Sunter v. Sunter

• Decision Date: 28 February 1906
• Citation: Sunter v. Sunter, 190 Mass. 449, 77 N.E. 497 (Mass. 1906)
• Parties: SUNTER et al. v. SUNTER.
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

190 Mass. 449

77 N.E. 497

SUNTER et al. v. SUNTER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

February 28, 1906

COUNSEL

Thomas F. Reddy, John D. Graham, and Michael J. Jordan, for appellant.

B. S Ladd and Thomas F. Strange, for appellees.

OPINION

BRALEY J.

Unless the defendant is a purchaser for value and without notice of the infirmity of his mother's title as against the plaintiffs, he holds by no better right the land described in the bill. Wyman v. Hooper, 2 Gray, 141, 145. In equity the consideration must be valuable, as distinguished from that which is merely moral or equitable, or imported from the nature of a sealed instrument, though it need not be pecuniary, or equal to the value of the property conveyed. Bullock v. Sadlier, Amb. 764; Patten v Moore, 32 N.H. 382; Wood v. Robinson, 22 N.Y 567; Price v. Jenkins, 5 Ch. D. 619; Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 508. But, if the defendant is found by the master to have neither paid money nor parted with other property for her conveyance to him, he relies on a clause in the deed by which he agreed to support her during the remainder of her life. This defense is devoid of merit, for it is shown in the report, by the respondent's own testimony, that the conveyance was made out of gratitude for his care and kindness to her in the past, as well as upon his promise to care for her in the future, and during the few months elapsing between the date of the deed and that of her death she was not in fact supported by him, though he expressed his willingness to do so if required. Dow v. Jewell, 18 N.H. 340, 45 Am. Dec. 371; Padgett v. Lawrence, 10 Paige (N. Y.) 170, 40 Am. Dec. 232. Upon these findings the master's final ruling that as between the parties the agreement to furnish her with maintenance could not be considered a valuable consideration, and that the conveyance. being purely voluntary, let in the plaintiffs to their equitable rights in the land, if they chose to assert them, was well warranted, and must be sustained. The case is thus left to be considered as if the title had remained in her when, as the probate guardian of the parties, she personally acquired the estate through an intermediary at a sale made by herself, acting in a fiduciary capacity.

While it is significant that the master finds, although she was duly licensed to sell the property for the maintenance of her wards, in reality she sold and obtained title for her own benefit, yet if the purchase by her had been for a fair price, or to prevent a sacrifice of the land, the transaction equally would have been voidable by them. Walker v. Walker, 101 Mass. 169, 172; Goodell v. Goodell, 173 Mass. 140, 146, 53 N.E. 275; Hayes v. Hall, 188 Mass. 510, 74 N.E. 935. A sale by herself officially to herself individually was not absolutely void; for, if the wards, upon coming of age and with knowledge of the transaction, had been content to let the conveyance remain unimpeached, the title would have remained absolutely in her. Jones v. Dexter, 130 Mass. 380, 383, 39 Am. Rep. 459; Morse v. Hill, 136 Mass. 60. But, as the plaintiffs have elected to avoid, the defendant claims that the delay of which they have been guilty since attaining their majority shows their acquiescence, and the bill cannot be maintained. Until of age acquiescence could not be imputed to them, nor could they be affected by the uncommunicated knowledge of their mother and guardian that she had appropriated the property. Denholm v. McKay, 148 Mass. 438, 441, 442, 19 N.E. 551, 12 Am. St. Rep. 574. If a cause of action accrued entitling them to have the transfer set aside when she unlawfully acquired title, the plaintiffs were under the disability of infancy and could not assert their right. Under Pub. St. 1882, c. 196, § 5, now Rev. Laws, c. 202, § 24, they had a period of 10 years after reaching their majority in which to do so; but this time expired without any action being taken by them, because, after attaining full age and until their mother's death, the plaintiffs are found to have been ignorant of her conduct, though almost immediately upon such discovery they brought this bill. If, in equity or at law, the statute of limitations began to run when they ascertained the fraud that had been practiced upon them, they are not thereby barred, and if, in equity independently of the statute, a delay had ensued which might have made the claim stale, and hence unenforceable, they are found to have exercised reasonable diligence. Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 212, 245; Evans v. Bacon, 99 Mass. 213, 215; Cook v. Sawyer, 188 Mass. 163, 74 N.E. 356; Prevost v. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481, 5 L.Ed. 311; Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 592, 23 L.Ed. 328.

