Superintendent of Police of City of Bridgeport v. Freedom of Information Com'n, 14410

• Decision Date: 30 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 14410,14410
• Citation: 609 A.2d 998,222 Conn. 621
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 20 Media L. Rep. 1443 SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE OF the CITY OF BRIDGEPORT, et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, et al.

Page 998

609 A.2d 998

222 Conn. 621, 20 Media L. Rep. 1443

SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE OF the CITY OF BRIDGEPORT, et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, et al.

No. 14410.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 31, 1992.

Decided June 30, 1992.

John H. Barton, Associate City Atty., for appellants (plaintiffs).

Victor R. Perpetua, with whom, on the brief, was Mitchell Pearlman, Gen. Counsel, for appellee (named defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and BERDON, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the administrative appeal of the plaintiffs, the superintendent of police for the city of Bridgeport and the Bridgeport police department (plaintiffs), from a decision of the named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (FOIC). ¹ In its decision, the FOIC had concluded that the information appearing in permits, issued by the plaintiffs, to carry pistols or revolvers in the city of Bridgeport was not exempt from disclosure pursuant to General Statutes § 1-19(b)(2). ² The plaintiffs appealed the decision of the FOIC to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 1-21i(d) and 4-183. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal from which the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court. We transferred the appeal to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.

The factual situation that precipitated the plaintiffs' appeal is undisputed. On October 7, 1987, a newspaper, the Fairfield County Advocate (Advocate), through an employee, Edward Ericson, requested the plaintiffs to furnish it with a list of all those residents of Bridgeport who possessed municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers. ³ Ericson specified that for each permit holder he desired to know the individual's name, birthdate, address, telephone number, occupation, sex, date of issuance of the permit and what weapons were registered to the individual. Initially, the plaintiffs informed Ericson that the information sought would be made available, but that it was not computerized and would take some time to produce. Thereafter, Ericson telephoned the plaintiffs regularly for approximately six weeks in an effort to obtain the requested information. That information, however, was not forthcoming. Thereafter, by letter dated December 7, 1987, the Advocate appealed to the FOIC alleging the wrongful denial of the desired data and requesting an order for its production.

On January 29, 1988, Commissioner Joan Fitch of the FOIC heard the Advocate's appeal as a contested case. At the hearing the plaintiffs volunteered to make available to the Advocate the information that was contained in the permits issued by the plaintiffs with the exception of the names and addresses of the permit holders. Fitch, however, determined that all the requested information was subject to disclosure except the permit holders' telephone numbers, which was not information appearing in the permits. She therefore recommended in her proposed finding to the FOIC that the plaintiffs be ordered to disclose the name, address, date of birth, occupation, and sex of all municipal permit holders and also the date the permits were issued and a description of any weapon registered.

The FOIC in a final decision dated April 27, 1988, and in a corrected final decision dated May 11, 1988, substantially adopted Fitch's recommendations. ⁴ The FOIC concluded that the information requested by the Advocate, which appeared in municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers, was not exempt from disclosure as a medical, personnel or "similar" file pursuant to § 1-19(b)(2) and that its disclosure did not constitute an invasion of personal privacy under that subsection. The FOIC, therefore, ordered that the plaintiffs disclose the information appearing in the permits.

The plaintiffs appealed the FOIC's decision to the Superior Court. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the plaintiffs were aggrieved parties and were entitled to maintain the appeal. It also found that the plaintiffs' copies of issued permits were public records that are kept on file or maintained by a public agency and that they were subject to disclosure unless they fell within the exception to disclosure set forth in § 1-19(b)(2). Those findings are not disputed by either party. Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers were medical, personnel or "similar" files exempt from disclosure under § 1-19(b)(2).

The plaintiffs do not contend that a municipal permit to carry a pistol or revolver is a medical or personnel file. They argue instead that it is a "similar" ⁵ file within the meaning of § 1-19(b)(2) and therefore exempt from disclosure.

In considering the plaintiffs' argument, it must be noted initially that there is an "overarching policy" underlying the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) favoring the disclosure of public records. Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 193, 196, 585 A.2d 96 (1991); Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 201 Conn. 421, 431, 518 A.2d 49 (1986); Maher v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn. 310, 315, 472 A.2d 321 (1984). Our construction of the FOIA must be guided by the policy favoring disclosure and exceptions to disclosure must be narrowly construed. Ottochian v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 393, 398, 604 A.2d 351 (1992); Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 233, 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, 216 Conn. 253, 266, 579 A.2d 505 (1990); Board of Police Commissioners v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn. 183, 188, 470 A.2d 1209 (1984).

In keeping with that policy, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving that municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers are "similar" to medical and personnel files and are therefore entitled to the exemption from disclosure provided such files by § 1-19(b)(2). Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 221 Conn. at 232, 602 A.2d 1019; Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra; Commissioner of Consumer Protection v. Freedom of Information Commission, 207 Conn. 698, 702, 542 A.2d 321 (1988). "The plaintiffs must meet a twofold burden of proof to establish the applicability of the § 1-19(b)(2) exclusion. First, they must establish that the [permits] in question are within the categories of files protected by the exemption, that is, personnel, medical or 'similar' files. Second, they must show that disclosure of the records 'would constitute an invasion of personal privacy.' " Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 201 Conn. at 431-32, 518 A.2d 49; Ottochian v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 221 Conn. at 399-400, 604 A.2d 351; Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 217 Conn. at 196, 585 A.2d 96; Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 590, 595, 556 A.2d 592 (1989). "This burden requires the claimant of the exemption to provide more than conclusory language, generalized allegations or mere arguments of counsel. Rather, a sufficiently detailed record must reflect the reasons why an exemption applies to the materials requested." New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 776, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988); Emergency Medical Services Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission, 19 Conn.App. 352, 357, 561 A.2d 981 (1989).

As previously noted, the plaintiffs do not contend that municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers are medical or personnel files. The question to be resolved, therefore, is whether such permits are, as argued by the plaintiffs, "similar" files that are exempt from disclosure pursuant to § 1-19(b)(2). If Bridgeport municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers are not "similar" files within the purview of § 1-19(b)(2), such permits are not exempt from disclosure and it is unnecessary to consider whether their release would constitute an invasion of personal privacy. Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra. ⁶

The FOIA does not define what constitutes a "similar" file. We believe, however, that a municipal permit to carry a pistol or revolver is not a file "similar" to a medical or personnel file as envisioned by § 1-19(b)(2). "We interpret the term 'similar files' to encompass only files similar in nature to personnel or medical files. This interpretation is consistent with our policy of narrowly construing exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act. Board of Police Commissioners v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn. 183, 188, 470 A.2d 1209 (1984). We also recognize that when a reference to a general category follows an enumeration of specific categories, the general category is construed to embrace only objects similar to those included in the specific categories. Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Conn. 545, 553, 400 A.2d 712 (1978); 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.1986) § 47.18." Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 201 Conn. at 432 n. 11, 518 A.2d 49.

In common parlance, a permit to carry a pistol or revolver is not "similar" to a medical or personnel file. ⁷ Unlike a personnel or medical file, a permit to carry a pistol or revolver does not contain detailed information with a potential for disclosure of the intimate details of one's personal life or capabilities. ⁸ To conclude that a permit to carry a pistol or revolver is "similar" to a medical or personnel file and therefore exempt from disclosure would be a broad interpretation of § 1-19(b)(2) that would stretch the ordinary meaning of "similar" to the breaking point. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the general principle that exceptions to disclosure must be narrowly construed. Ottochian v. Freedom of Information Commission, upra...