment on the understanding that the plaintiffs employment would terminate on September 30, 1990 unless sufficient full-time funding support for him was provided by DOE. Def. LR 56.1 Stmt ¶ 80; Sundaram Dep. Ex. 20 (found in Def. Appx Vol. I, Ex. B). When no such support materialized, Petrakis advised the plaintiff in late September 1990 that his employment would terminate at the agreed upon date. Def. LR 56.1 Stmt ¶¶ 92-94.
Shortly before termination, however, the plaintiff's former supervisor, Meyer Steinberg, proposed that the plaintiff be reassigned to work under him on the Mild Gasification program to which the plaintiff had been assigned for much of his career. Id. ¶ 95. That proposal was accepted by the laboratory and funding for his position was obtained by canceling a technician's position on the program. Id. ¶¶ 99-101, 111. The plaintiff thus received a final one-year appointment from October 1, 1990 through September 30, 1991. Id. ¶ 106. At the conclusion of that appointment, the plaintiff's employment at the laboratory ended when funding for the Mild Gasification program was terminated by the DOE. Id. ¶¶ 119-120, 135. As a result of that loss of funding the entire Process Science Group to which the plaintiff had been assigned was dissolved. Id. ¶ 136.
The plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on April 21, 1992. Holland Aff. ¶ 1; Sundaram Dep. Ex. 29. On January 27, 1994, the EEOC mailed a Notice of Right to Sue to the plaintiff. Holland Aff. ¶ 5. The plaintiff then commenced the instant action on May 12, 1994. He thereafter filed a Verified Amended Complaint in October 1994 and a Verified Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter the "complaint") in January 1995.
The plaintiff's complaint states ten claims for relief, a number of which have been withdrawn by stipulation.5 In the claims that remain, broadly stated, plaintiff alleges that the defendants discriminated against him on the basis of race color, national origin and age in making various employment decisions, including his termination, in violation of section 1981 (42 U.S.C. § 1981), Title VII (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.) (hereinafter the "ADEA"), and state law (N.Y. Exec. Law § 297; N.Y. Civ Law § 40-c). He further claims that the defendants retaliated against him in violation of Title VII. The plaintiff also asserts an ERISA claim (29 U.S.C. § 1140) and state common law claims for breach of an implied contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional tort. Finally, the complaint also asserts that false and fraudulent misrepresentations were made to the plaintiff which may be construed as a common law fraud claim.
The defendants' motion for summary judgment...
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