Sundberg v. Dirocco
| Decision Date | 08 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:17-CV-00063,4:17-CV-00063 |
| Parties | MARK SUNDBERG, Plaintiff, v. MARK D. DIROCCO, DAVID HIMES, PAULA REBER, MARK TEMPLE and LEWISBURG AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Brann)
When the American starlet Mae West remarked of a friend, "there is less here than meets the eye," few could predict this same observation would one day apply to a matter pending before this Court. This case involves facially enticing allegations by a former high school athletics coach who contends that the non-renewal of an annual coaching contract violated his constitutional rights.
To be sure, I take quite seriously any allegation that public entities are willfully stifling inherent liberties. However, upon closer inspection, it is apparent that the Plaintiff's allegedly protected speech was made in his official capacity as a coach and did not touch upon any matters of public concern. As such, Plaintiff's vague and shadowy pleadings must yield to his employer's interest in maintaining an orderly and effective workplace.
Plaintiff's amended complaint will therefore be dismissed with prejudice. To conclude otherwise and expend additional resources on this matter would disserve those cases in which cognizable constitutional violations have actually occurred.
The facts underlying this action, although perhaps controversial to some in the Lewisburg School District, do not give rise to a federal cause of action. From the outset, I note that my task is not to determine whether I personally agree with Lewisburg's decisions or whether I believe they were carried out in the most appropriate manner. The only question with which I am concerned is whether the circumstances surrounding the non-renewal of an annual athletics coaching contract violates the First or Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. With that framing in mind, I turn to the operative facts.
Plaintiff Mark Sundberg was a high school social studies teacher for 25 years, as well as the boys' track coach and the head cross-country coach at Lewisburg Area High School in Lewisburg, Union County, Pennsylvania.1 Following retirement from his position as a teacher in June of 2012, he continued to coach both the track and cross-country teams on a one-year basis until the end of2015-2016 school year. At that time, he was informed that the School District was posting all head coaching jobs and would likely not be renewing his coaching contracts for the subsequent year.2
Later, at a May 2016 meeting, Mr. Sundberg was formally notified that he would not be recommended to coach the teams for the following season. When asked for an explanation, he was told by High School Principal Paula Reber that the school wanted to "go in another direction."3 After not having been issued an annual contract for 2016, Mr. Sundberg sent a letter to his student-athletes regarding the dismissal, which also made its way to the Lewisburg cross-country alumni website.4 Coach Sundberg was reoffered the position 29 hours later.5
In November 2016, during the following school year, Mr. Sundberg received a letter from the School District's Superintendent, Mark D. DiRocco, indicating that Mr. Sundberg had failed to follow certain of the District's policies.6 Although Mr. Sundberg's pleadings are quite hazy as to the reason for the letter, it appears to be the product of a chain of events whereby he housed an athlete who purportedlyhad been kicked out of his own home.7 The student's parents then complained of Mr. Sundberg's actions to the School District.8
Shortly thereafter, all coaches were notified that the School District would again be reposting all coaching jobs for the 2017-2018 school year.9 At the time of the filing of this lawsuit and the Court's July 6, 2017 oral argument, Plaintiff had not been reoffered either the track or cross-country coaching positions for the upcoming school year.10
As a consequence of this typically discretionary decision not to hire him as a coach, the Plaintiff has brought rather grandiose First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the School District that he once called home. In particular, he complains of retaliation, conspiratorial acts, and due process violations as against several of the School District Defendants, including the superintendent, two principals who oversaw the school at which he worked, the athletic director, and the School Board.11
The sunset of Mr. Sundberg's Green Dragon coaching career seems to have come a long time in the making. Indeed, Plaintiff's own complaint paints all too suggestive a picture of the turbulent relationship between the Defendants andhimself. On the face of that document alone, it is plain to see that this relationship deteriorated over a number of years, leading to the inevitable result that has brought the Plaintiff to the courthouse in this action.
The Plaintiff, by his own admission, had received numerous verbal and written warnings to change his behavior as the coach of the cross-country and track teams. In the fall of 2012, for instance, Mr. Sundberg was called to the then-principal's (Defendant David Himes's) office for a meeting. During this meeting, it was explained to the Plaintiff that the District was not satisfied with the way he had managed his teams in the past.12
In July 2015, as Mr. Himes prepared to retire from his position as principal, he wrote the following to his successors in an evaluation of Coach Sundberg's performance:
As retiring Principal of the high school, I believe Mr. Sundberg should not be rehired as a coach. His actions over the past years have damaged the reputation of the school with the PIAA District IV Committee. He continues to be confrontational with students and parents who play club sports and does not show proper respect for those in authority. It is my belief that allowing Mr. Sundberg to continue in his positions will place the District and all of our athletic teams in jeopardy!13
Subsequent to these events, Plaintiff retained counsel and filed the instant law suit. "Quite honestly when we filed it," Plaintiff's counsel Matthew J. Zeigler,Esquire, explained at oral argument, "we . . . thought that it would cause the School District to be willing to settle."14 In accordance with the following discussion, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted, and Plaintiff's amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may file a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Such a motion "tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading," and "streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding."15 "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law."16 This is true of any claim, "without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one."17
Beginning in 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States initiated what some scholars have termed the Roberts Court's "civil procedure revival" by significantly tightening the standard that district courts must apply to 12(b)(6)motions.18 In two landmark decisions, Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal the Roberts Court "changed . . . the pleading landscape" by "signal[ing] to lower-court judges that the stricter approach some had been taking was appropriate under the Federal Rules."19 More specifically, the Court in these two decisions "retired" the lenient "no-set-of-facts test" set forth in Conley v. Gibson and replaced it with a more exacting "plausibility" standard.20
Accordingly, after Twombly and Iqbal, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"21 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."22 "Although the plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."23 Moreover, "[a]sking for plausible grounds . . . calls for enough factsto raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [wrongdoing]."24
The plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."25 No matter the context, however, "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'"26
When disposing of a motion to dismiss, a court must "accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]."27 However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."28 "After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or 'bare-bones' allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss."29 "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."30
As a matter of procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that:
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity...
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