Sundquist v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 30364.,30364. |
| Citation | 141 Idaho 450,111 P.3d 135 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | Larry Lee SUNDQUIST, Claimant-Respondent, v. PRECISION STEEL & GYPSUM, INC., Employer, and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation, Surety, Defendants-Appellants, and Superior Interiors, Inc., Employer, and Idaho State Insurance Fund, Surety; F & S Interiors, Inc., Employer, and Idaho State Insurance Fund, Surety; Lombac Construction Services, Inc., Employer, and Everest National Insurance Company, Surety; Interior Systems, Inc., Employer, and Everest National Insurance Company Surety; and Interior Systems, Inc., Employer, and Advantage Workers Compensation Insurance Company, Surety, Defendants. |
Law Offices of Harmon & Whittier, Boise, for appellant. Monte R. Whittier argued.
Bradford S. Eidam, Boise, argued for respondent.
Precision Steel & Gypsum and its surety Liberty Northwest Insurance (jointly, Precision) appeal from the decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission finding them liable for the worker's compensation claim of Larry Lee Sundquist, a former Precision employee. We affirm.
Sundquist worked as a drywall taper for most of his adult life. He began as an apprentice in 1968, and after taking a hiatus beginning in 1993 he resumed his career in 2000. A drywall taper smoothes "mud" over sheetrock seams, rendering them invisible. The work involves using trowels called "knives" to spread the mud evenly. The pressure that must be applied to the work surface and the repetitive motions required of a drywall taper invite certain limiting physical conditions over time, such as to the drywall taper's wrist and elbow.
Sundquist worked for many different employers before he first came to be employed by Precision in the February of 2002. In late 2000 while working for one of those previous employers Sundquist noticed tenderness in his elbow and pain in his wrist. The symptoms were mild and infrequent and so did not cause Sundquist great concern. Over time, the symptoms became more frequent and severe. He began to wear a wrist brace and to take ibuprofen for the pain.
When Sundquist came to work for Precision, he worked harder and for longer hours than he had previously. Sundquist's symptoms became worse, and sharp pains forced him to drop his knives when he worked. The wrist pain became so severe it awakened him at night. Sundquist did not recall any specific incident in which he may have injured his wrist or elbow, either while working for Precision or some previous employer.
On April 26, 2002, after two weeks to a month of such severe symptoms, Sundquist first consulted with a doctor about the pain. The doctor first told Sundquist his symptoms were work related on the "second or third visit." The second visit occurred on May 16, 2002, the third on June 13, 2002. During that third visit Sundquist's doctor restricted him from work. Sundquist's last day working for Precision was June 11, 2002. He provided Precision with timely notification of his medical condition.
Sundquist was diagnosed as suffering from tardy ulnar nerve palsy (sometimes designated as "cubital tunnel syndrome") and under-went surgery that ameliorated but did not eliminate his symptoms.
Sundquist claimed worker's compensation against Precision and several other former employers. Those cases were consolidated and heard by an Industrial Commission referee on August 1, 2003. Three of the defendants had been dismissed prior to the hearing. The referee determined that Sundquist "suffers from a compensable occupational disease for which Precision is wholly liable[.]" Sundquist's condition was found to have manifested itself and to have become disabling during his time at Precision. The referee specifically determined that relative to his employment at Precision, Sundquist's occupational disease was not a "preexisting" condition. The findings of fact and conclusions of law recommended by the referee were subsequently adopted by the Industrial Commission.
Precision filed a timely appeal from the decision of the Industrial Commission, which is presently before this Court.
When reviewing a decision of the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free review over questions of law. Uhl v. Ballard Medical Products, Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003). The question of when a claimant's medical condition becomes "manifest" and "preexisting" relative to later events is a question of fact. Dumaw v. J.L. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 155, 795 P.2d 312, 317 (1990). The factual findings of the Industrial Commission will be upheld provided they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Uhl, 138 Idaho at 657, 67 P.3d at 1269. "Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Id. The conclusions reached by the Industrial Commission regarding the credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless the conclusions are clearly erroneous. Hughen v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 351, 48 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2002). We will not re-weigh the evidence or consider whether we would have drawn a different conclusion from the evidence presented. Id.
