Sundh Electric Co. v. General Electric Co.

• Decision Date: 10 March 1913
• Docket Number: 150.
• Citation: 204 F. 277
• Parties: SUNDH ELECTRIC CO. v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

204 F. 277

SUNDH ELECTRIC CO. v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.

No. 150.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

March 10, 1913

Charles Neave and Wm. G. McKnight, both of New York City, for appellant.

Park Benjamin and Alfred Wilkinson, both of New York City, for appellee.

Before LACOMBE, WARD, and NOYES, Circuit Judges.

LACOMBE Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The opinion of Judge Ray is a very full one. It sets forth in detail the substance of the various patents and summarizes the main contentions of the opposing sides. The questions involved are questions of fact, invention, anticipation equivalency, infringement, and no discussion of these questions, as presented here, however elaborate, would add anything to the exposition of patent law. For these reasons we refrain from undertaking any exhaustive statement of the testimony bearing on these questions of fact; the opinion of the District Judge sets them forth sufficiently for any one to understand in a general way what this controversy is about, and the official reports need be incumbered with nothing further.

The contention that Lindquist was not the first inventor is based upon testimony as to a machine which is referred to as the 'Ihlder prior magnet.' It is asserted that this machine was completed and submitted to a satisfactory test at the Yonkers works of the Otis Elevator Company. The four principal witnesses were engineers in the employ of that company. Drawings, blueprints, and other records were produced to support their testimony. Of this testimony generally-- it covers many pages of the record-- it is sufficient to say that it comes far short of satisfying us that Ihlder embodied the Lindquist device in a usable structure before Lindquist's date of invention. This conclusion is strengthened by the consideration that it seems unaccountable why the carefully conducted corporation-- and the evidence shows it to be such-- in which these witnesses were employed should have paid a large sum of money for Lindquist's device, if its own employes had been making the same thing a year or more before he applied for a patent. Our conclusion is also fortified by the circumstance that Ihlder himself, who is alleged to have made this prior magnet, was not called as a witness. Apparently, although he was abroad, there was time and opportunity to take his testimony.

With regard to the other questions of fact in the case, there are difficulties which are not prominent in the one just disposed of. In the opening of appellant's brief reference is made to a suggestion in appellee's argument that the court is to weight the relative qualifications of the opposing experts, and it is said:

'The arguments or contentions of the experts are of no importance. Counsel are the ones to make arguments, and the court in passing upon those arguments will not accept the conclusions of those experts, no matter who they may be but will look to the facts.'

Generally of course, this is so. In the case of a mechanical device, like a multiple drill or a typewriting machine, the deliverances of the experts are mere aids to the comprehension of the...