Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Carley

• Decision Date: 21 July 1894
• Parties: SUPREME COUNCIL OF ROYAL ARCANUM v. CARLEY et al.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

29 A. 813

52 N.J.E. 642

SUPREME COUNCIL OF ROYAL ARCANUM

v. CARLEY et al.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

July 21, 1894.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Bill of interpleader by the Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum against Sarah J. Carley and Mary A. Carley. Decree in favor of said Sarah J. Carley.

W. Holt Apgar, for Royal Arcanum. Helsley & Morris, for Sarah J. Carley. Frank P. McDermott, for Mary A. Carley.

VAN FLEET, V. C. The contest in this case is between two females, each of whom claims to have been the wife of one Harvey Carley, during his life, and since his death to be his widow. Carley died January 29, 1893. Several years prior to his death, Carley became a member of a corporation known as the Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum, and a contributor to its widows' and orphans' benefit fund. As such contributor, he procured the corporation, in September, 1882, to issue a certificate by which it promised to pay his wife, Sarah, on his death, out of its widows' and orphans' fund, a sum not exceeding $3,000, provided, when he died, he was still a member of the corporation, in good standing, and the certificate issued to Sarah had not been surrendered, and another issued in its place. Sarah and Harvey were married in this state in May, 1870, and Sarah since then has continued to be a citizen of this state. In May, 1891, Harvey brought an action for divorce against Sarah in the county court of Arapahoe county, Colo. The ground alleged was desertion. Sarah appeared and answered, denying that she had deserted Harvey, but alleging that he had deserted her; and on the 3d day of October, 1891, after an ex parte hearing, a divorce a vinculo was granted. Twenty-three days afterwards, and on the 26th day of October, 1891, the court, on motion of Harvey's attorney, vacated the decree pronounced by it on the 3d; and on the 2d day of March, following, the court gave the same attorney leave to withdraw permanently from the files the plaintiff's testimony; and on the 2d day of May. 1892, the court, on motion of the same attorney, dismissed Harvey's suit, at his cost. A marriage ceremony was performed between Harvey and the other claimant, Mary, in the city of Brooklyn, on the 28th day of October, 1891, two days after the decree of divorce had been vacated. Immediately after the ceremony, Mary went to live with Harvey, as his wife, at Summit, N. J.; and she continued to live with him there until his death, in January, 1893. In January, 1892, Harvey applied for a new benefit certificate. He made oath that the certificate issued in 1882 was withheld by his former wife, now divorced; that he renounced all claim thereto, and requested the issue of a new certificate, payable to Mary, as his wife. He also paid the fee which, by the rules of the corporation, was payable on the issue of a new certificate. The officers of the corporation, not being satisfied that the certificate held by Sarah could be safely treated as a nullity, requested further evidence of the fact that a divorce had been granted, and subsequently, and after a copy of the whole record had been submitted, they refused to issue a new certificate. Though Harvey knew as early as January or February, 1892 (probably much earlier), that the decree made in his favor on the 3d day of October, 1891, had, a few days afterwards, been set aside, he never, so far as appears, made the slightest effort to have the vacating order set aside and the decree reinstated. When Harvey died, the decree dismissing his Colorado suit stood in full force, and remains so to-day. After Harvey's death, Sarah made proof of his death, and both she and Mary demanded payment of the sum which became payable by his death. Sarah attempted to enforce her demand by a suit at law, whereupon the Royal Arcanum filed the bill in this case, and paid the sum in controversy into court A decree directing the defendants to interplead, and have their respective claims to the money in controversy determined by this court, having been made, the question now to be decided is, to which of the defendants must the money be awarded?

It is clear beyond all question that the money must be awarded to the person who was Harvey Carley's wife at the time of his death. The claim of each defendant rests on that ground, and on that ground only. Neither claim has any other foundation. Now, while it is true that the Royal Areanum refused to Issue a certificate to Mary, and never, therefore, became bound, by a written promise, to pay her anything, yet it would seem to be entirely clear, as an obvious dictate of justice, if such refusal was wrongful, and Mary was in fact Harvey's lawful wife when he applied to have the certificate changed from a person who was not his wife to the person who was, that such refusal should not be allowed to defeat the just right of the true wife. Equity, under such circumstances, would consider that Mary was in right and justice the owner of the certificate, in obedience to the maxim that that shall be considered as done which ought to have been done. The fact, then, that no written promise has been made to pay the money in dispute to Mary constitutes no reason why it should not be awarded to her. But the money cannot be awarded to her unless she was the wife of Harvey at the time of his death. Whether she was his wife or not must, of course, depend entirely upon the effect which this court is obliged, by the law of the land, to give to the proceedings in the Colorado suit. If those proceedings must be given effect here according to the plain sense of their express words, then it is absolutely certain that Mary was never Harvey's wife, for, at the time of their attempted marriage, be was incompetent to contract a valid marriage with Mary, because he was then the lawful husband of another woman, and remained so up to the time of his death.

The effect which must be given by the judicial tribunals of one state to the judicial proceedings of a sister state is prescribed by federal law. The constitution of the United States ordains that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the judicial proceedings of every other state, and, also, that congress may prescribe the effect which judicial proceedings had in one state shall be given in each of the others. Congress, in the exercise of this power, after prescribing how such proceedings shall be authenticated to render them admissible in evidence, has declared that, when so authenticated, they "shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which they are taken." Rev. St U. S. p. 170, § 905. While the constitutional provision and federal statute just mentioned have been the subject of much discussion and considerable contrariety of judicial opinion, still certain results have been...