Sunken Treasure v. UNIDENTIFIED, WRECKED VESSEL, Civ. A. No. 1991/263.

• Decision Date: 14 July 1994
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1991/263.
• Citation: 857 F. Supp. 1129
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands
• Parties: SUNKEN TREASURE, INC., Plaintiff, Government of the Virgin Islands, Department of Planning & Natural Resources, Plaintiff/Cross Claimant, v. The UNIDENTIFIED, WRECKED, AND ABANDONED VESSEL, her tackle, armament, apparel, and cargo, located within 2,500 yards of a point located at coordinates 17 degrees, 47 minutes, 50 seconds North Latitude; and 64 degrees, 45 minutes, 30 seconds West Longitude, and United States of America, Defendants.

857 F. Supp. 1129

SUNKEN TREASURE, INC., Plaintiff Government of the Virgin Islands, Department of Planning & Natural Resources, Plaintiff/Cross Claimant, v. The UNIDENTIFIED, WRECKED, AND ABANDONED VESSEL, her tackle, armament, apparel, and cargo, located within 2,500 yards of a point located at coordinates 17 degrees, 47 minutes, 50 seconds North Latitude; and 64 degrees, 45 minutes, 30 seconds West Longitude and United States of America, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 1991/263.

District Court, Virgin Islands, D. St. Croix.

July 14, 1994.

Maurice Cusick, Law Offices of Lee Rohn, Christiansted, St. Croix, VI, for plaintiff Sunken Treasure, Inc.

Rosalie Simmonds Ballentine, Atty. Gen. by Dudley Hughes, Asst. Atty. Gen., U.S. Dist. Court, Christiansted, St. Croix, VI, for plaintiff/cross claimant Government of the Virgin Islands.

Hugh P. Mabe, III, U.S. Atty. by Michael A. Humphreys, Asst. U.S. Atty., U.S. Dist. Court, Christiansted, St. Croix, VI, for U.S.

OPINION

BROTMAN, Senior District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on the Government of the Virgin Islands' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in rem against the defendant vessel and, concomitantly, on the United States' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. For reasons addressed below, the respective motions to dismiss will be granted.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Sunken Treasure, Inc. (hereinafter "STI") is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of raising sunken ships, their remains, and treasure from the ocean floor. In 1991, STI commenced preparation for salvage operations in the Estate Salt River area upon belief that remains of a vessel from the era of Christopher Columbus existed there. STI intended to raise an anchor embedded in the submerged lands at Salt River, where historic remains such as anchors, chunks of metal, and cannons are commonly known to exist and, some believe, have remained for centuries.

The defendant vessel, all parties agree, is unidentified, wrecked and abandoned beneath the navigable waters of the United States, within three miles of the coast of St. Croix, and thus within the territorial waters of the United States Virgin Islands pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 2102(e) and (f). The submerged lands upon which the vessel presumably rests belong to the Government of the Virgin Islands as provided by federal statute. 48 U.S.C. § 1705. The vessel is also located in an area that the United States Congress has designated as a National Historic Park and Ecological Preserve. 16 U.S.C. § 410tt-1.

Portions of the vessel are "embedded" within the submerged lands such that the use of tools of excavation may be required in order to gain access to these portions. Because the salvage operations intended by STI will necessarily require dredging activity and/or alteration of navigable waters, local and federal permits are required. STI has not received any local or federal permits to excavate or remove artifacts or objects from the wreck site. Consequently, the Department of Planning and Natural Resources (hereinafter "DPNR") instructed STI not to remove anything from Salt River. STI has complied with this instruction and accordingly has not commenced salvage operations.¹

On September 18, 1991, STI initiated the instant litigation by filing a complaint in rem against the alleged shipwreck seeking to be placed in exclusive possession and title of the vessel and its remains or, alternatively, to be granted a salvage award. STI also filed motions for temporary restraints and preliminary and permanent injunctions, seeking to prevent all persons and governmental agencies from interfering with STI's intended salvage operations. The United States of America (hereinafter "U.S.A.") and the Government of the Virgin Islands (hereinafter "GVI") subsequently intervened as defendant and plaintiff, respectively. Both intervenors seek to be declared owners of the defendant vessel pursuant to the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, 43 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. (hereinafter the "ASA"), and seek an order restraining STI from conducting salvage operations in Salt River.

This Court denied STI's initial request for temporary restraints and has refrained from ruling on the injunctive relief sought by the U.S.A. and the GVI, opting instead to instruct all parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in relation to the respective underlying claims. All parties have complied with this request and have additionally provided the Court with numerous supplemental briefs.

