Superior Court v. County of Mendocino

• Decision Date: 18 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. S046963,S046963
• Citation: 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 837,913 P.2d 1046,13 Cal.4th 45
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 913 P.2d 1046, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2739, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4517 . COUNTY OF MENDOCINO et al., Defendants and Respondents. Supreme Court of California

Page 837

51 Cal.Rptr.2d 837

13 Cal.4th 45, 913 P.2d 1046, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2739,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4517

The SUPERIOR COURT of Mendocino County, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MENDOCINO et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S046963.

Supreme Court of California.

April 18, 1996.

Gray, Cary, Ware & Freidenrich, David B. Geerdes, Merrill F. Storms, Jr., and Mary A. Lehman, San Diego, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Ian Herzog, Santa Monica, Suzanne Leibowitz, Lakeport, Douglas Devries, Sacramento, Leonard Sacks, Granada Hills, Bruce Broillet, Santa Monica, Steven Kleifield, Los Angeles, Wayne McClean, Woodland Hills, William D. Turley, San Diego, Robert Steinberg, Los Angeles, Roland Wrinkle, Woodland Hills, Harvey R. Levine, San Diego, Thomas Stolpman, Long Beach, Tony J. Tanke, Belmont, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Richard Chernick, Los Angeles, Robin H. Wright, Morrison & Foerster, Raymond L. Wheeler, Palo Alto, Robert D. Thomas, Oakland, and Su W. Hwang, San Jose, as amici curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

McDonough, Holland & Allen, Mark A. Wasser, Don F. Harris and Jan P. Sherry, Sacramento, for Defendants and Respondents.

Alan K. Marks, County Counsel (San Bernardino) and Michael A. Markel, Deputy County Counsel, as amici curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

GEORGE, Justice.

Government Code section 68108 ¹ authorizes a county, under specified circumstances, to designate "unpaid furlough days" on which the trial courts of the county generally "shall not be in session." In this case, we are called upon to decide whether this statute is unconstitutional on its face. The trial court rejected the facial challenge to the constitutionality of section 68108, but the Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that the statute represents "a legislative exercise of judicial power" and violates the separation of powers doctrine embodied in article III, section 3, of the California Constitution.

As we shall explain, we conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in finding section 68108 unconstitutional on its face.

I

In 1993, the Legislature enacted section 68108 as part of a measure aimed generally at assisting local governments in meeting their then pressing fiscal concerns. (Stats.1993, ch. 70, § 3.) The statute was enacted as an urgency measure and took effect on June 30, 1993.

Section 68108 provides that when a county has entered into a "memorandum of understanding" with its employees that designates certain days as "unpaid furlough days" for employees assigned to regular positions in the superior, municipal, and justice courts, "the courts shall not be in session" on those designated days, "except as ordered by the presiding judge upon a finding ... of a judicial emergency...." The section also provides that although the clerk's office of an affected court shall not be open on unpaid furlough days, each court shall permit documents to be filed on such days at a "drop box" equipped with a mechanism for determining the actual date on which a document is deposited, and further provides that an appropriate judicial officer shall be available on such days to conduct statutorily required arraignments and preliminary examinations and "to sign any necessary documents on an emergency basis." ²

Shortly after section 68108 was enacted, the Board of Supervisors of Mendocino County (hereafter the Board of Supervisors, or the Board) ratified memoranda of understanding with county employees that provided for six specified unpaid furlough days during the 1993-1994 fiscal year. (The specified furlough days were Friday, October 8 1993; Friday, November 12, 1993; Monday, January 3, 1994; Friday, January 14, 1994; Friday, February 18, 1994; and Friday, May 27, 1994.)

The Superior Court of Mendocino County (hereafter the Superior Court) immediately notified the Board of Supervisors that, in its judgment, the court's "particular needs" required it to remain open on the specified furlough days in order to fulfill the court's constitutional duties. ³ The Board of Supervisors, in response, notified the Superior Court that it believed it had the authority under section 68108 to designate and enforce the unpaid furlough days, which called for the closing of all county offices, as well as the justice, municipal, and superior courts, on those days.

