Superior Oil Co. v. Van Breemen

• Decision Date: 10 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. 7105,7105
• Citation: 378 So.2d 444
• Parties: The SUPERIOR OIL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank David VAN BREEMEN et al., Defendants-Appellants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 444

378 So.2d 444

The SUPERIOR OIL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank David VAN BREEMEN et al., Defendants-Appellants-Appellees.

No. 7105.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Oct. 10, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 1979.

Raleigh Newman, Lake Charles, Edwards, Stefanski & Barousse, Nolan J. Edwards, Crowley, for defendants-appellants-appellees.

Diego Giordano and James M. Dunnam, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before GUIDRY, FORET and SWIFT, JJ.

GUIDRY, Judge.

This is a concursus proceeding in which the plaintiff, Superior Oil Company, seeks judicial determination of the ownership of a certain sum deposited in the registry of court, which sum represents rental payments made pursuant to the terms of an oil, gas and mineral lease covering an undivided one-third (1/3) interest in a 131.33 acre tract situated in Acadia Parish. The defendants are Frank David Van Breemen, William John Tessmer, Jr. and John Wiley Mitchell. Superior Oil deposited $2,983.25 in the registry of the court, representing rental payments attributable to the disputed one-third (1/3). After trial on the merits, the district court entered a judgment recognizing Mitchell and Tessmer's claim to the rental money as transferees of the one-third (1/3) undivided interest in the 131.33 acres formerly owned by Frank David Van Breemen. From this judgment, Van Breemen has appealed. We affirm.

The dispute between defendants arises from a series of transactions occurring primarily in 1974 and 1975. The controversy as presented to the trial court, revolves around an instrument executed on July 23, 1975, purportedly conveying from appellant, Van Breemen, to appellee, Mitchell, a one-third (1/3) undivided interest in the 131.33 acres, the acreage subject to Superior Oil Company's lease.

Prior to the July 23, 1975 conveyance the 131.33 acre tract was owned by the Van Breemen brothers, William Buckley Van Breemen, Joe H. Van Breemen, and Frank David Van Breemen, who acquired the property by inter vivos donation in December, 1964.

The three Van Breemen brothers executed an oil, gas and mineral lease on the 131.33 acres to Edward P. Allis on July 12, 1975. On July 14, 1975, Allis assigned the mineral lease to Superior Oil Company.

Thereafter, the July 23, 1975 conveyance instrument was filed in Acadia Parish whereby Frank David Van Breemen's one-third (1/3) undivided interest in the 131.33 acres was transferred to appellee, Mitchell. Mitchell subsequently transferred the one-third (1/3) undivided property interest to William John Tessmer, Jr. by act of conveyance dated November 10, 1975.

As rental payments attributable to the one-third (1/3) undivided interest became due in the summer of 1977, Superior Oil Company was presented with conflicting claims to the rentals due. Frank David Van Breemen claimed the rental funds as owner of the one-third (1/3) interest in the property, alleging that his signature to the July 23, 1975 act of conveyance to Mitchell was a forgery. John Wiley Mitchell made demand on Superior Oil Company for the rental payment based upon an alleged assignment of income from the property by William John Tessmer, Jr. to him. Tessmer made demand for payment of the rental based upon the act of conveyance dated November 10, 1975. Being uncertain as to the ownership of the interest in question and of the right to the rental payment, Superior Oil Company provoked the concursus proceeding.

The concursus suit was filed July 12, 1977. On that same date, Lawrence G. Pugh, Jr. was appointed counsel for Mr. Van Breemen, a non-resident. The first trial date was set February 1, 1978 for May 25, 1978. On May 1, 1978 a motion for continuance was filed on behalf of Van Breemen on the grounds that a Texas proceeding had rendered judgment on the subject matter of the present suit and an appeal was then pending in Texas. The trial court granted Van Breemen's motion and the trial was continued until October 24, 1978. On that date, October 24, Van Breemen appeared with counsel Lawrence G. Pugh, Jr., ready for trial, however, at that point Mr. Pugh withdrew as counsel for Mr. Van Breemen and the trial court continued the trial for a special fixing on November 20, 1978. Mr. Van Breemen was specifically advised by the court that he should immediately secure representation and be prepared for trial of this matter on the scheduled date of November 20, 1978. Mr. Van Breemen thereafter retained the services of Mr. Kenneth W. Dejean. On November 16th Mr. Dejean, on behalf of Van Breemen, filed a motion to continue the trial fixing of November 20, 1978. On November 20, Attorney Dejean appeared to represent Van Breemen, however, Van Breemen was absent. The trial was then rescheduled for the next day, November 21. On November 21, the trial court heard and denied the motion for a continuance filed by Mr. Dejean. The matter was then tried on its merits with Mr. Van Breemen present and represented by his attorney, Mr. Dejean, resulting in the judgment appealed from.

Appellant has presented two issues for our determination:

(1) Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing to grant Van Breemen's motion to continue the trial; and, if the denial was proper,

(2) Did the trial court err in finding Van Breemen to have validly transferred his 1/3 undivided interest in the tract to Mitchell by rejecting Van Breemen's defense that the deed from himself to Mitchell was a forgery?

MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

Appellant, Van Breemen, alleges that error was committed by the trial court by denying a contradictory hearing on his motion for continuance as required by Article 1605 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:

"Every contested motion for a continuance shall be tried summarily and contradictorily with the opposite party."

The record reflects that the district court ordered issuance of a rule nisi on the motion to continue to be heard on November 20, 1978. The record shows that nothing could be heard on November 20, 1978 because Van Breemen was absent without excuse. On the next day, the trial court after considering evidence presented by Van Breemen in support of his motion denied same.

In brief counsel for Van Breemen urges that the hearing on the motion for a continuance was not a "true contradictory hearing", the denial of which constituted error. The record indicates otherwise.

As to the merits of the motion for continuance, Van Breemen alleges error in the refusal of the trial court to grant a continuance based on both peremptory grounds contained in LSA-C.C.P. Article 1602 and on discretionary grounds contained in LSA-C.C.P. Article 1601, which provide:

Article 1601:

"A continuance may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor."

Article 1602:

"A continuance shall be granted if at the time a case is to be tried, the party applying for the continuance shows that he has been unable, with the exercise of due diligence, to obtain evidence material to his case; or that a material witness has absented himself without the contrivance of the party applying for the continuance."

The peremptory grounds urged by Van Breemen are the inability to produce certain witnesses to the signing of the instrument executed on July 23, 1975; the inability to produce testimony of two handwriting experts; and, the inability to produce certain exhibits and transcripts of another proceeding. The inability to produce or obtain this evidence was due, according to Van Breemen, to the insufficiency of time to review and obtain this evidence. The "time to review...