Sundquist v. Madison Rys. Co.

• Citation: 221 N.W. 392,197 Wis. 83
• Parties: SUNDQUIST v. MADISON RYS. CO.
• Decision Date: 09 October 1928
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

197 Wis. 83

221 N.W. 392

SUNDQUIST

v.MADISON RYS. CO.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oct. 9, 1928.

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dane County; A. G. Zimmerman, Circuit Judge. Affirmed.

Action begun April 4, 1927, by Josephine Sundquist against the Madison Railways Company to recover for personal injuries. From a judgment for the plaintiff entered January 30, 1928, the railway company appealed.

The plaintiff was sitting in the rear seat of an Essex coach, which was waiting in a line of cars for a traffic signal to change, when the automobile in which she was riding was struck from the rear by a car operated by the defendant railway company. She saw the car approaching and became hysterical when the crash came. She sustained no physical injuries. She was quieted with difficulty and was taken to a hotel. She was very nervous and was unable to sleep until an early hour the next morning. She had been in good health before the accident and had never been nervous or had digestive trouble. After the accident she suffered from stomach trouble and was nervous.

From Madison she rode in the same automobile to Milwaukee, Chicago, and Minneapolis,and then to the Pacific Coast. Two months and eight days after the accident, while the car was standing near the curb and out of the path of the street car, at Olympia, Wash., a street car approached the automobile and clanged its bell. Plaintiff immediately became hysterical. Later she fainted. During the following night one side of her body became paralyzed.

Schubring, Ryan, Clarke & Petersen, of Madison, for appellant.

Hill, Thomann & Beckwith, of Madison, for respondent.

STEVENS, J.

[1] 1. The jury found all the facts essential to a recovery by the plaintiff. There is no question as to the paralyzed condition of the plaintiff. The case turns wholly upon the question whether the facts sustain the finding of the jury that the paralysis of the plaintiff followed naturally and directly from the shock which she sustained when the automobile in which she was riding was struck by the defendant's car. Upon this question there is a conflict in the testimony of the doctors. The plaintiff offered the testimony of the doctor who examined her the day after the collision in Madison, and also that of the physician who has treated her in Washington after she became paralyzed. Both doctors diagnosed the condition as hysterical paralysis. These doctors testified that plaintiff's paralysis was a condition that might follow such a nervous shock; that paralysis could be caused by such a shock; that the shock at the time of the collision was a contributing factor; that it was very reasonable to expect such a condition; and that unquestionably the paralysis could be referred back to this shock. They further said that the fright experienced by the plaintiff in Washington would not cause paralysis in a normally healthy person.

The doctors called by the defendant company had never seen or treated the plaintiff. In general, they came to the conclusion that the accident in Madison could not have caused the paralysis in Washington. But they did agree that the incident in Washington would not cause paralysis in a normally healthy person, that the collision with the street car in Madison might cause a serious nervous ailment, and that there might be some connection between the accident and the paralysis. Such proof presented an issue of fact for the jury and is sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury.

[2] In order that his testimony may be admissible it is not necessary, often not possible,...