Superior Oil Co. v. Harsh

• Citation: 50 F. Supp. 358
• Decision Date: 08 June 1943
• Docket Number: No. 141-D.,141-D.
• Parties: SUPERIOR OIL CO. v. HARSH et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Illinois

50 F. Supp. 358

SUPERIOR OIL CO. v. HARSH et al.

No. 141-D.

District Court, E. D. Illinois.

June 8, 1943.

W. B. Wagner and J. P. Adoue, both of Houston, Tex., and Charles Wham and John P. Wham, both of Centralia, Ill., for plaintiff.

Ray M. Foreman and Wm. Acton, both of Danville, Ill., and Russell Wilson, of Centralia, Ill., for defendants.

LINDLEY, District Judge.

This cause has to do with $29,077.88, proceeds from the sale of oil deposited in the registry of this court, pending litigation. The facts involved in the original hearing are fully set forth in Superior Oil Co. v. Harsh, D.C., 39 F.Supp. 467 and Id., 7 Cir., 126 F.2d 572. Plaintiff, who has been adjudged entitled to the oil, seeks to recover the entire amount. Defendants, who have been declared trespassers, seek reimbursement for all the expense incurred by them in drilling the well from which the oil was produced and in producing the oil, or, in the alternative, if denied recovery in full, for all costs incurred from and after April 30, 1941, when, by stipulation of the parties, approved by the court, defendants were permitted to continue to produce oil pending litigation.

On the record defendants were trespassers. Whether they were willful or inadvertent in their actions is probably immaterial, but a discussion of the respective alternative conclusions will be included.

In Illinois a trespasser who mines and removes minerals from the lands of another subjects himself to liability in damages to the true owner for the value of the mineral, if removed from the estate, at the place of severance. He is not to be credited for expense incurred or labor bestowed in production. The courts of Illinois have applied this rule even though the trespass may have been inadvertent, but have indicated that, when circumstances in aggravation are relied upon, additional punitive damages may be recovered. Illinois & St. L. R. & Coal Co. v. Ogle, 82 Ill. 627, 25 Am.Rep. 342; Bruner v. Hicks, 230 Ill. 536, 82 N.E. 888, 120 Am.St.Rep. 332; Greer v. Carter Oil Co., 373 Ill. 168, 25 N.E.2d 805; Zeigler v. Brenneman, 237 Ill. 15, 86 N.E. 597; Washington Ice Co. v. Shortall, 101 Ill. 46, 40 Am.Rep. 196; Shell Oil Co. v. Dye, 7 Cir., 135 F.2d 365; Shell Oil Co. v. Manley, 7 Cir., 124 F.2d 714; 7 A.L.R. 930. The rule was specifically applied to wrongfully recovered oil in Bruner v. Hicks, 230 Ill. 536, 82 N.E. 888, 120 Am.St.Rep. 332; Gillespie v. Fulton Oil & Gas Co., 239 Ill. 326, 88 N.E. 192; Zeigler v. Brenneman, 237 Ill. 15, 86 N.E. 597. Inasmuch, therefore, as defendants drilled the well as trespassers, in accounting for the oil produced, they are entitled to no credit for the expense incurred in drilling.

Defendants insist, however, that the Illinois doctrine had birth in erroneous reasoning and that if the issue were squarely presented to the Supreme Court today, certain various expressions uttered in the past would lead inevitably to rescission of the rule or, at least, to its modification to the extent that, if the trespass should be found to be inadvertent or in good faith, credit for expense of production would be allowed. Sufficient reply to this suggestion is that we can not speculate as to future decisions. But even were the court to modify its rule, as it is contended it might, I think defendants have not brought themselves within the class of inadvertent or good faith trespassers.

Defendants were trustees of the school located on the property and their lessees. They had no title of record, but based their claim to ownership on allegedly adverse possession and a presumption of a lost grant. The evidence submitted did not sustain either premise and there was absence of proof that the owner and his predecessors ever treated the trustees as other than permissive occupants. The record owners had at all times paid the taxes on the land, which at no time had been excepted from the whole tract on the tax books. Never, until this suit was instituted, had there been any controversy as to the title. At best, defendants' claim hung upon extremely slender threads. They attempted to interest the Evansville Refinery in drilling for oil, but, after an investigation that company declined to act. This refusal alone was notice to defendants that their claim, at its best, was exceedingly doubtful.

Despite this and with knowledge of plaintiff's claim of superior title, defendants moved onto the land under a contract whereby they were to be compensated wholly from such oil, if any, as should be found and produced and, over the express objection of plaintiff, commenced drilling without attempt to reach an understanding with plaintiff, or to procure an adjudication in court. With these facts in mind, I can not say defendants entered in good faith and with a reasonable belief that their action was rightful. Although they assert that they did not commit the trespass with willful intent to overrun plaintiff's rights to its detriment, they at least showed such such reckless disregard for the rights of plaintiff as to brand them as willful or intentional trespassers. See Resurrection Gold Min. Co. v. Fortune Gold Min. Co., 8 Cir., 129 F. 668, 679; United States v. Homestake Min. Co., 8 Cir., 117 F. 481, 485.

Those cases which have declared a trespasser to be acting inadvertently or in good faith are those where interpretation of a statute was uncertain and the trespasser had acted upon the advice of reputable counsel, United States v. Midway Northern Oil Co., D.C.S.D.Cal., 232 F. 619; where an assignment apparently valid was held to be invalid. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co. v. Right of Way Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 137 S.W. 171; or where a government official wrongfully granted permission. United States v. Homestake Min. Co., 8 Cir., 117 F. 481. In all such cases the trespasser acted upon a reasonable belief that he was acting legally and without knowing that plaintiff had rights which might well be superior.

To hold that defendants were not intentional trespassers would lead to a situation where any person with even the remotest claim of right could enter upon another's property and proceed to drill for oil, mine coal, or cut timber, hoping or taking a chance that the court, when the real landowner protested, would find in his favor. If he were found to have no right to the land, he would lose nothing since he could fall back on his assertion of title, declare himself an honest, mistaken trespasser and be compensated for any expense incurred. To allow such a trespasser to proceed with impunity would work grave injustice to the true owner, and result in endless litigation with the necessity of time-wasting accountings. Where a person asserts a claim and has been forewarned that his chances of being declared the true owner of the land are remote, and has full knowledge of the claim of superior title of record, as here, his recourse should be to the courts.

Since defendants were willful, or at least...