Superior Transfer Co. v. Halstead

Decision Date15 January 1948
Docket Number62.
Citation56 A.2d 706,189 Md. 536
PartiesSUPERIOR TRANSFER CO. v. HALSTEAD et al.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Herman M. Moser, Judge.

Action by Bertha Halstead against Superior Transfer Company and Admiral Taxi Service, Inc., for injuries alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff as result of collision between taxicab of defendant Admiral Taxi Service, Inc., in which plaintiff was passenger, and a tractor-truck owned by defendant Superior Transfer Company. From judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant Superior Transfer Company and in favor of defendant Admiral Taxi Service, Inc., against the plaintiff, the defendant Superior Transfer Company appeals.

Judgment for defendant Admiral Taxi Service, Inc., affirmed, judgment against defendant Superior Transfer Company reversed, and judgment entered in its favor.

Foster H. Fanseen and Philip S. Ball, both of Baltimore, for appellant.

M Richard Moss, of Baltimore (Williard I. Silverberg, of Baltimore, on the brief), for Bertha Halstead.

James J. Lindsay, of Baltimore (George L. Darley, of Baltimore, on the brief), for Admiral Taxi Service, Inc.

Argued before MARBURY, Chief Judge, DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

Opinion by MARBURY, Chief Judge.

This is a suit for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by the appellee, Bertha Halstead, as the result of a collision between a taxicab of the Admiral Taxi Service Inc., in which she was a passenger, and a tractor-truck owned and operated by the appellant, Superior Transfer Company. It was tried in the Baltimore City Court before Judge Moser sitting without a jury. He found in favor of the plaintiff against the appellant, and in favor of the Admiral Taxi Service, Inc., against the plaintiff. From judgments based on these verdicts, the Transfer Company appealed.

The collision occurred about 10:30 a. m., on January 30, 1946, at the corner of Mulberry and Fremont Streets in the City of Baltimore. Both vehicles were traveling east on Mulberry, a one way street. Both were stopped at the corner of Fremont by a red light. The taxi was continuing east on Mulberry. The tractor-truck was intending to make a right-hand turn down Fremont. The tractor-truck was on the right near the curb. The taxi was several feet to the left. The tractor, by reason of the length of the truck or trailer, had to turn slightly to the left, towards the taxi, before making the right-hand turn. Both started when the light changed, and the left front bumper of the tractor scratched the right rear fender of the taxi. The scratch was about six or seven inches long, and was not felt by the plaintiff who was sitting on the rear seat of the taxi. The driver of the taxi, however, stopped when the impact occurred, and the plaintiff says (the driver denies) that the stop was so sudden she was thrown against the back of the front seat, striking it with her stomach. The plaintiff was pregnant. She told the driver she was not hurt, but says she did feel some cramp-like pains which she attributed to shock. When she reached her destination, the home of a relative, the pain became so bad she had to go to bed. Her husband was called after a couple of hours, took her home in a cab, and a doctor was called later in the night. She stayed in bed three days, then got up, and went back to bed intermittently until February 23d when she was taken to the hospital. During the period from January 30th to February 23d, she testified she had pains and bled, and saw the doctor several times. Her doctor had a stroke, she called another doctor when pains and bleeding got much worse, and the second doctor took her to the hospital where she had a still born child on February 24th. She testified that she was in perfect condition before the accident.

Various questions arising out of rulings on the evidence are raised by the record, and it is contended that the Admiral Taxi Service should not have been exonerated because of the high degree of care required of it towards its passengers. But the most important question is whether there was legally sufficient evidence to connect the accident with the plaintiff's injuries. As the decision of this phase of the case may dispose of the entire litigation, its immediate consideration is imperative.

Under some circumstances, non-medical proof that a disease or an injured condition followed an accident is sufficient to take to the jury the question whether it resulted from that accident. That has been held in a number of cases arising under the Workmen's Compensation law where the evidence rules are somewhat relaxed. Cumberland etc. Co. v Caler, 157 Md. 596, 146 A. 750; Neeld Const. Co. v. Mason, 157 Md. 571, 146 A. 748; Celanese Corp. v. Lease, 162 Md. 587, 160 A. 801; Baber v. John C. Knipp & Sons, 164 Md. 55, 163 A. 862. But in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Ziegenfuss, Md., 49 A.2d 793, we held that lay evidence that a person did not have hernia before the accident was not sufficient to satisfy the statute which required definite proof of such fact before an award could be made. And in Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Brooks, 158 Md. 149, 148 A. 276, it was held that insanity could not be proved to result from an accident without medical evidence. Statements by an injured person how an accident affected him are admissible as facts and not as opinions. City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Nugent, 86 Md. 349, at page 360, 38 A. 779. But where such statements fail to show a sufficient connection between the accident and the malady (premature separation of the placenta from the uterus, causing the death of an unborn child) this court has held the jury could not conjecture or speculate on the cause. Speaking through Judge Parke, we said 'It...

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    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • January 15, 1948

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