Supreme Hive of Ladies of Maccabees of the Worled v. Harrington

• Decision Date: 19 June 1907
• Citation: 227 Ill. 511,81 N.E. 533
• Parties: SUPREME HIVE OF LADIES OF MACCABEES OF THE WORLED v. HARRINGTON et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

227 Ill. 511

81 N.E. 533

SUPREME HIVE OF LADIES OF MACCABEES OF THE WORLED

v.HARRINGTON et al.^*

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 18, 1907.

On Rehearing, June 19, 1907.

Appeal from City Court of Chicago Heights; Homer Abbott, Judge.

Action by Nellie Harrington and others against the Supreme Hive of the Ladies of the Maccabees of the World. From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Scott, C. J., and Hand, J., dissenting.

Bastrup & O'Neill, for appellant.

Frank H. Graham and Ernest B. Cresap, for appellees.

VICKERS, J.

On the 18th day of May, 1898, the appellant, being a fraternal beneficiary society organized under the laws of the state of Michigan, issued a benefit certificate to Ellen Hickey for the sum of $1,000. The beneficiaries named in the certificate are the appellees, nieces of Ellen Hickey. The insured died on the 17th day of February, 1904. Proofs of death were furnished, and upon appellant's refusal to pay the amount mentioned in the certificate an action of assumpsit was begun by the beneficiaries on the 7th day of February, 1905, when a summons issued out of the city court of Chicago Heights, directed to the sheriff of Sangamon county, this state, commanding him to summon the Supreme Hive of the Ladies of the Maccabees of the World to appear before the city court of Chicago Heights on, etc. The sheriff of Sangamon county returned that he had served the writ upon appellant ‘by reading the same to W. R. Vredenburg, superintendent of insurance of the state of Illinois, who is the authorized agent of appellant,’ etc. In apt time appellant appeared specially and filed five pleas to the jurisdiction of the city court of Chicago Heights, setting forth, in substance, that the supposed contract upon which the action was brought was not made within the city of Chicago Heights, nor within its territorial limits, nor made specifically payable in the city of Chicago Heights, but that the cause of action did accrue in the city of Chicago, in the county of Cook; that neither of the plaintiffs nor the defendantresided in the city of Chicago Heights at the time of nor since the commencement of this suit; that the defendant was not found or served with process in said cause in the city of Chicago Heights; that the plaintiffs were at the time of the commencement of this suit and at all times thereafter residents of the city of Chicago; that the defendant is a corporation duly organized, existing, and doing business under the laws of the state of Michigan; that service of process was actually had on the defendant in the county of Sangamon, in the state ofIllinois, and outside the territorial limits of the city of Chicago Heights; that the city of Chicago Heights is situated in the county of Cook; that in the county of Cook there are a circuit court of Cook county and a superior court of Cook county, both of which said courts have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs and over the defendant. To each and all of the five pleas to the jurisdiction of the said court appellees interposed a general demurrer. The court sustained the demurrers to all of the pleas, and, appellant standing by its pleas, judgment quod recuperet was rendered against appellant. A jury was waived by appellees, and the court assessed the damages, upon the evidence which was introduced, at the sum of $1,110, for which sum final judgment was rendered against appellant. After the court had sustained the demurrer to the pleas of appellant it took no further part in the disposition of the cause, except at each stage of the proceedings to object to the action of the court in taking jurisdiction of the cause. The position of appellant is that the city court of Chicago Heights had no power to issue a summons to be served outside the territorial limits of the city of Chicago Heights, and that the service of the summons on the superintendent of insurance in the county of Sangamon was without authority of law.

