Supinger v. Stakes, 970423

• Decision Date: 09 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 970423,970423
• Parties: Lori Ann SUPINGER v. Gloria STAKES. Record
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 813

495 S.E.2d 813

255 Va. 198

Lori Ann SUPINGER v. Gloria STAKES.

Record No. 970423.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Jan. 9, 1998.

Lisa D. Barnett, McLean (R. Craig Jennings; Slenker, Brandt, Jennings & Johnston, Merrifield, on brief), for appellant.

Peter A. Teumer (Robey & Teumer, on brief), for appellee.

Present: All the Justices.

KINSER, Justice.

At issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of Code § 8.01-383.1(B) in cases where the damages are unliquidated. ¹ This section allows a trial court to use additur when it determines that the damages awarded by a jury are inadequate. Because we find that Code § 8.01-383.1(B), as written and as applied in this case, violates an individual's right to a jury trial as guaranteed in the Constitution of Virginia art. I, § 11, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

I.

This appeal arises from a jury verdict rendered in a case involving an automobile accident that occurred between Lori Ann Supinger (Supinger) and Gloria Stakes (Stakes) on August 22, 1994, in Fairfax County. Following the accident, Supinger filed a motion for judgment alleging that Stakes' negligence caused the collision. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Supinger and awarded her damages in the amount of $515.50. On June 11, 1996, the trial court entered a final order in accordance with the jury's verdict.

Following entry of the court's order, Supinger moved the trial court to set aside the jury verdict and to award her a new trial. On June 25, 1996, the trial court suspended its final order pending the disposition of Supinger's motion. Subsequently, in a letter opinion dated July 23, 1996, the trial court agreed with Supinger that the jury's damage award was inadequate as a matter of law. However, the court denied Supinger a new trial, and held, instead, that the use of additur would be appropriate. The court determined that an award of $5,000 would "fairly compensat[e]" Supinger for her pain and suffering, her time lost from work, and any inconvenience caused by the accident. The court then gave Stakes the option of either paying the $5,000 to Supinger or submitting to a new trial. ² Finally, the court stated that, contrary to Supinger's assertions, it "may order additur irrespective of whether or not additur is specifically sought by a disappointed plaintiff."

In response, Supinger filed a motion to reconsider arguing, inter alia, that Code § 8.01-383.1(B) violates her right to a jury trial because this statute allows the trial court to use additur without her consent. In a letter opinion dated September 16, 1996, the trial court denied Supinger's motion and upheld the constitutionality of Code § 8.01-383.1(B), stating that the court "must presume the constitutionality of acts of the General Assembly in the absence of a clear indication that the legislative act is unconstitutionally unsound." After also denying Supinger's supplemental motion for reconsideration, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of Supinger on December 2, 1996, and awarded her $5,000 in damages. Supinger appeals.

II.

Supinger contends that Code § 8.01-383.1(B) violates her constitutional right to a jury trial because it allows the trial court to use additur without her consent. In considering her constitutional challenge, we adhere to the well-settled principle that all actions of the General Assembly are presumed to be constitutional. Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 237 Va. 87, 94, 376 S.E.2d 525, 528 (1989). This Court, therefore, will resolve any reasonable doubt regarding a statute's constitutionality in favor of its validity. Blue Cross of Virginia v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 349, 358, 269 S.E.2d 827, 832 (1980). Any "judgment as to the wisdom and propriety of a statute is within the legislative prerogative," and this Court "will declare the legislative judgment null and void only when the statute is plainly repugnant to some provision of the state or federal constitution." Id., 269 S.E.2d at 832-33 (citing Newport News v. Elizabeth City County, 189 Va. 825, 831, 55 S.E.2d 56, 60 (1949)).

Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia provides, inter alia, "[t]hat in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred." "In Virginia, the right to trial by jury extends to civil litigants ...," and they are entitled to a fair and impartial jury trial. Edlow v. Arnold, 243 Va. 345, 347, 415 S.E.2d 436, 437 (1992); see Code § 8.01-336. "Trial by jury is a sacred right, and should be sedulously guarded." Buntin v. City of Danville, 93 Va. 200, 212, 24 S.E. 830, 833 (1896).

