Suppiger v. Enking

Decision Date25 May 1939
Docket Number6696
Citation60 Idaho 292,91 P.2d 362
PartiesG. W. SUPPIGER, FRANK LANGLEY, W. L. ROBISON and W. F. REYNOLDS, Plaintiffs, v. MYRTLE P. ENKING, State Treasurer, Defendant
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

REVOLVING FUND-APPROPRIATIONS-EXPENDITURES-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE-JURISDICTION OF BOARD OF EXAMINERS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. There is a distinction between an "appropriation" which is the setting aside by the Legislature of a specified amount of money for particular purpose distinctly and recognizably a legislative function and the making of "expenditures"; the latter being the act of expending, a laying out of money, a disbursement, while the former means to set apart for, or assign to a particular person or use in exclusion of all others.

2. In construing a statute, words are to be given the meaning the context indicates.

3. Under statutes providing that a revolving fund may be "created" by the State Board of Examiners for any state officer, no new or additional fund is brought into existence by the board of examiners in allowing a requisition for cash advances of the Industrial Accident Board "pursuant" to amount of appropriation made by the Legislature. (I. C. A., secs. 65-2018 to 65-2021; sec 43-1301, Sess. Laws 1935, 3d Ex. Sess., chap. 12, as amended.)

4. Under the revolving fund statutes, setting aside of a fund for cash advances of the Industrial Accident Board, was not an unlawful withdrawal of money from the treasury as not pursuant to an "appropriation" since the appropriation as made by the Legislature remained the limit. (I. C. A., secs. 65-2018 to 65-2021; sec. 43-1301; Sess. Laws 1935, 3d Ex. Sess., chap. 12, as amended; Const., art. 7 sec. 13.)

5. The revolving fund statutes do not contemplate the making of an appropriation by the board of examiners and are not invalid as unlawful delegation of legislative authority. (I. C. A secs. 65-2018 to 65-2021; Const., art. 2, sec. 1.)

6. The board of examiners has sole discretionary power to decide how and in what manner it will pass upon and allow or reject claims against the state.

7. The revolving fund statutes for which an appropriation has been made as expressly provided thereby do not in setting up a scheme for cash advances for departments or officers for whom the fund is authorized by the board of examiners involve any delegation of the legislative function since the legislature may not delegate that which it does not have. (I. C. A., secs. 65-2018 to 65-2021; Const., art. 2, sec. 1.)

8. The revolving fund statutes which are to be operative only if there has been an appropriation provided therefor, if deemed to involve a legislative function in setting up the revolving fund, are not invalid as delegating the legislative function, since the legislature has exercised its legislative function by making the appropriation, and has merely granted authority within defined and safeguarded limits for executive and administrative action. (I. C. A., secs. 65-2018 to 65-2021; Const., art. 2, sec. 1.)

9. The provision of revolving fund statute that revolving fund, if allowed, shall be regarded as an advance for "current cash items" is a limitation on the amount of any revolving fund the board of examiners may authorize, since quoted words connote in point of time, present and immediate expenditures and limited in amount. (I. C. A., sec. 65-2019.)

10. The revolving fund statutes by which money is to be advanced to state officials in furtherance of official business which the officer is carrying on for the state, and whose disposition and return is mandatory if not so spent, is not unconstitutional as involving a giving of "loan or credit" by the state. (I. C. A., secs. 65-2018 to 65-2021; Const., art. 8, sec. 2.)

11. The constitutional inhibition against the extension of credit by the state is directed at credit extended to private sources to promote private schemes. (Const., art. 8, sec. 2.)

12. Under constitutional inhibition against extension of credit by the state, the inherent nature of service for which expenditure is made and for which advance is allowed determines its character. (Const., art. 8, sec. 2.)

Original petition for writ of mandate. Judgment for plaintiffs.

Vestal P. Coffin and B. B. Belknap, for Plaintiffs.

Since a State Constitution is a limitation, not a grant, of power the Legislature has authority to enact any law not prohibited by the Constitution. (Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho 222, 241, 141 P. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 282; Ingard v. Parker, 27 Idaho 124, 131, 147 P. 293; State v. Moore, 36 Idaho 565, 585, 212 P. 349; Diefendorf v. Gallet, 51 Idaho 619, 637, 10 P.2d 307.)

No act of the Legislature will be held in valid by the court, unless its conflict with the Constitution is demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt. (Bannock County v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 53 Idaho 159, 176, 22 P.2d 674; State v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15; Mills v. Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 P. 332, 47 A. L. R. 424.)

Although the Legislature may not limit or restrict the exercise of the jurisdiction of the board of examiners to examine all claims against the State (State v. Parsons, 57 Idaho 775, 69 P.2d 788; State ex rel. Taylor v. Robinson, 59 Idaho 485, 83 P.2d 983) there is nothing contained in article 4, section 18, of the Constitution with which the provisions of the Revolving Fund Act are in conflict. (State v. Parkinson, supra; State v. Hallock, 20 Nev. 326, 22 P. 123; Mills v. Stewart, supra; Thoreson v. State Board of Examiners, 21 Utah 187, 60 P. 982; Stone v. Board of Trustees, 19 Ky. Law 1977, 44 S.W. 984.)

Judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs and the writ of mandate compelling the treasurer to issue the draft made permanent.