II. Discussion

A. Issue Before Court

The underlying core of this litigation is STI's facial constitutional challenge of the ASA. All parties effectively agree that STI's complaint in this action stands or falls on this Court's ruling in regard to the constitutional validity of that statute.

The significance of the ASA in this case is born out by a summary review of the jurisdictional framework surrounding the litigation. STI brings this lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333 as an admiralty action under the maritime law of salvage and/or the related doctrine of finds, primarily seeking a salvage award for its intended efforts to recover items from the defendant vessel and alternatively seeking title to the vessel and such items contained within it.

The U.S.A. and the GVI challenge the jurisdictional basis of STI's action on the grounds that the ASA governs this matter and statutorily divests this Court of jurisdiction. This argument is grounded on two operative effects of the ASA: first, the assumption of title by the United States to abandoned shipwrecks² that are, inter alia, "embedded"³ in the submerged lands of a state (which, for purposes of the ASA, includes lands of the Virgin Islands)⁴ and the transfer of such title to that state, id. §§ 2105(a)(1), (c); second, the exclusion of the aforementioned shipwrecks from the laws of salvage and finds. Id. § 2106(a).

Assuming both the applicability and constitutionality of the ASA, its effect in this case would be (1) to transfer ownership of the defendant vessel to the GVI, (2) to deprive STI of a cause of action based on the law of salvage and/or the law of finds, (3) to divest this Court of admiralty jurisdiction over the claim, and (4) to concurrently vest the Virgin Islands Territorial Courts with jurisdiction over the claim. Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be the SB "Seabird," 941 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1991) (Zych II).

The applicability of the ASA is effectively undisputed among the parties. STI concedes that the defendant vessel is abandoned and at least partly embedded within the submerged lands of the United States Virgin Islands for purposes of the ASA. It is the constitutionality of the statute that STI challenges in seeking to retain jurisdiction in this Court and to ultimately prevail on the merits of its complaint. As the fate of STI's complaint thus hinges on the validity of the ASA, the Court accordingly must now address the substance of STI's constitutional challenge.

B. Constitutionality of ASA

STI contends that the ASA is unconstitutional on its face for three independent reasons. The arguments are: first, that the statute, in categorically excepting a class of abandoned shipwrecks from the law of salvage and the law of finds, impermissibly excludes from federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction something that falls "clearly within" it, and thus exceeds the amount that Congress may validly alter the boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction; second, that the ASA violates the principle that maritime law must be uniform; third, that the ASA violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause in that the "embeddedness" distinction is not rationally related to a valid public purpose.

Each of these arguments have recently been considered and rejected by the Seventh Circuit in several opinions relating to one case, Zych, cited above. That case involved analogous facts to those in this case: the finder of an abandoned shipwreck in the waters of Lake Michigan brought an admiralty action in rem seeking title to the wreck, and state agencies intervened seeking to enforce the ASA and obtain a dismissal of the action. Of the two district and two circuit opinions entered in Zych, the most comprehensive is that of Judge Ilana Diamond Rovner, 811 F.Supp. 1300 (N.D.Ill.1992) (Zych III), aff'd, 19 F.3d 1136 (7th Cir.1994), wherein the court scrupulously analyzed a series of constitutional objections to the ASA, and ultimately held the statute constitutional, resulting in the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint for lack of admiralty jurisdiction. This Court, while not bound, elects to follow Zych in ruling on the constitutional challenges raised by STI, which challenges are discussed in turn below.

1. ASA's Exclusion of Law of Salvage and Law of Finds

It is undisputed among the parties that the ASA eliminates the laws of salvage and finds as causes of action in cases relating to abandoned shipwrecks that fall within the ASA's statutory framework. 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a). Inasmuch as these two doctrines provide abandoned shipwreck salvors and finders with what is effectively their sole basis for stating a claim under the laws of admiralty, this exclusion effectively divests federal courts of jurisdiction over disputes relating to such shipwrecks; such a result is confirmed by the Seventh Circuit in Zych II. 941 F.2d at 530. A constitutional question thus arises as to whether Congress has abused the parameters established in the case law that endeavor to define how extensively admiralty jurisdiction may be modified through legislation.⁵

The Supreme Court long ago clarified that Congress has some leeway to "alter, qualify or supplement admiralty and maritime law as experience or changing conditions might require." Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 44 S.Ct. 391, 68 L.Ed. 748 (1924). That leeway, the Panama Court went on to observe, is limited by two "well recognized" limitati...