Supreme Lodge Knights & Ladies of Honor v. Menkhausen

• Decision Date: 20 April 1904
• Citation: 70 N.E. 567,209 Ill. 277
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS & LADIES OF HONOR v. MENKHAUSEN et al.

209 Ill. 277

70 N.E. 567

SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS & LADIES OF HONOR

v.MENKHAUSEN et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 20, 1904.

Appeal from Appellate Court, Fourth District.

Action by Olivie Menkhausen and others against the Supreme Lodge Knights and Ladies of Honor. From a judgment of the Appellate Court (106 Ill. App. 665) affirming a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.J. M. Hamill (Ashcraft & Ashcraft, of counsel), for appellant.

Turner & Holder, for appellees.

This was an action of assumpsit in the circuit court of St. Clair county by appellees against the Supreme Lodge Knights & Ladies of Honor. The declaration was filed to the January term, 1902, of that court, and consisted of one special count for the amount of a certainbenefit certificate. It sets out the facts that on March 22, 1893, the defendant issued its policy of insurance on the life of Elizabeth Menkhausen in the sum of $1000, payable, at her death, to her husband, Gustav Menkhausen; that on November 9, 1893, Elizabeth Menkhausen departed this life, and that due proof was then and there furnished the defendant of her death, according to the rules, laws, and regulations of the defendant; that said Gustav Menkhausen, on August 6, 1895, instituted a suit upon said policy, and the defendant appeared and filed a plea. This plea is then set out in full, the substance of which was that Gustav Menkhausen willfully murdered his wife, and was sentenced to be hung, but that the sentence was commuted by the Governor to imprisonment for life, and that said Gustav was, at the time of filing the plea, in the penitentiary under such sentence. The declaration further avers that the only issue in said suit was whether the fact that Gustav Menkhausen murdered his wife was a bar to his suit; that upon a trial a verdict was returned for the defendant, judgment was entered on the verdict, and that judgment is still in force. It is averred by the declaration that the defendant is organized under the laws of Kentucky, Missouri, and Indiana for the purpose of promoting benevolence and charity by establishing a relief fund, from which, on satisfactory evidence of the death of a member, a sum not exceeding $5,000 shall be paid to such member of his or her family, or person dependent upon or related to him or her, as he or she may have directed; that the defendant is doing business in this state, and has complied with the laws thereof governing fraternal beneficiary societies; that the by-laws of the defendant provide that a benefit may be made payable to the wife or husband, children and grandchildren, parents, brothers and sisters, grandparents, nieces and nephews, cousins, aunts and uncles, or to the next of kin who would be distributees of the personal estate of the member upon his death intestate, in the order above named. It is then averred that by reason of the death of Elizabeth Menkhausen, and proof of that fact, and by reason of the fact that because of her death at the hands of Gustav Menkhausen it became impossible for him to recover upon said policy or benefit certificate or to receive the proceeds thereof, the said amount named in said certificate became due and payable to the plaintiffs herein, and that the defendant has not paid the said sum of $1,000 to the plaintiffs, or to any other person, but refuses so to do. The declaration then avers that Elizabeth Menkhausen died intestate, leaving plaintiffs as her only children and heirs at law; that plaintffs were members of her family, were her heirs and blood relations, and were dependent upon her for their support. A demurrer interposed by the defendant to this declaration was overruled by the court, and, the defendant electing to stand by its demurrer, judgmentwas entered in favor of the plaintiffs for $1,000. An appeal was taken by the lodge to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District, where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. The Appellate Court granted a certificate of importance, and appellant appealed to this court.

Appellant urges as reasons why the demurrer should have been sustained, the following: First. Because appellees have no right, title, or interest in said benefit certificate, or any part thereof, and cannot maintain any action thereon. Second. The act of the Legislature of June 22, 1893 (Laws 1893, p. 130), for the organizing and management of fraternal beneficiary societies, has no application to this case, as it was passed after he benefit certificate was issued; and the act of the Legislature approved Une 16, 1887 (Laws 1887, p. 204), under which this benefit certificate was issued, confers no authority on appellees to maintain this suit. Third. The murder of the assured by the beneficiary named in the benefit certificate was not one of the risks insured against and covered by the benefit certificate, and therefore no action can be maintaned on said benefit certificate, or for the amount therein specified, by appellees againt appellant.

SCOTT, J. (after statin the facts).

The beneficiary named in a benefit certificate who feloniously takes the life of the insured cannot recover from the fraternal beneficiary society, and it is now urged that public poilcy also requires us to hold that in such a case there can be no recovery by any person whomsoever aganst such a society, and that under such circumstances not only is the certificate void, but the obligation of the society to pay to any one whomsoever is canceled, and rendered absolutely inoperative. The cases relied upon by appellant are of two classes: First, where the insured was murdered by the beneficiary, and suit was brought by the criminal, or some one claiming through him; and, second, where the insured was executed in pursuance of the sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction for a crime committed by him or her. Neither class of cases is in point here. The only reason in favor of appellant's contention that seems to us of weight is found in the fact that the beneficiary might be incited to commit murder by the fact that, if unable to collect the benefit himself, it would be...