In addition to assisting claimants with injuries or disablement stemming from workrelated accidents, Idaho's worker's compensation law provides benefits to claimants suffering from occupational diseases. Mulder v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Co., 135 Idaho 52, 55, 14 P.3d 372, 375 (2000). An occupational disease is one that arises from the nature of employment and is "peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment[.]" I.C. § 72-102(21)(a). Here, it was found by the Industrial Commission and agreed by both parties that Sundquist suffers from an occupational disease arising from his former career as a drywall taper.
Precision contends it is protected from liability under the doctrine articulated by this Court in Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enterprises, 126 Idaho 129, 133, 879 P.2d 592, 596 (1994). The Nelson doctrine provides that a claimant seeking compensation for the aggravation of a preexisting condition must prove his injuries are attributable to an accident that can reasonably be located as to the time and place it occurred. Id. Sundquist has not pointed to an identifiable accident or mishap contributing to his medical condition. However, the findings of fact reached by the Industrial Commission included a determination that Sundquist's occupational disease was not preexisting to his employment with that firm. The Nelson doctrine does not apply to all cases where there is an occupational disease, only in those where the claimant's occupational disease preexisted employment with the employer from whom benefits are sought. Id. Consequently, the Nelson doctrine would only be applicable in this case if Precision were able to persuade this Court to overturn the Industrial Commission's factual finding as to when Sundquist's condition first became manifest.
Precision argues that because Sundquist suffered from pain prior to coming to work for Precision, the Industrial Commission was wrong to find that Sundquist's occupational disease was not a preexisting condition. In making its determination, the Industrial Commission considered evidence including Sundquist's testimony, his medical records, and the deposition testimony of physicians who had examined him. Precision has not argued that the Industrial Commission lacked substantial and competent evidence to support its factual finding.
An occupational disease exists for the purposes of the worker's compensation law when it first manifests. With respect to occupational diseases, the worker's compensation law treats the "manifestation" of the disease as being equivalent to the time or occurrence of an accident causing an injury. I.C. §§ 72-216, 72-217, 72-218, 72-229, 72-307, 72-401, 72-411, 72-413, 72-413A, 72-419, 72-430, 72-706, 72-719, and 72-805. In addition, it is the manifestation of the occupational disease that triggers the employer's obligation to provide medical services, appliances, and supplies and that triggers the running of the time periods for giving notice to the employer and filing a claim for benefits. I.C. §§ 72-432 and 72-448.
In 1997, the Idaho legislature amended the law to include a definition of "manifestation," which is defined as "the time when an employee knows that he has an occupational disease, or whenever a qualified physician shall inform the injured worker that he has an occupational disease." Ch. 274, § 1, 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws 799, 802. This definition is subjective. The employee must know that he has an occupational disease or have been so informed by a qualified physician. In addition, the knowledge required is that he has an occupational disease, not that he has symptoms that are later diagnosed as being an occupational disease. Knowledge of symptoms is not synonymous with knowledge the symptoms are caused by an occupational disease. Boyd v. Potlatch Corp., 117 Idaho 960, 793 P.2d 192 (1990).
For an occupational disease to be a preexisting condition under the holding in Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enterprises, 126 Idaho 129, 879 P.2d 592 (1994), there must have been a prior manifestation of the disease. Nelson sought benefits for the aggravation in 1988 and 1989 of her carpel tunnel syndrome that had been first diagnosed by a physician in 1980. Id. at 130-31, 879 P.2d at 592-94.
In the instant case, prior to Sundquist's employment with Precision, he had not sought any medical care with respect to the pain he was experiencing in his elbow and wrist. Whether or not he knew that such pain was caused by an occupational disease was a question of fact for the Industrial Commission. Its finding that he did not know is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
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