The only question to be determined is whether the city court of Chicago Heights obtained jurisdiction of the personof the defendant, and had the power, under the service had, to render a judgment in personam against it. The city court of Chicago Heights having been organized under section 240 of chapter 37 of Hurd's Revised Statutes of 1905, which provides for the organization of city courts in and for cities, only has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court within the city within which it is located in all civil and criminal cases arising in said city and in appeals from justices of the peace in said city. It has often been held by this court that the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a city court for service of original process is confined to the city limits wherein such court is located. People v. Evans, 18 Ill. 361;People v. Barr, 22 Ill. 241;Covill v. Phy, 26 Ill. 432;Holmes v. Fihlenburg, 54 Ill. 203;Gardner v. Witbord, 59 Ill. 145;Dixon v. Dixon, 61 Ill. 324;Joslyn v. Dickerson, 71 Ill. 25;Reid v. Morton, 119 Ill. 118, 6 N. E. 414;Miller v. People, 183 Ill. 423, 56 N. E. 60. In People v. Evans, supra, this court held that an act of the Legislature creating the recorder's court of the cities of La Salle and Peru was unconstitutional because the act purported to extend the jurisdiction of the court to the two towns named. This case has been followed in all the subsequent decisions of this court wherein the validity of a statute purporting to extend the jurisdiction of city courts beyond the limits of the city of their location have been involved, so that the law must be regarded as firmly established in this state that the Legislature has no constitutional powers to pass a law extending the territorial jurisdiction of city courts beyond the territorial limits of the city wherein they are located.

The doctrine of these cases is not questioned by appellees; but it is contended that, since the Legislature may prescribe any conditions it sees fit upon which foreign corporations will be permitted to do business in this state, conditions relating to the manner of acquiring jurisdiction over such foreign corporations by the courts of this state may be lawfully imposed which would be unconstitutional and void as applied to corporations residing in this state. If the existence of the power of the Legislature in this regard be conceded to the extent claimed by appellees, the question still remains: Has such power been exercised in the passage of any law which will uphold the jurisdiction of the city court of Chicago Heights over the person of appellant when acquired by service of its process in a foreign county? The only section of the statute which is pertinent to this inquiry is section 5, p. 133, of an act passed June 22, 1893, and found in Hurd's Revised Statutes of 1905 as section 262 of chapter 73, which is, in part, as follows: ‘Each such society now doing or hereafter admitted to do business in this state and not having its principal office within this state, and not being organized under the laws of this state, shall appoint in writing the Auditor of Public Accounts or his successor in office to be its true and lawful attorney, upon whom all lawful process in any action or proceeding against it may be served, and in such writing shall agree that any lawful process against it which is served on said attorney shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served upon the society, and that the authority shall continue in force so long as any liability remains outstanding in this state. Copies of such certificate, certified by said Auditor of Public Accounts, shall be deemed sufficient evidence thereof, and shall be admitted in evidence with the same force and effect as the original thereof might be admitted. Service upon such attorney shall be deemed sufficient service upon such society.’ By a subsequent statute the superintendent of insurance has been substituted for the Auditor of Public Accounts in the foregoing section.

A careful reading of the foregoing statute will show that the conditions therein imposed on foreign societies of this character coming into this state to do business are that such societies shall appoint, in writing, the superintendent of insurance their true and lawful attorney, upon whom all lawful process in any action or proceeding against them may be served, and that such societies must agree, in writing, that the service of any lawful process against them which is served upon the superintendent of insurance shall have the same legal force and validity as if it had been served upon the society. There is nothing in this section which would authorize the service of an original summons issued by a circuit court against a foreign insurance company upon such foreign company by serving it upon the superintendent of insurance, unless such service was had in the county where the suit was instituted. If this statute stood alone, it would clearly afford no warrant for sending a summons out of the county in and for which said summons had issued for service upon a foreign insurance society by service upon the superintendent of insurance in Sangamon county.

Appellees insist that the method of obtaining jurisdiction of a foreign insurance company by service upon the superintendent of insurance under this statute is exclusive, and, if city courts may not send their process to Sangamon county for service on such superintendent, then the effect would be to deprive city courts of jurisdiction in all cases against such foreign corporations. This deduction proceeds from false premises. Service upon the superintendent of insurance is not the only method of acquiring jurisdiction over a foreigh insurance company doing business in this state. Section 26 of chapter 32 (1 Starr & C. Ann. St. 1896, p. 1017) provides that ‘foreign corporations, and the officers and agents thereof, doing business in this state, shall be subjected to all the liabilities, restrictions and duties that are or may...