Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Quinn

• Decision Date: 29 April 1901
• Citation: Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Quinn, 78 Miss. 525, 29 So. 826 (Miss. 1901)
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS OF PYTHIAS OF THE WORLD v. HELEN QUINN ET AL

29 So. 826

78 Miss. 525

SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS OF PYTHIAS OF THE WORLD v. HELEN QUINN ET AL

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 29, 1901

FROM the circuit court of Attala county. HON. WILLIAM F. STEVENS Judge.

Helen Quinn and another, were plaintiffs, and the Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias of the World was defendant in the court below. Frank Quinn, deceased, was in his lifetime a member of the endowment rank of the Knights of Pythias, and as such obtained an insurance policy or benefit certificate in the order for $ 3,000, payable to his wife and child. At the time of issuance of the certificate his wife was Julia Quinn, who died shortly thereafter, leaving one child. Quinn, the insured, afterwards married the appellee, Helen Quinn; the certificate provided for such case and made the last wife together with the child by the previous marriage, the beneficiaries.

Quinn the defendant, forfeited his membership in the order by a failure to pay monthly dues. He became seriously ill, and his illness was protracted. While confined to his bed, and after it became quite apparent that he would not recover, he procured a letter to be written, June 20, 1899, to the board of control of the endowment rank of the Knights of Pythias at Chicago, Ill. in which he remitted nine dollars, the monthly dues in arrear, being for the months of April, May and June, 1899. In this letter he gave no intimation of his bad health. On June 29, 1899, the board of control answered Quinn's letter, inclosing a receipt for the nine dollars and informed him that his forfeiture had been canceled and he placed in good standing, provided he was then in good health. Quinn died July 2, 1899, and this suit was begun by appellees--Quinn's last wife and child by the former one--to collect the benefit certificate. It appeared upon the trial that Quinn was proximately in a dying condition when he remitted his dues and when he received the letter conditionally remitting his forfeiture and reinstating him in the order, but Mrs. Quinn and her sister testified that a letter of earlier date than June 29 was received by decedent from the officers of appellant, waiving the forfeiture and reinstating him as a member unconditionally. They fixed the date of this letter as June 24, 1899, and swore that it had been lost, and after the most diligent search could not be found.

The by-law of the appellant relating to the subject of forfeitures and reinstatements, which was read in evidence is as follows:

"Art. IV., sec. 7. Monthly payments and dues of members holding certificates of endowment shall be due and payable to the secretary of the section, without notice, on the first day of each and every month; and a failure to make such payment on or before the tenth day of each month shall cause, from and after such date, a forfeiture of the certificate of endowment, and all right, title and interest such member or his beneficiaries may have in and to the same, and membership shall cease absolutely. In case of such forfeiture, membership may be regained by making application in the form prescribed for new applicants, the payment of required membership fee, and surrender of the forfeited certificate. If approved by the medical examiner in chief, and accepted by the board of control, a new certificate shall be issued, and the rating shall thereafter be at the age of nearest birthday to the date of the last application."

There was no evidence whatever that the officers of appellant had any knowledge of the condition of Quinna's health at the time it was claimed that they waived his forfeiture and rein stated him as a member of the order.

The defendant, appellant, asked for a peremptory instruction in its favor; the court below declined to grant the same, and the case was submitted to a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs, from which defendant appealed to the supreme court.

Reversed and remanded.

Mc Willie & Thompson, for appellant.

The theory of the plaintiffs that there was a waiver of the condition of good health will not bear criticism. It is equivalent to saying that the board waived its rights to reject the application on account of Quinn's bad health, a fact of which it had no knowledge. An acceptance of the arrearages without knowledge of his grave illness showed no intention to waive. Insurance Company v. Pruett, 74 Ala. 487; 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (2d ed.), p. 1091, and notes.

Waiver is a question of intent, and no one can be bound by a waiver of his rights, unless it is distinctly made and with full knowledge of the rights he intends to waive. 28 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (1st ed.), pp. 527, 528.

It has frequently been decided in express terms that the acceptance of arrearages does not operate as a waiver if the custom of the association was to receive dues in arrear only if the insured was in good health, and in fact that insured at the time of such receipt was not in good health. 2 Bacon on Ben. Soc., sec. 431, p. 856; Lewis v. Insurance Company, 44 Conn. 73; Leffingwell v. Grand Lodge, 53 N.W. (Iowa), 243; Gabbutt v. Association, 51 Ib., 148; Sherrett v. Royal Clan, 37 Ill.App. 446.

Apart from the board's lack of that knowledge of the true condition of affairs essential to the establishment of a waiver, it may be said, on the authority of numerous well considered cases, that the officers had no power to waive the provisions of the general laws in respect to good health at the time of reinstatement.

It is not pretended that the deceased made any showing whatever in respect to his health, while under the general laws he had to secure the approval of his application by the medical examiner in chief, and pay a higher rate, or, if his forfeiture was without fault on his part and was occasioned by nonpayment of dues, he was required to furnish satisfactory evidence of good health at his own expense. The matter of the good health of one applying for reinstatement to membership is just as much one going to the substance of the contract as in the case of original applications for membership, and the officers of a mutual benefit association are without power to dispense with the requirements of the laws of the association in respect to that subject. In mutual associations each member has an interest in the enforcement of all requirements going to the substance of the contract and officers are without power to affect this right by waiving such requirements. 2 Bacon on Ben. Soc., sec. 426, p. 840; May v. N.Y. etc., Society, 14 Daly, 389; Nagel v. Glasburger, 10 N.Y.S. 503; Brady v. Coachman's Ben. Association, 14 Ib., 272; Mattoon v. Weatworth, 4 Weekly L. Bull., 513; Frey v. Fidelity Lodge, 6 Pa. Co. Ct. R., 435; Harvey v. Grand Lodge, 50 Mo. App., 472; Coleman v. Knights of Honor, 18 Mo. App., 189; Grand Lodge v. Elsner, 26 Mo. App., 108; Lyon v. Supreme Assembly, 26 N.E. 236; Brotherhood's case, 31 Beav., 365, 375; Burbank v. Association, 144 Mass. 437; McCoy v. Church, 152 Mass. 273; Baxter v. Insurance Co., 1 Allen, 294; Evans v. Insurance Co., 9 Allen, 329; Hale v. Insurance Co., 6 Gray, 169; Mulroy v. Insurance Co., 2 Allen, 116; Sweet v. Society, 78 Me. 541; Lyon v. Royal Society, 153 Mass. 86; Ancient Order v. Jesse, 50 Ill.App. 101; Froehley v. Insurance Co., 32 Mo. App., 312; Mulroy v. Insurance Co., 4 Allen, 116; ...