Sunspan Engineering & Const. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., SPRING-LOCK
| Decision Date | 29 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | SPRING-LOCK,No. 44899,44899 |
| Citation | 310 So.2d 4 |
| Parties | SUNSPAN ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Petitioner, v.SCAFFOLDING COMPANY and Spring-Lock Scaffolding of Florida, Inc. and Ike M. Hayden and Threesia A. Hayden, his wife, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Gary H. Rushmer, Akerman, Senterfitt, Eidson & Wharton, Orlando, for petitioner.
Lawrence M. Watson, Jr., and Robert L. Young, Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Orlando, for respondents.
We consider a petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County, Florida, to review that court's interlocutory order in this case.
The interlocutory order held unconstitutional Section 440.11(1), F.S.1972, insofar as it was sought to be applied in this case to preclude a third party plaintiff, an alleged tort-feasor of an injured employee covered by workmen's compensation insurance, from right of access to the courts to maintain a common law tort action against employer for being violative of Article I, Section 21, Florida Constitution, F.S.A., and insofar as it violates such third party plaintiff's rights to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Article I, Section 2, Florida Constitution, and Amendment XIV, Sections 1 and 2, United States Constitution.
Section 440.11(1), F.S. to the extent involved herein was enacted by the Legislature as Chapter 71--190 and became law July 19, 1971. It was obviously enacted to abrogate the effect of this Court's decision in Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan (Fla.1970), 235 So.2d 482.
In essence, Chapter 71--190 amended existing Section 440.11, F.S. to provide:
'That the liability of an employer prescribed in § 440.10 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to any third party tort-feasor and to the employee . . . and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer . . . on account of such injury or death . . .'
The salient facts in this case are briefly as follows: Respondent Ike M. Hayden, employee of Sunspan Engineering and Construction Company, brought an action against Respondents Spring-Lock Scaffolding Company and Spring-Lock Scaffolding of Florida, Inc., as alleged third party tort-feasors to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when a platform board fell from a scaffolding tower which had been leased to Hayden's employer, Petitioner Sunspan Engineering and Construction Company (the construction contractor on the job where Hayden was employed) by Respondent Spring-Lock Scaffolding of Florida, Inc. Hayden alleged the scaffolding tower had been negligently manufactured by Respondent Spring-Lock Scaffolding Company, a foreign corporation.
After Hayden filed his action against the alleged third party tort-feasors, they, as defendants, filed in the action a third party complaint against Hayden's employer, Sunspan Engineering and Construction Company, alleging that Sunspan is or may be liable to Spring-Lock for all or part of Hayden's claim for the negligent construction or operation of the scaffolding tower.
Sunspan moved to dismiss the third party complaint on the ground that Section 440.11(1), F.S. precluded suit by a third party tort-feasor against an employer complying with the statutory provisions on workmen's compensation for injuries sustained by an employee in the course of his employment. After hearing thereon, the circuit court denied the motion and ruled the statute unconstitutional and entered his record proper interlocutory order to that effect, i.e., the order under review herein.
Since the trial court's interlocutory order passed upon the constitutionality of Section 440.11(1), F.S. it is reviewable here by certiorari and we exercised our discretion to issue the writ. See Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, as construed in Burnsed v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company (Fla.), 290 So.2d 13.
It is our view we should sustain the interlocutory order and hold the statute, Section 440.11(1), F.S., unconstitutional as applied in this case.
The trial court's order specifically reads as follows:
'1. Section 440.11 Fla.Stats. (1972) and the, 'no contribution among joint tortfeasors' rule of Florida have no bearing on Counts I and II of the Third Party Complaint since those counts sound in contract. All other grounds for dismissing Counts I and II are without merit.
'2. As to Count III, this Court specifically finds:
a. Section 440.11 Fla.Stats. (1972) is unconstitutional insofar as it precludes Third Party Plaintiff from its right to access to the Courts and insofar as it abrogates Third Party Plaintiff's common law right of action against Third Party Defendant, all in violation of Art. I § 21, Fla.Const. Section 440.11 is also unconstitutional insofar as it violates Third Party Plaintiff's right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Art. I § 2 Fla.Const. and amend. XIV & 1 U.S.Const.
b. The 'no contribution among joint tortfeasors' rule of Florida is no longer valid.
We agree with respondents that in this review only paragraph 2a concerning Count III in the interlocutory order alleging negligence of the employer in the falling of the board from the scaffold tower can be considered. Paragraphs 1 and 2b of the order do not purport to pass upon the validity of a Florida statute as does paragraph 2a, and afford no basis for certiorari review thereof under the Constitution.
Going directly to a review of paragraph 2a of the interlocutory order, we first call attention to the fact that prior to the enactment of Ch. 71--190 Section 440.11, F.S., this Court in Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan, supra, had held that a third party tort-feasor does not receive any benefit from the Workmen's Compensation Act. It subjects him to liability to employer and to the employee. As held in that decision, the Act permits the employee to sue a third party tort-feasor. The employer is subrogated to the rights of the employee as against a third party tort-feasor to the extent of compensation benefits payable to the employee. The employer has a lien on any proceeds recovered by the employee from the tort-feasor which are equitably distributed. If employee does not sue the tort-feasor within one year, employer may sue.
Taking into account those rights of the employer against the third party tort-feasor provided by the Act, this Court concluded in Trail Builders that only the employee covered by workmen's compensation, but not the tort-feasor, was precluded from suing the employer because of the employee's injury in a compensable industrial accident. Trail Builders was reaffirmed by us in Florida Gas Company v. Spaulding (Fla.1970), 243 So.2d 129.
Without reciprocally taking away these rights of the employee or the employer to sue the third party tort-feasor, the Legislature, within seven months after the Spaulding decision by its enactment of Ch. 71--190, purported to abrogate this Court's holdings in Trail Builders and Spaulding.
It is our view that this amendatory statute is unconstitutional as applied to the situation in this case and we affirm the Circuit Court.
In support of our view, we first refer to Article I, § 21, Florida Constitution, which provides access for every person to the courts 'for redress of any injury.'
Construing this provision of the Constitution in the recent case of Kluger v. White (Fla.1973), 281 So.2d 1, concerning the validity of a portion of the state's 'no-fault' insurance law (the Automobile Reparations Reform Law--F.S. § 627.738), we held that...
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