When their mother took possession of the property the land was unimproved, and at her own expense she built thereon a dwelling house, the cost of which the defendant now claims should be allowed to him as an improvement; but the master, in stating the account, declined to allow to him the benefit of this expenditure, and the exception of the defendant to this ruling raises the most important and difficult question in the case. At common law, compensation was not awarded for improvements to the freehold, even when made in good faith by one in possession claiming ownership, but who ultimately was found to have no title as against the true owner. Russell v. Blake, 2 Pick. 505, 507; Marshall v. Crehore, 13 Metc. 462, 468. But this doctrine, in many cases harsh and inequitable, was ameliorated by St. 1807, c. 75, now embodied in Rev. Laws, c. 179, § 17; and since this enactment, where the land demanded has actually been held and possessed by the tenant or his predecessor for six years, he becomes entitled to betterments, whether annexed by himself or by a former occupant, or, if this period of time has not passed, and where the improvements have been made in good faith by himself, or those who previously have occupied, then he may recover compensation therefor, whether the title is put in issue by a writ of entry or by petition for partition. Rev. St. c. 101,§ 20, St. 1850, p. 458, c. 278; Rev. Laws, c. 184, § 19; Rev. Laws, c. 179, § 18; Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass. 303; Marshall v. Crehore, ubi supra; Plimpton v. Plimpton, 12 Cush. 458, 467; Butrick, In re, 185 Mass. 107, 109, 69 N.E. 1044. If the plaintiffs had resorted to a writ of entry, the defendant would have been entitled to the benefit of these provisions; but if, instead, they seek relief in equity, the form of remedy does not change the right, as the protection which the statute affords is the same. McSorley v. Larissa, 100 Mass. 270, 272; Billings v. Mann, 156 Mass. 203, 30 N.E. 1136. Except for the limitation of time, the statute is declaratory only of the general maxim that those seeking equity must be equity. 2 Story's Eq. Jur. (13th Ed.) §§ 799a, 799b, note 1; Williams v. Gibbes, 20 How. (U. S.) 535, 15 L.Ed. 1013.

The provision that, if it appears possession has been held by a title which the tenant had reason to believe good, he then becomes entitled to compensation, is not applicable to the present case, as the guardian must be presumed to have known that she was acquiring the estate of her wards; but where it appears that the betterment has been annexed, either by the tenant, or those under whom he claims, and that either has actually held the and adversely to the true owner for six years previous to the bringing of the suit in which the ownership is put in issue, the value of permanent improvements may be assessed. Rev. Laws, c. 179, § 17; Baggott v. Fleming, 10 Cush. 451; Plimpton v. Plimpton, ubi supra; Wales v. Coffin, 100 Mass. 177. The conveyance of the guardian indirectly to herself was not an absolute nullity, for it passed an estate to which she had the legal seisin, and if she had conveyed to an innocent purchaser for value he would have acquired an indefeasible grant as against the plaintiffs. Somes v. Brewer, 2 Pick. 184, 191, 13 Am. Dec. 406; Robbins v. Bates, 4 Cush. 104. If, however, at their election, it was defeasible as to her, yet, as she occupied under it for more than six years, she held by a tenure that, although it has now failed, was altogether in her own right, and, being adverse, supports the defendant's claim for betterments. Bacon v. Callender, ubi supra; Heath v. Wells, 5 Pick. 140, 16 Am. Dec. 383. See Davy v. Durant, 1 De G. & J. 535.

The implied or constructive trust, which it is sought by the bill to have declared, having been found to be established as of the date of the deed to herself, though by reason of the disability of infancy, and, after that was...