On October 8, 1993, and November 12, 1993, the first two designated unpaid furlough days, all county offices and the municipal and justice courts in the county were closed. The Superior Court, however, directed all county employees assigned to the Superior Court to report for work on those dates. On October 14, 1993, and November 19, 1993, the Superior Court issued orders to the Board of Supervisors, the county administrative officer, and the county auditor/controller, directing the county to provide funding for the salaries of the employees assigned to the Superior Court who had worked on the furlough days.

When the Board of Supervisors failed to comply with these orders, the Superior Court instituted the present lawsuit against the County of Mendocino, the Board of Supervisors, the county administrative officer, and the county auditor/controller (hereafter referred to collectively as the county). The complaint sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and the issuance of a writ of mandate directing the county to comply with the Superior Court's orders of October 14 and November 19 and to modify the furlough program to exclude court employees, unless the Superior Court specifically agreed to their inclusion. The county responded by filing its own cross-complaint for declaratory relief, seeking a judicial declaration that, under section 68108, it had the authority to designate unpaid furlough days for all county employees, including those assigned to the Superior Court. The county also filed an answer, denying a number of the allegations contained in the complaint, including the Superior Court's assertion that "any further reductions in the court's staff or working schedule will prevent the court from fulfilling its statutorily and constitutionally mandated duties."

The Judicial Council assigned a judge from another county to hear the case. With the agreement of the parties, the trial court considered the Superior Court's motion for a preliminary injunction and its petition for a writ of mandate at a single consolidated hearing, treating both causes of action as based upon the same substantive claim that section 68108 is unconstitutional on its face insofar as it purports to authorize a county, without the concurrence of the superior court, to designate days on which that court would not be in session. (The parties' respective causes of action for declaratory relief were not considered at the hearing.) After reviewing the parties' written briefs and hearing argument, the trial court rejected the Superior Court's facial challenge to the statute, concluding that section 68108, on its face, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment denying the requested writ of mandate, and concluded that that ruling rendered moot the issues raised by the motion for a preliminary injunction.

The Superior Court appealed from the judgment denying its petition for writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal, in a two-to-one decision, concluded that section 68108 on its face violates the Constitution's separation of powers provision, because the statute authorizes legislative exercise of a power reserved to the judiciary, namely "the inherent power of the courts to control their own hours and days of operation, as they determine to be appropriate." (Original italics.) The dissenting justice in the Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that "[w]hile ... a court might in certain circumstances show that a statute relating to court hours as applied precluded it from performing its judicial duties" (original italics), the challenged statute was not unconstitutional on its face, because it could be applied in a manner that would not have such a deleterious effect. ⁴

We granted review to consider the proper application of the separation of powers doctrine in this context. ⁵

II

From its inception, the California Constitution has contained an explicit provision embodying the separation of powers doctrine. (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. III, § 1, now art. III, § 3.) Article III, section 3, provides: "The powers of State government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution."

Although the language of California Constitution article III, section 3, may suggest a sharp demarcation between the operations of the three branches of government, California decisions long have recognized that, in reality, the separation of powers doctrine " 'does not mean that the three departments of our government are not in many respects mutually dependent' " Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 191, 137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148, or that the actions of one branch may not significantly affect those of another branch. Indeed, upon brief reflection, the substantial interrelatedness of the three branches' actions is apparent and commonplace: the judiciary passes upon the constitutional validity of legislative and executive actions, the Legislature enacts statutes that govern the procedures and evidentiary rules applicable in judicial and executive proceedings, and the Governor appoints judges and participates in the legislative process through the veto power. Such interrelationship, of course, lies at the heart of the constitutional theory of "checks and balances" that the separation of powers doctrine is intended to serve.

At the same time, this doctrine unquestionably places limits upon the actions of each branch with respect to the other branches. The judiciary, in reviewing statutes enacted by the...