The role of a jury is to settle questions of fact. Forbes & Co. v. So. Cotton Oil Co., 130 Va. 245, 263, 108 S.E. 15, 21 (1921). "The resolution of disputed facts continues to be a jury's sole function." Etheridge, 237 Va. at 96, 376 S.E.2d at 529. "Without question, the jury's fact-finding function extends to the assessment of damages." Id. The initial question, therefore, is whether in cases involving unliquidated damages, the use of additur without the plaintiff's consent usurps the jury's fact-finding function and thus deprives the plaintiff of a full and fair jury trial. ³

Before a trial court can utilize remittitur or additur, it must first find that a jury verdict is either excessive or inadequate, respectively, as a matter of law. See Code § 8.01-383.1. Inherent in such a conclusion is the trial court's finding that the jury was "influenced by passion, corruption or prejudice" or "misconceived or misunderstood the facts or the law," and that, therefore, the verdict was not "the product of a fair and impartial decision." Rutherford v. Zearfoss, 221 Va. 685, 689, 272 S.E.2d 225, 227-28 (1980) (quoting Smithey v. Sinclair Refining Co., 203 Va. 142, 146, 122 S.E.2d 872, 876 (1961)). In this situation, the aggrieved party has not had a proper jury trial and is therefore entitled to a new trial. Thus, when the trial court uses remittitur or additur in lieu of proceeding with a new trial, it is attempting to restore the benefits of the constitutional right to a full and fair jury trial. Indeed, prior to the General Assembly's 1994 amendment of Code § 8.01-383.1 allowing for the use of additur, a plaintiff who demonstrated that the verdict was inadequate as a matter of law was entitled to a new trial. See Code § 8.01-383.

However, an examination of the analytic differences between remittitur and additur raises the question whether the use of additur, without the plaintiff's consent, does, in fact, restore to the plaintiff the right to a full and fair jury trial. In remittitur, the trial court reduces an excessive verdict to an amount supported by the evidence. The amount of damages eventually awarded by the trial court is an amount that the jury actually passed on in arriving at its verdict. ⁴ Thus, the jury determines the damages, and the court merely reduces the verdict to an amount that represents a full and fair award. "Once the jury has ascertained the facts and assessed the damages, ... the constitutional mandate is satisfied," and "it is [then] the duty of the court to apply the law to the facts." Etheridge, 237 Va. at 96, 376 S.E.2d at 529.

In contrast to remittitur, when a trial court uses additur, the increased award is not an amount passed on by the jury in arriving at its verdict. Thus, in additur, the ultimate award includes an amount that was never assessed by the jury. Therefore, the use of additur without the plaintiff's consent requires the plaintiff to forego the right to have a jury fully and fairly determine the amount of damages, thereby violating the plaintiff's right to a jury trial guaranteed in art. I, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia. To avoid constitutional infirmity, the additur process must allow the plaintiff the option of either having a new trial or submitting to additur. The presence of such an option recognizes that the plaintiff has a right to a second jury trial, since the first one was defective, and, therefore, renders additur a constitutionally adequate substitute for a new trial.

Although not binding on this Court because it addressed the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, see Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 24 L.Ed. 436 (1877), we find the reasoning in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935), persuasive. In Dimick, the Court stated that the remittitur practice in the case of an excessive verdict "is not without plausible support in the view that what remains is included in the verdict along with the unlawful excess--in [the] sense that it has been found by the jury--and that the remittitur has the effect of merely lopping off an excrescence." Id. at 486, 55 S.Ct. at 301. In contrast, however, where an inadequate verdict is increased by the court, there is a "bald addition of something which in no sense can be said to be included in the verdict." Id. Further, if additur is done with the consent of the defendant alone, the plaintiff is compelled to forego his "constitutional right to the verdict of a jury and accept 'an assessment partly made by a jury which has acted improperly, and partly by a tribunal which has no power to assess.' " Id. at 487, 55 S.Ct. at 301.

Contrary to Stakes' argument, our decision in Etheridge does not compel a different result. In Etheridge, we held that the limitation on medical malpractice recoveries contained in Code § 8.01-581.15 does not violate the plaintiff's right to a jury trial. We reasoned that since the trial court applies the statutory remedy only after the jury has fulfilled its fact-finding function, Code § 8.01-581.15 allows a jury to resolve disputed facts and assess damages. As in remittitur, when a jury returns a verdict in excess of the statutory cap, the amount of the cap is an amount passed on by the jury. Moreover, the...