J. W. Taylor, Attorney General, and Lawrence B. Quinn, R. W. Beckwith, E. G. Elliott and D. W. Thomas, Assistant Attorneys General, for Defendant.

Sections 65-2018 to 65-2021, I. C. A., inclusive, delegate legislative authority to the State Board of Examiners of the State of Idaho in violation of article 2, section 1 of the Constitution of Idaho. (Article 2, sec. 1, Constitution of Idaho; Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570, 97 A. L. R. 947; 11 Am. Jur., p. 955, pars. 240, 241 and 242; United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 77 L.Ed. 175, 53 S.Ct. 42; Jeffreys v. Huston, 23 Idaho 372, 129 P. 1065.)

The credit of the State is both given and loaned by the provisions of sections 65-2018 to 65-2021, I. C. A. , inclusive, violating our fundamental law. (Article 8, sec. 2, Constitution of Idaho; Atkinson v. Board of County Commissioners, 18 Idaho 282, 108 P. 1046, 28 L. R. A., N. S., 412; Bannock County v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 53 Idaho 159, 22 P.2d 674; State Water Conservation Board v. Enking, 56 Idaho 722, 58 P.2d 779.)

The State Board of Examiners have the final duty, power and authority to pass on claims against the State, the only exception being salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law. (Article 4, sec. 18, Constitution of Idaho, secs. 65-2001 to 65-2017, I. C. A., inclusive; Winters v. Ramsey, 4 Idaho 303, 39 P. 193; Bragaw v. Gooding, 14 Idaho 288, 94 P. 438; Thomas v. State, 16 Idaho 81, 100 P. 761.)

The phrases "claims against the State" and "claim against the State" in the text of article 4, section 18, which the board of examiners have the power to examine, constitute any demand or assertion as of right for the payment from the State Treasury of State money and has been construed to mean an unliquidated claim or demand. (Constitutional Debates, pp. 1427 and 1428; Davis v. State, 30 Idaho 137, 163 P. 373, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 911; State v. National Surety Co. , 29 Idaho 670, 161 P. 1026, 2 A. L. R. 251; Winters v. Ramsey, supra; 59 C. J., p. 284, par. 343.)

GIVENS, J. Ailshie, C. J., and Budge and Holden, JJ., concur. Morgan, J., dissents.

OPINION

GIVENS, J.

--Plaintiffs ' application for writ of mandate, alleges in substance an appropriation was made for expenses of the administration, by the Industrial Accident Board composed of the first three plaintiffs, the fourth being the board's disbursing officer (sec. 43-1301, I. C. A.; 1935 Idaho Sess. Laws Third Extraordinary Session, July 28, 1936, chap. 12, p. 20, amended, 1937 Idaho Sess. Laws, chap. 9, p. 20; chap. 183, p. 303; chap. 187, p. 311; chap. 188, p. 320, and chaps. 202 and 239, Idaho Sess. Laws 1939), and that March 21, 1939, the State Board of Examiners approved and allowed plaintiffs' requisition for a revolving fund for $ 250 out of said appropriation under secs. 65-2018 to 65-2021, I. C. A. [1]

Defendant, State Treasurer, admitting the facts, refuses to pay a sight draft [2] duly drawn in accordance with the rules and forms as prescribed by the department of finance (sec. 65-2020, I. C. A.) thereon for prospective expenses of G. O. Bradshaw, an employee in the unemployment compensation administration, on the grounds that the revolving fund statute, supra, (1) delegates legislative powers to the State Board of Examiners in violation of art. 2, sec. 1, Idaho Constitution; (2) gives or loans the credit of the state in violation of art. 8, sec. 2, Idaho Constitution; (3) authorizes the withdrawal of money from the treasury without an appropriation contrary to art. 7, sec. 13, and (4) payment thereof without examination and approval by the board as required by art. 4, sec. 18 of the Constitution.

Date

Items for Which Payment is Made

4/6/39

Advance for travel to Idaho Falls to hear appeal of

Keyes M. Blair

40.00

Advance for witness fees in said case

10.00

Miscellaneous supplies used in appeal of Edison W.

Bretthauer

3.75

Total

53.75

ENDORSEMENTS
/s/ Geo. O. Bradshaw
PAYMENT REFUSED** Not
...

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11 cases
  • Nelson v. Marshall
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • May 15, 1972
    ... ... Nielson v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009 (1948) (old-age assistance); Suppiger v. Enking, 60 Idaho 292, 91 P.2d 362 (1939) (advances to state employees); cf. Hansen v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 93 Idaho 655, 471 ... ...
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    ...make "law." See State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713, 213 P. 358 (1923); State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642, 228 P. 796 (1924); Suppiger v. Enking, 60 Idaho 292, 91 P.2d 362 (1939); Board of County Com'rs of Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Fac. Auth., 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588 (1975). While the pow......
  • Gernatt v. Huiet
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    • September 13, 1941
    ...to the authorities there cited, see Gillum v. Johnson, 7 Cal.2d 744, 62 P.2d 1037, 63 P.2d 810, 108 A.L.R. 595; Suppiger v. Enking, 60 Idaho 292, 91 P.2d 362; Industrial Commission v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P.2d 560; Maine U. C. Comm. v. Androscoggin Junio......
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